Couch v. Cro-Marine Transport, Inc. ( 1995 )


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  •                  United States Court of Appeals,
    Fifth Circuit.
    No. 93-3902.
    Ray COUCH, III, Plaintiff-Appellee,
    v.
    CRO-MARINE TRANSPORT, INC., et al., Defendants,
    James J. Flanagan Shipping Corporation, Defendant-Appellant.
    BERISFORD METALS CORPORATION, d/b/a Erlanger & Co., Third-Party
    Plaintiff,
    v.
    CENTRAL ILLINOIS DOCK COMPANY, Third-Party Defendant Intervenor-
    Appellee,
    v.
    JAMES J. FLANAGAN SHIPPING CORPORATION, Third-Party Defendant-
    Appellant.
    Feb. 13, 1995.
    Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
    District of Louisiana.
    Before GARWOOD, JOLLY and STEWART, Circuit Judges.
    GARWOOD, Circuit Judge:
    Plaintiff-appellee longshoreman Ray Couch (Couch) filed this
    suit against Cro-Marine-Transport (Cro-Marine), Berisford Metals
    Corporation/Erlanger and Company (Erlanger), and James J. Flanagan
    Shipping Corporation, d/b/a New Orleans Stevedoring Company (NOSC),
    for injuries sustained while unloading steel cargo from a Cro-
    Marine barge in Peoria, Illinois.    Erlanger was the owner of the
    steel cargo, and NOSC was the stevedore that loaded the steel into
    the barges in the port of New Orleans.     After the district court
    1
    dismissed   the      claims   against    Cro-Marine    and   Erlanger,     Couch
    proceeded with his suit against NOSC and recovered a $1,722,640
    judgment in a bench trial.              Defendant-appellant NOSC appeals,
    raising several factual and legal issues.                We affirm in part,
    vacate in part, and remand.
    Facts and Proceedings Below
    Couch,    a   longshoreman   employed    by     Central   Illinois    Dock
    Company (CIDC), was injured while discharging steel cargo from Cro-
    Marine barge VL-8141 in Peoria, Illinois, on December 14, 1987.               As
    a result of his injuries, Couch's leg was amputated above the knee.
    The steel destined for Peoria had arrived in the port of New
    Orleans aboard the M/V UCKA.            Thereafter, the owners of the M/V
    UCKA hired NOSC to discharge the M/V UCKA and transload the steel
    cargo onto three Cro-Marine barges, including barge VL-8141, for
    the trip upriver to Peoria.        The steel cargo consisted of bundles
    of steel billets of various sizes, steel coils, and steel bars.
    Chander Gorowara, an independent marine surveyor hired by the
    cargo owner Erlanger, inspected and photographed the steel cargo in
    New Orleans while it was stacked in a wharf storage shed and again
    after NOSC loaded it into the barges bound for Peoria.                     These
    photographs, introduced into evidence at trial, show the condition
    of the cargo and its stow in the barges bound for Peoria.                     As
    depicted by the photographs of the stow in the storage shed, NOSC
    neatly stacked the steel bundles in tiers with wood dunnage placed
    between the layers.       By contrast, the photographs of the stow in
    the   barges,       particularly   barge    VL-8141,     reveal    that     NOSC
    2
    haphazardly dumped irregular piles of steel into the barges.
    Several of the piles were dropped in the barge at an angle instead
    of being stacked to provide a walking surface for the discharging
    stevedore. Moreover, NOSC used dunnage irregularly and as a bridge
    to support the weight of the steel instead of its intended use as
    a separation.1
    Tugs accompanied the unmanned barges on the voyage upriver to
    Peoria.    Erlanger hired CIDC, a Peoria stevedoring company with
    over thirty years' experience on the Illinois River, to discharge
    the steel from the barges to trucks for shipment to the Caterpillar
    Truck Company, also in Peoria.            Ninety-five percent of CIDC's
    business consists of discharging vessels, and steel accounts for
    about ninety percent of the cargo it unloads.               After personally
    inspecting the barges, Daniel McNally (McNally), the owner and
    president of CIDC, described the stow as one of the worst barge
    loads he had ever seen.      There were four or five distinct piles of
    steel    bundles   jammed   against   each   other   with    broken   dunnage
    throughout the barge.       McNally noticed bundles not separated by
    dunnage and overhanging bundles ready to fall over.
