Clarise v. Gonzales , 161 F. App'x 409 ( 2006 )

United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
F I L E D
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
For the Fifth Circuit January 6, 2006
Charles R. Fulbruge III
Clerk
No. 04-60893
Summary Calendar
MANKA BIH CLARISE,
Petitioner
VERSUS
ALBERTO R. GONZALES, ATTORNEY GENERAL,
Respondent
On Petition for Review of an Order of
the Board of Immigration Appeals
Before JOLLY, DAVIS, and OWEN, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Manka Bih Clarise, petitioner, seeks review of a final order
of the Board of Immigration Appeals (“Board”) affirming an order of
the immigration court denying her application for political asylum.
For the following reasons, we affirm.
I.
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the Court has determined that this
opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under
the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
Petitioner is a native of Cameroon and entered the United
States under a business visa that was obtained under the pretense
that she was a model hired to work at a fashion show in Atlanta,
Georgia. She overstayed her visa and she concedes removability
under INA § 237(a)((1)(B), 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(1)(B). Petitioner now
seeks asylum in this country and withholding of removal on grounds
that she has suffered past persecution in Cameroon on account of
her political affiliation with the Southern Cameroon National
Council (“SCNC”). The immigration judge denied Clarise’s petition
for asylum because he had “reason to doubt the respondent’s
veracity due to the fact that her testimony was implausible and
internally inconsistent.” Petitioner appeals, arguing that the
immigration judge’s order was not supported by substantial
evidence.
II.
We ordinarily review orders of the Board of Immigration of
Appeals (“BIA”), not the immigration judge (“IJ”). In the instant
case, however, the BIA affirmed the IJ’s order without opinion; we
therefore review the findings of the IJ. See Chun v. INS, 40 F.3d
76, 78 (5th Cir.1994). We review the administrative findings of
fact as conclusive unless any reasonable adjudicator would be
compelled to conclude to the contrary. Id. Thus, we may not
reverse the agency’s factual determinations unless we “find not
only that the evidence supports a contrary conclusion, but that it
compels it.” Id.2
The IJ found the petitioner was not credible for several
reasons. First, he found Clarise’s testimony that her father was
being sought by the government as a member of the SCNC in conflict
with an official document submitted by Clarise stating that
authorities were not actually seeking out members of the SCNC.
Second, the IJ found the fact that petitioner’s application for
asylum stated that she joined another militant political group
known as CAM (Cameroon Anglafone Movement), was inconsistent with
the fact that she made no mention of joining CAM in her testimony
before the IJ. Third, the judge found inconsistencies in
petitioner’s testimony and application with the supporting
documents she submitted regarding an incident in which she was
purportedly beaten. Fourth, he found her statement that she was a
leader of the youth wing of the SCNC inconsistent with her
testimony that she was a public relations person for the SCNC.
Fifth, petitioner testified that she had been kidnapped and that
after her release, she ran to her uncle’s house a mile away. The
statement attached to her application, however, stated that the
individuals who freed her, took her home. Finally, the IJ found no
plausible explanation for petitioner’s failure to produce the
testimony of her uncle who lived in Texas.
Under the very deferential standard we afford to the trier of
fact, we conclude that the IJ’s credibility finding was reasonable
based on the record and was supported by substantial evidence. We
therefore deny the petition for review.
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