Eugene v. Alief Independent School Dist. ( 1995 )


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  •                     United States Court of Appeals,
    Fifth Circuit.
    No. 94-20352.
    Beryl EUGENE, Plaintiff-Appellant,
    v.
    ALIEF INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT, Paula Conley and R.F. Griffin,
    Individually and in their Official Capacities, Defendants-
    Appellees.
    Oct. 5, 1995.
    Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern
    District of Texas.
    Before REYNALDO G. GARZA, HIGGINBOTHAM and PARKER, Circuit Judges.
    REYNALDO G. GARZA, Circuit Judge:
    Beryl Eugene filed this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 suit against Alief
    Independent     School   District,    Paula    Conley   and   R.F.    Griffin,
    claiming that she was wrongly arrested and prosecuted in violation
    of her state and federal constitutional rights.                Holding that
    summary judgment in favor of Alief Independent School District was
    proper and that summary judgment in favor of Paula Conley and R.F.
    Griffin was improper, we affirm in part and reverse in part.
    I.
    FACTS
    Beryl Eugene's (Eugene) son attended Landis Elementary School
    in Alief Independent School District (A.I.S.D.) during the 1990-
    1991 school year. On September 28, 1990, Eugene attended a meeting
    at the school concerning her son.            She voiced complaints because
    she believed that her son's placement in a special education
    program   was    racially   motivated—he       is   black,    and    Alief   is
    1
    predominantly white. She also complained that her son's medication
    had been mishandled by school personnel.       Her son's teacher, a
    special education counselor, the assistant principal, and the
    school nurse initially came to the meeting.    The nurse left after
    a short time and the assistant principal, concerned that Eugene was
    angry, summoned the principal, Paula Conley (Conley), and a school
    security officer, R.F. Griffin (Griffin).
    Eugene decided to withdraw her son from school and asked that
    someone go get her son.   The counselor left the conference room to
    get her son from his class.   Eugene stated that she needed to use
    the restroom, left the conference room and started down the hall
    toward the classrooms.    Eugene claims that she did not know that
    the hall led to the classrooms, and that she was simply looking for
    a restroom.    Conley told Griffin to stop Eugene.      Conley then
    pushed Eugene, and again told Griffin to stop her.    Eugene claims
    that, when pushed by Conley, she attempted to explain that she
    simply needed to go to the bathroom.     Griffin then pushed Eugene,
    and Eugene pushed back. Griffin then tripped Eugene, pushed her to
    the ground, and tried to handcuff her.    When she resisted, Griffin
    began to choke her.    She then bit his hand to make him let go of
    her neck.   Griffin then told Eugene that she was under arrest, and
    she allowed him to handcuff her.   Eugene was not aware that Griffin
    was a police officer during the confrontation.
    Eugene was charged with assault on a police officer and found
    guilty by a jury.     The state district judge, however, entered a
    verdict of not guilty as a matter of law.
    2
    Less than one year after her acquittal, Eugene filed suit
    against A.I.S.D., Conley and Griffin in state district court,
    alleging violations of her constitutional rights under the Texas
    and federal constitutions, as well as state common law causes of
    action.1     The defendants removed the case to federal district
    court.      A.I.S.D.,    Conley   and    Griffin   then   moved    for   summary
    judgment     on   five   grounds:       (1)   Eugene   did   not   assert    any
    constitutional violations actionable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983;                (2)
    Eugene could not recover against A.I.S.D. because she did not show
    that an official policy or custom of A.I.S.D. caused her rights to
    be violated;      (2) Conley and Griffin were entitled to qualified
    immunity;     (4) no cause of action existed for violations of the
    Texas state constitution;         and (5) Eugene's claims were barred by
    limitations.      The district court granted Appellees' motion for
    summary judgment on the first four grounds, and entered judgment in
    favor of Appellees.       Eugene appeals from that judgment.
    II.