    CIDC had more experience in discharging steel cargo than any
    other stevedore in the area.          McNally decided that CIDC would
    proceed carefully to discharge the steel from the barges.             McNally
    assigned a crew consisting of a crane operator, two laborers, one
    1
    The district court observed that NOSC was paid to discharge
    the M/V UCKA at a fixed price per metric ton rather than at an
    hourly rate, thus providing an incentive to load the barges as
    quickly as possible.
    3
    of whom was Couch, a superintendent, and a truck driver to unload
    the barge.   At the time of the accident, Couch had three months of
    experience unloading barges.           Cohenour, the laborer assisting
    Couch, had one and one-half years of experience.
    The   unloading     operation    consisted    of   the   crane   operator
    lowering a block with two attached choker chains into the cargo
    area. Cohenour and Couch, positioned at either end of the piles of
    steel, would wrap the choker chains around the ends of the bundle
    of steel billets to be unloaded.            At this point, Cohenour would
    signal the crane operator to lift the bundles out of the barge and
    onto the truck.
    Due   to    the    haphazard    dump   stow   of   the   steel   and   the
    insufficient and improper use of dunnage, Couch and Cohenour had
    difficulty getting the chains around the bundles and needed to use
    pry bars to lift up the bundles so that the chains could be placed
    around the ends.       Moreover, the crane operator occasionally had to
    pick up one end of a bundle so that chains could be placed around
    the other end.    This operation proceeded for some twenty-one hours
    until only eight bundles, located in the starboard bow of barge VL-
    8141, remained to be unloaded.        These bundles were leaning against
    the rake of the bow and were arranged so that there were three
    bundles on the bottom, two in the middle, and three on the top, the
    weight of the top three bundles being supported by the two bundles
    in the middle.
    Couch and Cohenour then attempted to unload two of the top
    bundles positioned closest to them.           Because these bundles were
    4
    pressed against the rake of the bow, the crane operator lifted one
    end of either one or two of these bundles and set them down.
    Couch, who was closest to the bow, was trying to wrap the chains
    around the ends of the two bundles when he heard a crack.         A one
    and one-half to four ton bundle of steel billets fell and crushed
    Couch's left leg.    At the time of the accident, the crane operator
    was still awaiting a signal from Cohenour.
    After    five   unsuccessful       surgical   procedures,   Couch's
    physicians amputated his leg above the knee.          Since the initial
    amputation, Couch has undergone additional surgery, including stump
    revision, bringing the total number of surgeries to fourteen at the
    time of the district court judgment.       Couch now wears a prosthetic
    device, which requires maintenance and regular part replacement due
    to his active lifestyle.    Couch suffers severe ghost pains in his
    leg and has also endured back and knee pain due to the pressure his
    activities place on those muscles.        Couch was twenty-seven years
    old at the time of his injury.      Prior to the accident, he had led
    a very active life, was a black belt in karate and an amateur boxer
    aspiring to turn professional.      Before the accident, Couch worked
    approximately forty hours per week earning $9.25 per hour.
    At his own initiative and expense, Couch enrolled in community
    college after the accident to train for another career as a diesel
    mechanic.    In December 1992, he returned to work for CIDC as a
    diesel mechanic, eventually working twenty-four hours each week at
    $11.25 per hour, approximately the same hourly rate he would be
    earning if he had not been injured.      Shortly after starting work as
    5
    a   diesel    mechanic,   Couch's      condition       forced   him   to   take   off
    approximately one month.          Couch still hopes to work five days a
    week, but that will depend upon the strain such a schedule puts on
    his body.
    Couch originally filed suit in the United States District
    Court for the Central District of Illinois against Cro-Marine, the
    owner of the barge, and Erlanger, the owner of the steel cargo.                    He
    subsequently amended his complaint to name NOSC as a defendant.
