United States v. Melbert ( 1999 )


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  •                IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
    No. 98-30165
    Summary Calendar
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff-Appellee,
    versus
    VICTOR L. MELBERT,
    Defendant-Appellant.
    - - - - - - - - - -
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Western District of Louisiana
    USDC No. 97-CR-20007-7
    - - - - - - - - - -
    June 3, 1999
    Before KING, Chief Judge, STEWART and PARKER, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:*
    Victor L. Melbert appeals his conviction and sentence for
    conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute cocaine base, in
    violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846, and three counts of distributing
    cocaine base, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1).    On appeal
    Melbert argues that the district court erred because it
    (1) denied his request to exclude two prospective jurors for
    cause; (2) based his sentence on information about cocaine sales
    that lacked sufficient indicia of reliability; and (3) based his
    *
    Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined
    that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent
    except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.
    R. 47.5.4.
    sentence on crack cocaine rather than powder cocaine.
    Melbert did not object to the district court’s denial of his
    motion to exclude prospective jurors for cause.   Consequently, we
    review for plain error.    See United States v. Calverley, 
    37 F.3d 160
    , 162-64 (5th Cir. 1994).   The challenged jurors indicated
    that they understood the rules of law as described by the court
    and that they could be impartial in rendering a verdict.    Melbert
    used his peremptory strikes to exclude both of the challenged
    jurors.   Melbert has failed to demonstrate that the prospective
    jurors’ views would substantially impair their sworn duties as
    jurors.   See Wainwright v. Witt, 
    469 U.S. 412
    , 423 (1985).
    Consequently, the district court did not commit any error when it
    denied Melbert’s challenge.
    Melbert next argues that the district court improperly
    relied on ten cocaine sales, allegedly made by Melbert to James
    Brunson, when it calculated his sentence.   Information about the
    sales was included in the presentence report (PSR).    The district
    court found that the information bore sufficient indicia of
    reliability.    See U.S.S.G. § 6A1.3(a) (the sentencing court may
    consider any relevant information, without regard to its
    admissibility, as long as the court concludes that it has
    sufficient indicia of reliability); see also United States v.
    Alfaro, 
    919 F.2d 962
    , 966 (5th Cir. 1990) (holding that a PSR
    generally bears sufficient indicia of reliability).
    At the sentencing hearing, the probation officer provided
    an explanation of how the information in the PSR was
    corroborated.   See United States v. Narviz-Guerra, 
    148 F.3d 530
    ,
    No. 98-30165
    -3-
    537 (5th Cir. 1998).   The information regarding Melbert’s cocaine
    sales to Brunson is not “mere allegation” or “bald conclusionary
    statements” as argued by Melbert.   As a result, the district
    court did not err in finding that the information in the PSR
    contained sufficient indicia of reliability.
    Finally, Melbert contends that the Government failed to
    prove by a preponderance of evidence that the substance he was
    distributing was crack cocaine rather than some other form of
    cocaine.    See United States v. Lombardi, 
    138 F.3d 559
    , 562 (5th
    Cir. 1998) (holding that the burden of proof at sentencing is a
    preponderance of the evidence).   As this issue was not raised
    before the district court, it is reviewed for plain error.
    United States v. Brewster, 
    137 F.3d 853
    , 856 (5th Cir.), cert.
    denied, 
    119 S. Ct. 247
    (1998).
    There is ample evidence indicating that the substance was
    crack cocaine, including testimony of seven witnesses who all
    specified that Melbert sold them crack cocaine.   Moreover,
    Melbert has not produced any evidence indicating that the
    substance was something other than crack cocaine.   The court did
    not err in its factual conclusion that the substance distributed
    by Melbert was crack cocaine rather than some other form of
    cocaine.    See United States v. Chavez, 
    947 F.2d 742
    , 746 (5th
    Cir. 1991).   Accordingly, Melbert’s conviction and sentence are
    AFFIRMED.