    STANDARD OF REVIEW
    This is an appeal from a summary judgment.          Our review of the
    record is plenary, International Shortstop, Inc. v. Rally's, 
    939 F.2d 1257
    , 1263 (5th Cir.1991), cert. denied 
    502 U.S. 1059
    , 
    112 S. Ct. 936
    , 
    117 L. Ed. 2d 107
    (1992), and "in reviewing a grant of
    summary judgment we use the same standard used by the district
    1
    Eugene did not appeal the district court's granting of
    summary judgment dismissing her state common law causes of
    action. Thus, the propriety of that dismissal is not before this
    Court.
    3
    court."      Dorsett   v.    Board   of    Trustees   of   State   Colleges   &
    Universities, 
    940 F.2d 121
    , 123 (5th Cir.1991).               "Having delved
    through the record to set forth all of the facts in a light most
    favorable to Sanders, we must now consider whether an application
    of the relevant law to those facts will lead us to the inescapable
    conclusion that Appellees are entitled to judgment in their favor
    as a matter of law."        Sanders v. English, 
    950 F.2d 1152
    , 1159 (5th
    Cir.1992).
    III.
    VALIDITY OF EUGENE'S SECTION 1983 CAUSE OF ACTION
    We first address whether the district court erred in holding
    that Eugene's allegations of malicious prosecution, retaliation,
    false arrest and bodily harm were not actionable under 42 U.S.C. §
    1983 (Section 1983).          Whether such acts are actionable is a
    question of law;       consequently, we apply a de novo standard of
    review.
    This circuit has explicitly held that malicious prosecution,
    false arrest and bodily harm are actionable under Section 1983
    because they violate the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. Sanders
    v. English, 
    950 F.2d 1152
    , 1159 (5th Cir.1992).             See Doe v. Taylor
    Indep. Sch. Dist., 
    15 F.3d 443
    , 450-51 (5th Cir.1994), cert. denied
    --- U.S. ----, 
    115 S. Ct. 70
    , 
    130 L. Ed. 2d 25
    .               Thus, the district
    court erred when it held that such claims were not actionable.
    This case is complicated, however, by the Supreme Court's decision
    in Albright v. Oliver, --- U.S. ----, 
    114 S. Ct. 807
    , 
    127 L. Ed. 2d 114
    (1994), which was decided while the instant case was on appeal.
    4
    Albright held that pretrial deprivations of liberty, such as
    malicious prosecution, are not actionable under the Fourteenth
    Amendment, but left open the possibility that such claims would be
    actionable under the Fourth Amendment.           
    Id. at ----,
    114 S.Ct. at
    813. Because Eugene's Section 1983 claims were based on violations
    of her Fourteenth Amendment rights, her petition no longer states
    a claim after Albright.
    While we do not question Albright, we will not affirm the
    summary judgment based on that case.               Had the district court
    followed this circuit's case law when it decided the motion for
    summary judgment, it would have found that Eugene had a cause of
    action.       When Albright was decided, Eugene would then have been
    able to amend her complaint to base her Section 1983 action on
    violations of the Fourth, rather than the Fourteenth, Amendment.
    Thus,    to    the   extent   that   Eugene's   summary   judgment   evidence
    establishes a fact issue as to whether she can maintain suit
    against Appellees,2 she should be able to amend her complaint to
    base her claims on the Fourth Amendment.
    IV.
    EUGENE'S CLAIMS AGAINST A.I.S.D.
    Eugene's summary judgment evidence failed to create a fact
    issue as to whether A.I.S.D. can be held liable under Section 1983.
    A.I.S.D. cannot be held liable under Section 1983 on a theory of
    2
    Based on our holding in Section IV, infra, Eugene failed to
    create a fact issue as to whether A.I.S.D. can be held liable
    under Section 1983, and therefore cannot amend her complaint as
    to A.I.S.D. on remand.