    After NOSC objected to venue in the Central District of Illinois,
    the entire proceeding was transferred to the Eastern District of
    Louisiana.      Prior to trial, the district court granted Cro-Marine
    and Erlanger's motions for summary judgment and dismissed them from
    the action.       NOSC filed a third-party complaint against CIDC
    seeking indemnity and contribution.                CIDC also remained in the
    litigation as an intervenor seeking to recover amounts paid to or
    on behalf of Couch under the Illinois Workers' Compensation Act
    (IWCA).
    After a bench trial, the district court entered a judgment
    against NOSC awarding Couch $1,722,640.                    This award included
    $134,225 for past medical and prosthesis expenses, $150,000 for
    future medical and prosthesis expenses, $88,415 for past wage
    losses,      $200,000   for     future    loss    of    earning    capacity,      and
    $1,150,000 for physical pain and suffering, disability, impairment,
    and mental anguish.       Because Couch received IWCA benefits from his
    employer CIDC, the district court held that CIDC was entitled to
    recover from      his   award    the     amount   spent    on   medical    expenses
    6
    ($134,225) and the compensation benefits paid ($71,105), subject to
    a credit of 25% attorneys' fees in favor of Couch and his counsel.
    Finally, the district court awarded interest from the date of the
    entry of the judgment on the award of future medical expenses and
    future loss of earning capacity.                   On the past medical expenses,
    past lost wages and the $1,115,000 pain and suffering award, the
    district court awarded interest from the date of the injury.
    Discussion
    I. Applicability of Scindia
    The Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act (LHWCA)
    establishes a comprehensive framework to provide a federal workers'
    compensation       program      for   longshoremen          injured     or   killed    in
    job-related accidents. 
    33 U.S.C. §§ 901-950
    ; Gilmore & Black, The
    Law of Admiralty 408-412 (1975). The 1972 congressional amendments
    to the LHWCA "were the first significant effort to reform the 1927
    Act   and   the    judicial      gloss      that    had    been   attached     to     it."
    Northeast Marine Terminal Co. v. Caputo, 
    432 U.S. 249
    , 261, 
    97 S.Ct. 2348
    , 2356, 
    53 L.Ed.2d 320
     (1977).                   Prior to 1972, an injured
    longshoreman could receive benefits from his stevedore-employer
    under LHWCA       and    also   recover      damages       from   the   shipowner     for
    injuries caused by the negligence or unseaworthiness of the vessel
    being serviced.         Gilmore & Black, The Law of Admiralty 411 (1975).
    In order to prevail in an unseaworthiness cause of action, the
    longshoreman did not have to prove fault on the part of the
    shipowner    but    only     needed    to    show     an    unsafe,     injury-causing
    condition on the vessel.           Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki, 
    328 U.S.
                       7
    85, 
    66 S.Ct. 872
    , 
    90 L.Ed. 1099
     (1946).                       Under the Sieracki
    doctrine, a shipowner could be held liable even if the stevedore
    created or caused the injury-causing condition. See, e.g., Crumady
    v. The Joachim Hendrik Fisser, 
    358 U.S. 423
    , 
    79 S.Ct. 445
    , 
    3 L.Ed.2d 413
     (1959).2        Moreover, the shipowner thus held liable to
    the longshoreman could maintain an indemnity action against the
    stevedore for breach of an implied or express warranty to handle
    the cargo in a reasonably safe manner.                    Ryan Stevedoring Co. v.
    Pan-Atlantic S.S. Corp., 
    350 U.S. 124
    , 
    76 S.Ct. 232
    , 
    100 L.Ed. 133
    (1956).
    The Supreme Court has described the 1972 amendments as a
    legislative      compromise    between         three   groups:     (1)     shipowners
    dissatisfied with decisions permitting longshoremen compensated
    under LHWCA to recover in unseaworthiness actions;                  (2) stevedores
    subject     to   indemnification      suits          by   vessel   owners;        (3)
    longshoremen seeking increased compensation benefits.                       Northeast
    Marine    Terminal   Co.,     
    432 U.S. at 263-65
    ,   
    97 S.Ct. at 2357
    .
