Buser by Buser v. Corpus Christi Independent School ( 1995 )

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
No. 94-60055
JOHN E. BUSER, JR., by his
next friends, JOHN E. and
VIRGINIA BUSER,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
CORPUS CHRISTI INDEPENDENT
SCHOOL,
Defendant-Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Texas
(April 21, 1995)
Before KING, BENAVIDES, Circuit Judges, and LAKE*, District
Judge.
FORTUNATO P. BENAVIDES, Circuit Judge:
Plaintiff-Appellant appeals the district court's judgment in
favor of Defendant-Appellee, finding that Defendant-Appellee
complied with the procedural mandates of the Individuals with
Disabilities Education Act ("IDEA"), 20 U.S.C. § 1400, et seq., and
acted in good faith in developing and implementing Plaintiff-
Appellant's individualized educational programs. We affirm.
I.
*
District Judge of the Southern District of Texas, sitting
by designation.
John E. Buser, Jr., an autistic twenty-nine year old man, was
enrolled in Corpus Christi Independent School District ("CCISD")
through the 1985-86 school year. His parents, Dr. John E. Buser,
Sr. and Virginia Buser ("the Busers"), actively participated in
Admission, Review and Dismissal ("ARD") committee meetings. In
these meetings committee members and parents participated in
developing individualized educational programs ("IEPs") for
students with disabilities.1 Through the 1984 school year, the
Busers approved the IEPs developed for their son in the ARD
meetings they attended. However, in a meeting conducted in
September 1985, the Busers indicated that they both agreed and
disagreed with a proposed IEP. Then at the April 1986 meeting, the
Busers disagreed with the ARD committee's recommendations.
Thereafter in May 1986, the Busers requested a due process
hearing before the Texas Education Agency, claiming that CCISD
failed to provide free appropriate public education under the IDEA
and seeking compensatory special education for their son. A
hearing was held before the Special Education Officer, who
concluded that because John E. Buser, Jr. reached the age of
twenty-two prior to the date of the hearing, he had exceeded the
age of eligibility for services under the Act.2
On July 1, 1987, the Busers filed suit as next friends for
their son in federal district court against CCISD. The district
court determined that compensatory education is an equitable remedy
1
34 C.F.R. § 300.343.
2
20 U.S.C. § 1412(2)(B).
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that is not foreclosed by a student reaching twenty-two years of
age, and remanded the case to the Texas Educational Agency for a
decision on the merits. Upon remand, the Special Education Officer
concluded that the IEP developed by CCISD for John E. Buser, Jr.
met the standards for free appropriate public education under the
IDEA.
The case was reinstated to the district court, where the
parties agreed to submit the case to the court based on the record
developed before the Special Education Officer with the Texas
Education Agency. After reviewing the administrative record,
stipulations of the parties and the pleadings, the court found that
CCISD complied with the procedural mandates of the IDEA, that the
John E. Buser, Jr.'s individual education programs were designed to
provide him some educational benefit and that he did receive some
educational benefit while attending CCISD. On January 10, 1994,
the district court entered a final judgment in favor of CCISD.
II.
A district court's review of the Special Hearing Officer's
decision requires a two-part inquiry. First, the district court
must decide whether the state, through its local education agency
or intermediate educational unit, has complied with the procedures
set forth in the IDEA. Board of Education, etc. v. Rowley, 458
U.S. 176, 206-07, 102 S. Ct. 3034, 3051, 73 L. Ed. 2d 690 (1982).
Second, the court must determine whether the IEP developed for the
disabled child is "reasonably calculated to enable the child to
receive educational benefits." Id.
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Because the Busers only appeal the district court's decision
that CCISD complied with the procedural mandates of the IDEA, our
review of this mixed question of law and fact is de novo. Teague
Indep. School Dist. v. Todd L., 999 F.2d 127, 131 (5th Cir. 1993).
Our review of the court's findings of underlying facts is for clear
error. Id.
III.
Under the IDEA, states are required to provide handicapped
children "free appropriate public education." 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400(c)
and 1412(1). In order to ensure a handicapped child's right to
free appropriate public education, the Act mandates that an IEP be
developed for each child. An IEP is a written statement created in
a meeting by a representative of the local education agency or an
intermediate educational unit. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(a)(20). The IEP
must include a statement (1) of the present levels of educational
performance of the child, (2) of the annual goals, including short-
tern instructional objectives, (3) specific educational services to
be provided, (4) projected date for initiation and anticipated
duration of services, and (5) evaluation procedures. Id.
The IDEA also imposes extensive procedural requirements
designed to "guarantee parents both an opportunity for meaningful
input into all decisions affecting their child's education and the
right to seek review of any decision they think inappropriate."
Hoing v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 311-12, 108 S. Ct. 592, 598, 98 L. Ed. 2d
686 (1987). These procedures include: (1) an opportunity for the
parents to examine all the child's records and to obtain an
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independent educational evaluation of the child; (2) written prior
notice to the parents whenever the local education agency or
intermediate educational unit proposes or refuses to initiate or
change the "identification, evaluation, or educational placement of
the child or the provision of a free appropriate public education
to such child"; and (3) an opportunity for parents to present
complaints to the agency or educational unit, including the
opportunity for an due process hearing before the state or local
educational agency. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(1)(A),(C),(E), and (2).