    5
    respondeat superior for the actions of its employees.    See Monell
    v. Department of Social Services, 
    436 U.S. 658
    , 690-94, 
    98 S. Ct. 2018
    , 2035-37, 
    56 L. Ed. 2d 611
    (1978);    Johnson v. Moore, 
    958 F.2d 92
    , 93 (5th Cir.1992).     Eugene must show that her Constitutional
    rights were violated through the execution of an official policy by
    A.I.S.D.   
    Id. This circuit
    has defined official policy as:
    1. A policy statement, ordinance, regulation, or decision that
    is officially adopted and promulgated by the [district] ... or
    by an official to whom the [district] ha[s] delegated
    policy-making authority; or
    2. A persistent, widespread practice of [district] officials
    or employees, which, although not authorized by officially
    adopted and promulgated policy, is so common and well settled
    as to constitute a custom that fairly represents [district]
    policy. Actual or constructive knowledge of such custom must
    be attributable to the governing body of the district or to an
    official to whom that body had delegated policy-making
    authority.
    
    Johnson, 958 F.2d at 94
    .   Eugene advances two arguments to support
    her claim that her rights were violated by the execution of an
    official A.I.S.D. policy. First, she argues that force is a policy
    of A.I.S.D., and that excessive force is an accepted practice.
    Second, she argues that, under the site-based management philosophy
    adopted by the Texas Education Agency, A.I.S.D. delegated final
    decision-making authority on the Landis school campus to Conley.
    Because Conley ordered Griffin to arrest her, she argues, the
    arrest and subsequent prosecution were official policies of the
    school district.
    Eugene's summary judgment evidence failed to create a fact
    issue as to whether the use of excessive force against parents was
    an official policy of A.I.S.D.   In support of her argument, Eugene
    6
    presented evidence of a school manual allowing teachers to use
    physical force against children that were out of control, and of
    evidence of two alleged incidents of A.I.S.D. officials using
    excessive force against students.      This evidence, however, is only
    indicative of A.I.S.D.'s policy of using force against unruly
    students;     it does not show that A.I.S.D. had a policy to use
    excessive force against parents.
    Eugene also failed to raise a fact issue as to whether Conley
    had the type of final policy-making authority that would subject
    A.I.S.D. to liability under Section 1983.        Only the actions of
    district officials with final policy-making authority subject the
    district to such liability.    St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 
    485 U.S. 112
    ,
    128, 
    108 S. Ct. 915
    , 926-27, 
    99 L. Ed. 2d 107
    (1988).     Whether Conley
    had final policy-making authority is a question of state law.     
    Id. If she
    can show that Conley had such authority, she would also have
    to show that Conley was responsible under state law for making
    policy relating to security decisions.      Eugene failed to make such
    a showing.
    Under Texas law, the final policy-making authority in an
    independent school district rests with the district's board of
    trustees.    Jett v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 
    7 F.3d 1241
    , 1245 (5th
    Cir.1993) (citing Tex.Educ.Code Ann. §§ 23.01 & 23.26(b) & (d)
    (Vernon 1987)).    Eugene failed to create a fact issue as to whether
    A.I.S.D.'s trustees delegated final policy-making authority in the
    area of security to Conley.    Texas law enumerates the duties of a
    principal, and security is not one of them.     See Tex.Educ.Code Ann.
    7
    § 13.352 (Vernon 1991). Moreover, although Texas law provides that
    the principal is to exercise decision-making authority in certain
    areas, even in those areas the principal must follow the guidelines
    and policies established by the school district.             
    Id. Thus, under
    Texas law Conley did not have final policy-making authority for
    security.
    Eugene also failed to create a fact issue as to whether
    A.I.S.D.'s trustees delegated policy-making authority for security
    to Conley.     Eugene's sole support for her delegation theory was a
    bare assertion that, under the Texas Education Agency's site-based
    management philosophy, A.I.S.D. delegated final decision-making
    authority on the Landis campus to Conley.            This bare allegation,
    unsupported by any evidence, is not sufficient to defeat summary
    judgment.      In     any   event,   assuming   arguendo   that    Conley   had
    decision-making authority for security, Eugene does not even argue
    that    she   had    policy-making     authority.     When    an    official's
    discretionary decisions are constrained by policies not of that
    official's making, those policies, rather than the decision-maker's
    departure from them, are the act of the municipality.              