    Discussing the 1972 amendments, the Supreme Court has stated, "The
    design of these changes was to shift more of the responsibility for
    compensating injured longshoremen to the party best able to prevent
    injuries:    the stevedore-employer."               Howlett v. Birkdale Shipping
    Co., S.A., --- U.S. ----, ----, 
    114 S.Ct. 2057
    , 2063, 
    129 L.Ed.2d 78
     (1994).
    2
    In Usner v. Luckenbach Overseas Corp., 
    400 U.S. 494
    , 
    91 S.Ct. 514
    , 
    27 L.Ed.2d 562
     (1971), the Supreme Court held that a
    single act of operational negligence by the stevedore did not
    render the vessel unseaworthy.
    8
    The    legislative       compromise     incorporated       in   the     1972
    amendments       radically    reformulated       the    triangular     relationship
    between    vessel    owners,       stevedores,    and     longshoremen.         First,
    Congress        substantially      increased      the     benefits     payable      to
    longshoremen under the LHWCA. Second, the amendments abolished the
    longshoreman's        right     to    recover      from     the   shipowner       for
    unseaworthiness.        Finally, Congress eliminated the stevedore's
    obligation to indemnify the shipowner if it was held liable for
    damages suffered by the longshoreman.              Gilmore & Black, The Law of
    Admiralty 411 (1975).          The 1972 amendments, however, preserved a
    longshoreman's       right    to     recover    from    the   vessel      owner    for
    negligence.       
    33 U.S.C. § 905
    (b).3         Because Congress did not recite
    the acts or omissions of a vessel that would amount to negligence,
    the scope of the duty owed by a vessel to longshoremen was left to
    "be resolved through the application of accepted principles of tort
    law and the ordinary process of litigation." H.R.Rep. No. 92-1441,
    92nd Cong., 2nd Sess. (1972), reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4698,
    4704.    In Scindia Steam Navigation Co. v. De Los Santos, 
    451 U.S. 3
    33 U.S.C. § 905
    (b) provides:
    "In the event of injury to a person covered under this
    chapter caused by the negligence of a vessel, then such
    person, or anyone otherwise entitled to recover damages
    by reason thereof, may bring an action against such
    vessel as a third party in accordance with the
    provisions of section 933 of this title, and the
    employer shall not be liable to the vessel for such
    damages directly or indirectly and any agreements or
    warranties to the contrary shall be void.... The
    liability of the vessel under this subsection shall not
    be based upon the warranty of seaworthiness or a breach
    thereof at the time the injury occurred."
    9
    156, 
    101 S.Ct. 1614
    , 
    68 L.Ed.2d 1
     (1981), the Court articulated the
    scope of a shipowner's duty to longshoremen under section 905(b)
    and outlined three general duties shipowners owe to longshoremen.
    This Court has summarized the three scenarios under which a vessel
    owner may be liable under Scindia:
    "1) if the vessel owner fails to warn on turning over the ship
    of hidden defects of which he should have known.
    2) for injury caused by hazards under the control of the ship.
    3) if the vessel owner fails to intervene in the stevedore's
    operations when he has actual knowledge both of the hazard and
    that the stevedore, in the exercise of "obviously improvident'
    judgment means to work on in the face of it and therefore
    cannot be relied on to remedy it." Pimental v. LTD Canadian
    Pacific BUL, 
    965 F.2d 13
    , 15 (5th Cir.1992) (citations
    omitted).
    NOSC   argues   that     the   duty     a   loading    stevedore     owes   a
    discharging longshoreman is equivalent to the duty a shipowner owes
    a longshoreman under Scindia.           NOSC asserts that it cannot be
    liable under Scindia because its stow constituted an open and
    obvious condition, therefore not triggering a breach of the first
    Scindia duty to warn of hidden defects.            Scindia does hold that in
    a suit under section 905(b) by a longshoreman against a shipowner,
    the vessel's duty does not extend to open and obvious conditions.
