Mohwish v. Yusuff ( 2000 )

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
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No. 99-60379
Summary Calendar
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JOE MOHWISH,
Petitioner-Appellant,
versus
KURSHID Z. YUSUFF, Warden,
Respondent-Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Mississippi
USDC No. 5:99-CV-72-BrS
February 1, 2000
Before DAVIS, EMILIO M. GARZA, and DENNIS, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Joe Mohwish, federal inmate # 02860-032, appeals the district court’s dismissal with prejudice
of his 28 U.S.C. § 2241 petition. Mohwish contends that he was denied due process during prison
disciplinary proceedings and that the disciplinary charge was levied against him in retaliation for his
use of the administrative grievance procedure. We affirm.
The punishments that Mohwish received as a result of the disciplinary proceeding do not
constitute a deprivation of a constitutionally cognizable liberty interest. See Sandin v. Connor, 515
U.S. 472, 485 (1995); Luken v. Scott, 71 F.3d 192, 193 (5th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, Luken v.
Johnson, 517 U.S. 1196 (1996); Orellana v. Kyle, 65 F.3d 29, 31 (5th Cir. 1995); Harper v. Showers,
174 F.3d 716, 718 (5th Cir. 1999). Mohwish’s contention that the infraction disqualifies him from
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be
published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
being eligible to earn extra good time at a minimum security camp placement is too speculative to
create a constitutionally protected liberty interest. See Luken, 71 F.3d at 193 (loss of the opportunity
to earn good-time credits, which might lead to earlier release, was too speculative to create a
constitutionally protected liberty interest). Under 28 U.S.C. § 2243 (1999), the district court did not
err in dismissing Mohwish’s petition.
It is doubtful that Mohwish’s § 2241 petition adequately presented his retaliation claims to
the district court, and we cannot consider claims raised after the district court dismissed Mohwish’s
petition. See Ward v. Whitley, 21 F.3d 1355, 1360 (5th Cir. 1994) (“A habeas petitioner may not add
new constitutional claims to a petition after the district court has entered judgment.”); Behringer v.
Johnson, 75 F.3d 189, 190 (5th Cir. 1996). It is also doubtful that Mohwish’s retaliation claims are
cognizable under § 2241, which authorizes challenges to the legality of a prisoner’s custody. See 28
U.S.C. § 2241 (1999). Nevertheless examining Mohwish’s retaliation claims out of an abundance
of caution, we find that Mohwish fails to state a claim for retaliation because he fails to adequately
show that a retaliatory motive was the but-for cause of the disciplinary charge. See Woods v. Smith,
60 F.3d 1161, 1166 (5th Cir. 1995) (“To state a claim of retaliation an inmate must allege the violation
of a specific constitutional right and be prepared to establish that but for the retaliatory motive the
complained of incident . . . would not have occurred. This places a significant burden on the
inmate.”); Johnson v. Rodriguez, 110 F.3d 299, 313 n.19 (5th Cir. 1997) (“Unless the complained of
action would not have taken place ‘but for’ the retaliatory animus, then the retaliation claim has not
been made out.”) Any retaliation claims made by Mohwish were therefore properly dismissed under
§ 2243.
The district court’s dismissal of Mohwish’s § 2241 petition is AFFIRMED.
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