United States v. Sanford ( 1995 )


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  •                IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
    __________________
    No. 95-10091
    Conference Calendar
    __________________
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff-Appellee,
    versus
    PHILLIP DWAYNE SANFORD,
    Defendant-Appellant.
    - - - - - - - - - -
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Northern District of Texas
    USDC No. 3:94CR00212
    - - - - - - - - - -
    (October 17, 1995)
    Before POLITZ, Chief Judge, and REAVLEY and SMITH, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:*
    Phillip Sanford appeals his sentence following his
    conviction of making a false statement to a firearms dealer in
    connection with the acquisition of a firearm.
    The district court did not err by including the short-
    barreled shotgun in its calculation of Sanford's base offense
    level.   First, the term "instant offense" in the Sentencing
    Guidelines includes relevant conduct.     See United States v.
    Harris, 
    932 F.2d 1529
    , 1538-39 (5th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 
    502 U.S. 897
    & 917 (1991), and cert. denied, 
    502 U.S. 1049
    (1992);
    *
    Local Rule 47.5 provides: "The publication of opinions
    that have no precedential value and merely decide particular
    cases on the basis of well-settled principles of law imposes
    needless expense on the public and burdens on the legal
    profession." Pursuant to that Rule, the court has determined
    that this opinion should not be published.
    No. 95-10091
    -2-
    U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3, comment. (backg'd.)       Second, the relevant
    guideline provides for an offense level of 22 "if the defendant
    had one prior felony conviction of either a crime of violence or
    a controlled substance offense, and the instant offense involved
    a firearm listed in 26 U.S.C. § 5854(a)[.]"       § 2K2.1(a)(3).
    Sanford's shotgun satisfies the definition of a firearm in 26
    U.S.C. § 5845(a).
    Sanford's offense is subject to grouping under the
    guidelines.    § 3D1.2.   Conduct that is relevant to an offense
    subject to grouping includes those acts "that were part of the
    same course of conduct or common scheme or plan as the offense of
    conviction."    § 1B1.3(a)(2).
    Sanford purchased the 9mm. pistol on January 23.       Police saw
    several firearms at Sanford's residence on January 27 and seized
    the short-barreled shotgun from the residence on January 31.
    Sanford possessed the pistol and the shotgun simultaneously.
    Because he was a convicted felon, Sanford was prohibited from
    possessing any firearm or ammunition.       18 U.S.C.
    § 922(g)(1).    Sanford's simultaneous possession of the pistol and
    shotgun are sufficiently related for the possession of the
    shotgun to be relevant to Sanford's conviction for making a false
    statement on the BATF form.
    Next, the guidelines do not prohibit double-counting "``where
    a single act is relevant to two dimensions of the Guideline
    analysis.'"    United States v. Kings, 
    981 F.2d 790
    , 796 (5th Cir.
    1993)(citation omitted), cert. denied, 
    113 S. Ct. 1323
    (1993).       A
    previous conviction may be relevant to determine both a
    No. 95-10091
    -3-
    defendant's offense level and his criminal history score.      
    Id. at 796-97.
      Sanford's robbery conviction was relevant to his base
    offense level, which was based in part on his status as a
    convicted felon.   See § 2K2.1(a)(3).   The conviction also was
    relevant to Sanford's criminal history score.     See § 4A1.1(a).
    The double-counting of Sanford's robbery conviction was
    permissible under the guidelines.
    Additionally, "[r]eview of sentences imposed under the
    guidelines is limited to a determination whether the sentence was
    imposed in violation of law, as a result of an incorrect
    application of the sentencing guidelines, or was outside of the
    applicable guideline range and was unreasonable."      United States
    v. Matovsky, 
    935 F.2d 719
    , 721 (5th Cir. 1991).    A district court
    need not provide any reason for sentencing a defendant to a
    particular point within the applicable guideline range if the
    spread of that range is less than 24 months.     
    Id. Sanford's guideline
    sentencing range was 46 to 57 months, an 11-month
    spread.   See § 5A, Sentencing Table.   Sanford's 57-month sentence
    was within the applicable guideline range.   The district court
    need not have provided any reason for selecting that penalty.
    The reason offered by the district court, Sanford's criminal
    past, was not an illegal consideration or a misapplication of the
    guidelines.   See United States v. Webb, 
    950 F.2d 226
    , 231-32 (5th
    Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 
    504 U.S. 961
    (1992).
    AFFIRMED.