    Scindia, 
    451 U.S. at 172-74
    , 
    101 S.Ct. at 1625
    .             The district court
    refused to apply Scindia, citing crucial differences between the
    position of   the    vessel    owner   in     relation     to   the   discharging
    longshoremen and the position of the loading stevedore in relation
    to the discharging longshoremen.            We hold that the district court
    was correct for several reasons.
    NOSC argues that Scindia applies to the facts of this case and
    10
    establishes that it owed no duty to protect Couch or any other
    discharging longshoreman from open and obvious hazards.           Scindia
    involved a suit by an injured longshoreman against a shipowner
    under section 905(b), the longshoreman's statutory right to recover
    from the vessel owner for negligence as preserved in the 1972
    amendments.   The LHWCA defines the term "vessel" to mean "any
    vessel upon which or in connection with which any person entitled
    to benefits under this chapter suffers injury or death arising out
    of or in the course of his employment, and said vessel's owner,
    owner pro hac vice, agent, operator, charter or bare boat charter,
    master, officer, or crew member."       
    33 U.S.C. § 902
    (21).     Although
    Couch originally asserted a section 905(b) claim against Cro-Marine
    as the owner of the unmanned barges, the district court granted
    Cro-Marine's motion for summary judgment on the grounds that it
    breached no duty owed to Couch under Scindia, thereby eliminating
    section 905(b) from the suit.4         NOSC, the onloading stevedore,
    remained in   the   litigation   as   the   sole   defendant,   and   Couch
    proceeded with his cause of action against NOSC under the general
    maritime law as provided for in the pretrial order.
    In its supplemental brief and at oral argument on appeal, NOSC
    contends that Howlett v. Birkdale Shipping Co., --- U.S. ----, 
    114 S.Ct. 2057
    , 
    129 L.Ed.2d 78
     (1994), strongly reinforces its argument
    that the Scindia standard should govern the relationship between
    4
    In the same order, the district court granted defendant
    Erlanger's motion for summary judgment on the ground that a cargo
    owner owed no duty with respect to the cargo operations. Couch
    did not appeal the district court's order dismissing Erlanger and
    Cro-Marine.
    11
    the onloading stevedore and the discharging longshoremen.       The
    issue addressed by the Court in Howlett, a section 905(b) suit
    against a shipowner, was the scope of a shipowner's duty to warn of
    latent hazards in the cargo stow.    Although Howlett elaborates the
    scope of the first Scindia duty, it does not help NOSC overcome the
    insurmountable hurdle of applying the Scindia standard to a case
    involving a suit by an injured longshoreman against a loading
    stevedore.   Scindia and Howlett are section 905(b) cases brought
    against shipowners and do not support NOSC's contention that the
    Scindia standard should apply in this case, a negligence suit under
    the general maritime law against a party other than the vessel
    owner.
    The facts in this case may be somewhat unusual because they
    involve a domestic onloading stevedore (NOSC) loading a stow which
    causes injury to a domestic discharging longshoreman (Couch).
    Perhaps more typically, the vessel being unloaded by the injured
    longshoreman will have been loaded by a foreign stevedore over whom
    the discharging longshoreman is unable to obtain jurisdiction, and
    the injured discharging longshoreman hence sues only the vessel
    owner for negligence under section 905(b). See Howlett v. Birkdale
    Shipping Co., S.A., --- U.S. ----, 
    114 S.Ct. 2057
    , 
    129 L.Ed.2d 78
    (1994) (section 905(b) suit by discharging longshoreman injured
    when he slipped on a plastic sheet improperly placed in the stow by
    the loading stevedore in Ecuador);    Woods v. Sammisa Co., 
    873 F.2d 842
     (5th Cir.1989), cert. denied, 
    493 U.S. 1050
    , 
    110 S.Ct. 853
    , 
    107 L.Ed.2d 847
     (1990) (section 905(b) suit against shipowner by
    12
    longshoreman injured while unloading steel pipes improperly loaded
    by stevedore in Brazil);      Clay v. Lykes Bros. S.S. Co., 
    525 F.Supp. 306
     (E.D.La.1981) (section 905(b) suit against vessel owner by two
    longshoremen injured while unloading cargo negligently loaded by
    stevedores in London).5
    The facts of this case give rise to an important distinction
    between vessel owners and stevedores.        The Court in Scindia held
    that a vessel owner has "no general duty by way of supervision or
    inspection   to   exercise    reasonable   care   to   discover   dangerous
    conditions that develop within the confines of the cargo operations
    that are assigned to the stevedore."       Scindia, 
    451 U.S. at 172
    , 
    101 S.Ct. at 1624
    .    As support for this rule, the Court discussed at
    great length the fact that the stevedore is the expert in cargo
    operations hired by the nonexpert shipowner.           Id. at 168-74, 
    101 S.Ct. at 1623-1625
    .     Accordingly, the Court in Scindia described
    "the justifiable expectations of the vessel that the stevedore
    would perform with reasonable competence and see to the safety of
    the cargo operations."       Id. at 172, 
    101 S.Ct. at 1624
    .6
    5
    The court in Clay stated "[t]here is no question but that
    parties who are not before the court, the riggers in London who
    tied the cable and the stevedores who placed the bundles of pipe
    on top of the cable, were negligent and that this negligence was
    a cause of the resultant accident and injuries to plaintiffs."