    Jett, 7 F.3d at 1246-51
    .         Thus, Eugene failed to create a fact issue as to
    whether policy-making authority for security was delegated to
    Conley.
    Because Eugene failed to create a fact issue as to whether her
    rights were violated through the execution of an official A.I.S.D.
    policy, summary judgment in favor of A.I.S.D. was proper.                Thus,
    the district court's decision to grant summary judgment in favor or
    8
    A.I.S.D. is affirmed.
    V.
    QUALIFIED IMMUNITY
    The district court erred in holding that Conley and Griffin
    were entitled to qualified immunity.                 Public officials acting
    within the scope of their official duties are shielded from civil
    liability by the doctrine of qualified immunity.                    See Harlow v.
    Fitzgerald, 
    457 U.S. 800
    , 815-19, 
    102 S. Ct. 2727
    , 2736-38, 
    73 L. Ed. 2d 396
    (1982).      However, qualified immunity does not shield a
    public    official      whose    conduct      violates      clearly-established
    constitutional rights, if a reasonable person would have known that
    such conduct was unconstitutional.            Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 
    457 U.S. 800
    , 818, 
    102 S. Ct. 2727
    , 2738, 
    73 L. Ed. 2d 396
    .               To establish that
    Conley and Griffin are not entitled to qualified immunity, Eugene
    must satisfy a three-pronged test.            First, she must show that she
    has asserted a violation of a constitutional right.                     Siegert v.
    Gilley, 
    500 U.S. 226
    , 232, 
    111 S. Ct. 1789
    , 1793, 
    114 L. Ed. 2d 277
    (1992).     Second,     she    must    show   that   this   right    was   clearly
    established at the time of Conley and Griffin's actions.                    
    Id. at 233-34,
    111 S.Ct. at 1794.            Third, she must show that Conley and
    Griffin's actions were objectively unreasonable.                 
    Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818
    , 102 S.Ct. at 2738.
    Eugene    satisfied    this    three-pronged       test.       First,   she
    asserted a violation of a constitutional right, her right under the
    Fourth    and     Fourteenth    Amendments     to    be   free   from    malicious
    prosecution, false arrest and bodily harm.                See Sanders, 
    950 F.2d 9
    at 1159;   
    Doe, 15 F.3d at 450-51
    .    Second, this right was clearly
    established.     This circuit held that she had such a right long
    before the incident in question.     See, e.g., Shaw v. Garrison, 
    467 F.2d 113
    , 120 (5th Cir.1972), cert. denied 
    409 U.S. 1024
    , 
    93 S. Ct. 467
    , 
    34 L. Ed. 2d 317
    .      Finally, the summary judgment evidence
    created a fact issue as to whether Conley and Griffin's actions
    were objectively unreasonable.     Arresting and prosecuting Eugene
    would be objectively unreasonable if Conley and Griffin did not
    have probable cause for the arrest and prosecution.          To have
    probable cause, Conley and Griffin would have to possess knowledge
    that would warrant a prudent person's belief that Eugene had
    already committed or was committing a crime.     See Duckett v. Cedar
    Park, 
    950 F.2d 272
    , 278 (5th Cir.1992).         Griffin's deposition
    testimony, excerpts of which were properly before the district
    court as summary judgment evidence, supports a finding that she was
    committing no crime.    The directed verdict of acquittal likewise
    militates against summary judgment. A reasonable fact finder could
    have concluded, based on this evidence, that she was simply looking
    for a bathroom when Griffin, whom she did not know to be a police
    officer, assaulted her. Thus, the evidence created a fact issue as
    to whether Conley and Griffin had probable cause to arrest and
    prosecute her.
