Jones v. Metropolitan Life Insurance , 119 F. App'x 635 ( 2005 )

United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
F I L E D
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
January 4, 2005
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
Charles R. Fulbruge III
Clerk
No. 04-10090
Summary Calendar
ANGIE JONES,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
METROPOLITAN LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY,
Defendant-
Appellee.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Texas
USDC No. 3:03-CV-397-H
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Before WIENER, BENAVIDES AND STEWART, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Angie Jones appeals the summary judgment dismissal of her lawsuit against Metropolitan Life
Insurance Company (“MetLife”), alleging the unlawful denial of benefits under her former employer’s
Long Term Disability Plan (“the Plan”). The district court’s award of summary judgment is reviewed
de novo. Guillory v. Domtar Indus., Inc., 95 F.3d 1320, 1326 (5th Cir. 1996). The underlying
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be
published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.
R. 47.5.4.
decision by MetLife to deny benefits is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. See Meditrust Fin. Servs.
Corp. v. Sterling Chems., Inc., 168 F.3d 211, 213 (5th Cir. 1999).
Jones has not demonstrated any material factual dispute regarding whether MetLife abused
its discretion in denying her benefits which precluded summary judgment. She does not renew her
argument that MetLife was bound by the Social Security Administration’s determination that she was
disabled, and that argument is thus waived. See Yohey v. Collins, 985 F.2d 222, 224-25 (5th Cir.
1993). Jones argues, for the first time on appeal, that because MetLife was both the insurer of the
Plan and the fiduciary entrusted with complete discretion to decide whether to pay a claim for
benefits, it operated under an impermissible conflict of interest which the district court failed to
consider. However, this court will not entertain this newly raised argument. See Stewart Glass &
Mirror, Inc. v. U.S. Auto Glass Discount Centers, Inc., 200 F.3d 307, 316-17 (5th Cir. 2000).
Jones next contends that the district court erred in failing to consider the documentary
evidence she submitted in opposition to summary judgment on the ground that it was not part of the
administrative record. She argues that, if the district court had considered her evidence, it would
have found disputed issues of material fact regarding whet her she met the definition of “disabled”
under the Plan.
Jones’s argument is unavailing. The documents she submitted in support of her opposition
to summary judgment were not part of the administrative record, were not relevant to how MetLife
interpreted the terms of the Plan in the past, and offered no assistance to the district court in
understanding medical terminology or practice. Instead, the documents were introduced to resolve
factual disputes with respect to the merits of Jones’s claim. Consequently, the district court did not
err in refusing to consider them. See Estate of Bratton v. Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co., 215 F.3d 516,
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521 (5th Cir. 2000); Vega v. Nat’l Life Ins. Servs., Inc., 188 F.3d 287, 299-300 (5th Cir. 1999) (en
banc).
The undisputed facts demonstrate that MetLife’s determination that Jones was not disabled
within the meaning of the Plan was not arbitrary and was supported by substantial evidence, and the
district court did not err in granting summary judgment dismissing Jones’s claims. See Meditrust, 168
F.3d at 213-14. Accordingly, the district court’s judgment is AFFIRMED.
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