    525 F.Supp. at 308.
    6
    The indemnity cases decided before the 1972 amendments
    reason that "the stevedore was in the best position to avoid
    accidents during cargo operations and that the shipowner could
    rely on the stevedore's warranty to perform competently." Id.
    Section 41 of the LHWCA mandates that the stevedore provide its
    employees with a reasonably safe work place and implement
    safeguards necessary to prevent injuries. Further, 
    33 U.S.C. § 941
    (a). 
    33 U.S.C. § 941
    (a) also authorizes the Secretary of
    13
    In Scindia and Howlett the Court considered the relationship
    between and roles of the stevedore-employer and the vessel owner.
    Emphasizing the role of the stevedore-employer as a specialist in
    cargo operations on one side and the nonexpert vessel on the other
    side, the Court reasoned that, as between these two parties, the
    stevedore-employer was in the best position to prevent injuries to
    longshoremen.     Unlike the shipowner in Scindia, NOSC, as loading
    stevedore, is indeed an expert in cargo operations, thus creating
    a very different relationship, with experts in stevedoring on both
    sides.      Therefore, the reasoning of the Court in Scindia for
    crafting a limited scope of liability for the nonexpert vessel
    based on the justifiable expectations of the shipowner does not
    logically apply to the facts of this case.     Accordingly, based on
    the facts of this case, the onloading stevedore was in the best
    position to avoid creating a dangerous stow and therefore may be
    held liable for any injuries suffered by discharging longshoremen
    caused by its negligent stow.7
    Labor to promulgate regulations to protect the life, health, and
    safety of longshoremen. For example, an OSHA regulation
    governing cargo stows provides:
    "(a) When necessary, cargo shall be secured or blocked
    to prevent its shifting or falling.
    (b) In breaking down, precautions shall be taken, when
    necessary, to prevent the remaining cargo from
    falling." 
    29 C.F.R. § 1918.83
    (a)-(b).
    7
    By way of analogy, the district court observed that a
    stevedore may be held liable for cargo damage due to its
    negligence. Maurice Pincoffs Co. v. Dravo Mechling Corp., 
    697 F.Supp. 244
    , 249-50 (E.D.La.1987), aff'd without op., 
    880 F.2d 411
     (5th Cir.1989) (holding that an unloading stevedore has a
    duty to exercise reasonable care and may be liable for any damage
    14
    NOSC argues that the purpose of the 1972 amendments to the
    LHWCA was to shift the responsibility for compensating injured
    longshoremen to the party best able to prevent injuries, the
    stevedore-employer.     In     order    to   further    this    congressional
    purpose, NOSC contends that we should apply Scindia and Howlett to
    place    the   responsibility     for    compensating       Couch    on   his
    stevedore-employer.      The    Scindia      Court     described    the   1972
    amendments abolishing a longshoreman's unseaworthiness cause of
    action against a vessel owner as reflecting congressional intent
    "to make the vessel answerable for its own negligence and to
    terminate its automatic, faultless responsibility for conditions
    caused by the negligence or other defaults of the stevedore."