    Because the summary judgment evidence created a fact issue as
    to whether Conley and Griffin were entitled to qualified immunity,
    the court erred in granting summary judgment on that ground. Thus,
    the district court's decision is reversed as to the granting of
    10
    summary judgment against Eugene on her Section 1983 claims against
    Conley and Griffin.
    VI.
    CONSTITUTIONAL TORTS UNDER THE TEXAS CONSTITUTION
    The   district     court   correctly   decided   that   Eugene's
    constitutional tort claims under Article I, Section 19 of the Texas
    Constitution were unmeritorious.        Whether Eugene made out such a
    cause of action is a question of law, which we will review de novo.
    Texas does not appear to recognize violations of its constitution
    as an independent tort.    One Texas Court of Appeals has stated that
    "Texas has a strong bill of rights, but ... no Texas statute or
    case ... provides a citizen the kind of redress afforded by 42
    U.S.C. § 1983 or by Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the
    Federal Bureau of Narcotics.       There is no state constitutional
    tort." Bagg v. University of Texas Medical Branch, 
    726 S.W.2d 582
    ,
    584 n. 1 (Tex.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1987, writ ref'd n.r.e.)
    (citations omitted). See also City of Houston v. Leach, 
    819 S.W.2d 185
    (Tex.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1991, no writ).       But see Jones
    v. Memorial Hosp. Sys., 
    746 S.W.2d 891
    (Tex.App.—Houston [1st
    Dist.] 1988, no writ).    This circuit has not passed on the question
    of whether an actionable "state constitutional tort" exists under
    Texas law, and we need not pass on the issue in this case.          In
    Gillum v. City of Kerrville, 
    3 F.3d 117
    , 122 (5th Cir.1993), cert.
    denied --- U.S. ----, 
    114 S. Ct. 881
    , 
    127 L. Ed. 2d 76
    , we held that,
    even if such a "tort" exists, Texas law would not allow government
    employees to be sued for exercising their discretionary authority.
    11
    Because the evidence is uncontroverted that Conley and Griffin were
    acting within their discretionary authority—that is, as a principal
    and as a security guard—the district court properly held that they
    were immune to any suit under state law, including one based on the
    Texas Constitution.      
    Id. See Tex.Educ.Code
    Ann. § 21.912 (Vernon
    1987).
    VII.
    LIMITATIONS
    As an additional ground for affirming the summary judgment,
    Appellees argue that the statute of limitations had run before
    Eugene filed suit.           Her Section 1983 claims are subject to a
    two-year statute of limitations.            See Wilson v. Garcia, 
    471 U.S. 261
    ,    279,   
    105 S. Ct. 1938
    ,   1948-49,   
    85 L. Ed. 2d 254
      (1985);
    Tex.Civ.Prac. & Rem.Code Ann. § 16.003(a) (Vernon 1986).                Those
    claims arise from events that occurred on September 28, 1990, and
    she did not file her original suit in state court until December 9,
    1992.    However, because she could not file suit based on malicious
    prosecution until December 10, 1991, when she was acquitted from
    the criminal charges against her, Eugene's cause of action did not
    accrue until she was acquitted.         See Johnson v. Louisiana Dept. of
    Agriculture, 
    18 F.3d 318
    , 320-21 (5th Cir.1994). Because less than
    two years elapsed between the accrual of her claim and the date she
    filed her original petition in state court, her Section 1983 claims
    are not barred by limitations.
    VIII.
    CONCLUSION
    12
    We affirm the district court's summary judgment in favor of
    Alief I.S.D. and dismissing Eugene's state constitutional tort
    claims against Conley and Griffin, reverse and remand the district
    court's summary judgment in favor of Conley and Griffin insofar as
    it dismissed Eugene's 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims against them, and
    order the trial court to allow Eugene to amend her complaint to
    bring her 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims under the Fourth Amendment.
    AFFIRMED IN PART AND REVERSED IN PART.
    13