    Scindia, 
    451 U.S. at 168
    , 
    101 S.Ct. at 1622-23
    .                Therefore, the
    Court in Scindia reasoned that it would be inconsistent with the
    LHWCA as amended in 1972 to hold that a shipowner has a continuing
    duty to discover and remedy dangerous conditions that develop
    during the loading or unloading of cargo.            As the Court observed:
    "Such an approach would repeatedly result in holding the
    shipowner solely liable for conditions that are attributable
    to the stevedore, rather than the ship. True, the liability
    would   be  cast   in  terms   of  negligence   rather  than
    unseaworthiness, but the result would be much the same.
    "[C]reation of a shipowner's duty to oversee the stevedore's
    activity and insure the safety of longshoremen would ...
    saddle the shipowner with precisely the sort of nondelegable
    duty that Congress sought to eliminate by amending section
    905(b).' "    
    Id.
     [at 169, 101 S.Ct.] at 1623 (citations
    omitted).
    When Congress enacted the 1972 amendments, it adjusted the
    rights between shipowners, stevedore-employers, and longshoremen.
    done to the cargo due to its negligence).
    15
    Applying the 1972 amendments to the facts of this case, the three
    affected parties are Cro-Marine as the barge owner, CIDC as the
    stevedore-employer, and Couch as the injured longshoreman.        The
    1972 amendments, however, did not purport to adjust the rights of
    one stevedoring company versus another stevedoring company for
    injuries sustained by longshoremen.     Thus, the 1972 amendments and
    Court decisions interpreting section 905(b) do not affect the
    outcome of Couch's suit against NOSC under the general maritime
    law.
    We are not persuaded by NOSC's contention that Scindia 's
    trilogy of duties should apply to the loading stevedore/discharging
    stevedore or longshoreman relationship.      A review of the Scindia
    duties reinforces our conclusion that the Scindia duties were
    formulated specifically to govern section 905(b) suits between
    vessel owners and injured longshoremen.       For example, under the
    third Scindia duty, a shipowner has a duty to intervene in the
    stevedore's operations when it knows of the hazard and knows that
    the stevedore cannot be relied upon to remedy it.       Scindia, 
    451 U.S. at 176-78
    , 
    101 S.Ct. at 1627
    .       Because a loading stevedore
    such as NOSC will never be present when the discharging stevedore
    unloads the cargo, the loading stevedore could not be liable under
    the third duty.8      As the facts of this case demonstrate, NOSC was
    not present in Peoria, Illinois, when CIDC unloaded the cargo.
    8
    The only conceivable way a loading stevedore could be held
    liable under the third Scindia duty would be if someone informed
    it that the discharging stevedore could not be relied on to
    remedy the situation.
    16
    Again, this distinction underscores the thrust of Scindia, which
    was to prevent resuscitating, albeit under a negligence label, the
    unseaworthiness cause of action abolished in 1972 and not to
    reformulate the general maritime law governing negligence suits
    brought against a party other than a vessel owner.
    II. Standard of Care
    Having determined that Scindia does not apply to the facts of
    this case, we must turn to the issue of the duty owed by a loading
    stevedore to a discharging longshoreman.      We hold that a loading
    stevedore must load the cargo so that an expert and experienced
    stevedore will be able to discharge the cargo with reasonable
    safety by exercising reasonable care.       Federal Marine Terminals,
    Inc. v. Burnside Shipping Co., 
    394 U.S. 404
    , 414-15, 
    89 S.Ct. 1144
    ,
    1150, 
    22 L.Ed.2d 371
     (1969).       We find that the district court
    applied the correct standard of care under the general maritime law
    and thus will not disturb the district court's finding that NOSC's
    drop stow was such that an expert and experienced stevedore could
    not, despite the exercise of reasonable care, safely unload the
    steel cargo.      Accordingly, we reject NOSC's argument that the
    district court improperly applied a general layman's reasonableness
    standard.9
    9
    In its brief, NOSC seizes upon the district court's phrase
    "reasonable care under the circumstances" as evidence that the
    district court improperly applied a general layman's
    reasonableness standard. The phrase "reasonable care under the
    circumstances" is merely a way of paraphrasing the applicable
    standard of care. In fact, the Court in Scindia employed this
    shorthand to describe the precedent upon which NOSC relies:
    "We held in Marine Terminals v. Burnside Shipping
    17
    III. District Court Findings
    NOSC contends that the district court's findings that it was
    negligent and that CIDC was not contributorily negligent are
    clearly erroneous.    We disagree.    We review a district court's
    findings of fact for clear error and will not reverse a finding of
    fact unless a review of the entire record leaves us "with the
    definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed."
    Nichols v. Petroleum Helicopters, Inc., 
    17 F.3d 119
    , 121 (5th
    Cir.1994) (citation omitted).   We hold that the evidence taken as
    a whole adequately supports the district court's findings.10
    NOSC next argues that the district court erred in calculating
    the damages for pain and suffering and future wage losses.       We
    disagree again.   Based upon our review of the record as a whole, we
    Co., that the vessel owes to the stevedore and his
    longshoremen employees the duty of exercising due care
    "under the circumstances.' This duty extends at least
    to exercising ordinary care under the circumstances to
    have the ship and its equipment in such condition that
    an expert and experienced stevedore will be able by the
    exercise of reasonable care to carry on its cargo
    operations with reasonable safety to persons and
    property...." Scindia, 
    451 U.S. at 166-67
    , 
    101 S.Ct. at 1622
     (citations omitted).
    10
    Because we uphold the district court's finding that CIDC
    was not negligent, we need not reach NOSC's claim that the
    district court improperly denied its contribution claim against
    CIDC.
    NOSC also argues that the district court applied the
    improper causation standard. NOSC asserts that its
    negligence, if any, was not the legal cause of Couch's
    injuries, instead alleging CIDC was negligent in
    repositioning the steel bundles during the offloading
    process. Because we uphold the district court's findings
    that NOSC was negligent and that CIDC was not negligent, we
    reject NOSC's argument and hold that the district court
    applied the correct causation standard.
    18
    are unable to conclude that the district court's damage awards are
    clearly erroneous.
    IV. Prejudgment Interest
    NOSC   also   challenges   the    district   court's   award   of
    prejudgment interest on the entire $1,150,000 pain and suffering
    award.       The award of prejudgment interest in admiralty cases "is
    the rule rather than the exception, and, in practice, is well-nigh
    automatic."        Reeled Tubing, Inc. v. M/V Chad G, 
    794 F.2d 1026
    , 1028
    (5th Cir.1986) (citation omitted).           Prejudgment interest, however,
    may not be awarded with respect to future damages.            Boyle v. Pool
    Offshore Co., Div. of Enserch Corp., 
    893 F.2d 713
    , 719 (5th
    Cir.1990); Pickle v. International Oilfield Divers, Inc., 
    791 F.2d 1237
    , 1241 (5th Cir.1986), cert. denied, 
    479 U.S. 1059
    , 
    107 S.Ct. 939
    , 
    93 L.Ed.2d 989
     (1987).
    In Boyle, this Court vacated the district court's award of
    prejudgment interest on plaintiff's $195,910 recovery for general
    pain and suffering and remanded it to the district court to
    calculate what proportion of the damages, if any, represented
    compensation for future pain and suffering.              Boyle, 893 F.2d at
    718.    In this case, the judgment does not state what proportion of
    the pain and suffering award is for future damages.11              Because it
    appears to have included the award of prejudgment interest on
    damages for future pain and suffering, we must vacate this portion
    11
    The district court described the pain and suffering award
    as compensation for "[p]hysical pain and suffering, disability,
    impairment, and mental anguish." The court's findings do not
    divide the pain and suffering award as between that in the past
    and that to be undergone in the future.
    19
    of   the   judgment   and   remand   it   to   the   district   court   for   a
    determination of what proportion of the pain and suffering award
    represents future damages.
    Conclusion
    For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court
    is
    AFFIRMED in part;      VACATED in part;        and REMANDED.
    20