"Adequate compliance" with the procedures will, in most cases,
assure the disabled child's substantive right to free appropriate
public education has been met. Rowley, 458 U.S. at 206, 102 S.Ct.
at 3050.
The Busers allege that CCISD violated the procedural
requirements enumerated under the IDEA. Specifically, they contend
that they did not receive notice, nor were they invited to attend,
up to fifteen staff meetings at which their son's progress under
his IEP was evaluated. The Busers further contend that at these
meetings some of their son's short-term objectives were
discontinued or modified. They argue that CCISD's failure to
notify them of these meetings at which the school officials
discussed their son's progress in achieving short-term objectives
constitutes a per se violation of the IDEA because the short-term
objectives listed in their son's IEPs were "changed," as defined in
20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(1)(C), by either being discontinued or
modified.
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The Busers also contend that CCISD did not inform them that
they were equal participants in the participation and revisions of
their son's IEPs as required under the IDEA.3 They argue that the
ARD meetings they attended were conducted in such a way that they
were led to believe that they would have no impact in the
development of their son's IEPs, and that any disagreement they
might have with the IEPs would be futile.
We have previously held that a school's failure to meet the
IDEA's procedural requirements may alone warrant finding that, as
a matter of law, the school has failed to provide free appropriate
public education. Jackson v. Franklin County School Bd., 806 F.2d
623, 629 (5th Cir. 1986). However, under the facts of this case,
we can find no failures on the part of CCISD to meet the procedural
requirements mandated by the Act. The district court was not
persuaded that John E. Buser, Jr.'s short-term objectives in his
IEPs were "changed" without notice to his parents, and neither are
we.4 The Busers failed to present any evidence that CCISD actually
terminated their son's IEPs.5 Additionally, the Busers approved
3
See 34 C.F.R. § 300 app. C at questions 26, 35, and 55.
4
The district court also found that if any of John E.
Buser, Jr.'s short-term objectives were terminated, any injury
caused could only be de minimis. See Weil v. Board of Elementary
& Secondary Education, 931 F.2d 1069, 1072 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 502 U.S. 910, 112 S. Ct. 306, 116 L. Ed. 2d 249 (1991).
Because we find that CCISD did not violate any of the procedural
requirements under the IDEA, we decline to address the issue of
when such a violation is only de minimis.
5
The evidence in the record indicates that short-term
objectives were "discontinued" when they were mastered by John E.
Buser, Jr. Mastering a short-term objective is not a "change"
under 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(1)(C), but merely constitutes the
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every IEP developed for their son until the 1985-86 school term.
They were notified of the annual ARD meetings, where they were
given the opportunity to compare previous IEPs with the new
proposed IEP and to participate in the development of the new IEP.6
An evaluation or recognition of the short-term objectives contained
in the IEP is contemplated and essential to carry out the IEP
itself. We see no change or modification requiring notice in CCISD
carrying out the provisions of an IEP that was instituted with
notice to and input from John E. Buser, Jr.'s parents. Moreover,
any short-term objectives that may have been improperly marked as
discontinued or modified could have been discovered at these annual
meetings.7 Because the Busers did receive notice of the annual ARD
meetings, and did participate in those meetings, we find that CCISD
"adequately complied" with the notice requirements under the Act,
completion of a listed objective in the IEP. The successful
completion of a short-term objective is a necessary step in the
implementation of the IEP if the annual goal is to be achieved.
6
See 34 C.F.R. § 300 app. C. Appendix C, entitled "Notice
of Interpretation," addresses how the IDEA is to be implemented
by the states through a question and answer format. Question ten
discusses how often meetings must be held and provides, "Section
614(a)(5) of the Act provides that each public agency must hold
meetings periodically, but not less than annually, to review each
child's IEP and, if appropriate, revise its provisions. The
legislative history of the Act makes clear that there should be
as many meetings a year as any child may need."
7
Requiring CCISD to notify the Busers every time an
informal meeting takes place where John E. Buser, Jr.'s progress
is discussed between his teacher and a school administrator would
prove extremely ineffective in the administration of John E.
Buser, Jr.'s educational development. Rather than enhance his
right to free appropriate public education, the interpretation
urged by the Busers would hamper the efforts of CCISD to provide
John E. Buser, Jr. with an appropriate education and the
achievement of the goals set forth in his IEP.
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thereby assuring that John E. Buser, Jr.'s substantive right to
free appropriate public education was met. See Rowley, 458 U.S. at
206, 102 S.Ct. at 3050.
Neither can we find evidence that the Busers were barred from
participating in the development of their son's IEPs throughout his
many years in CCISD. The Busers have not presented any evidence
that their son's IEPs were not reasonably calculated to enable him
to receive some educational benefit. Nor do they argue that they
would have disagreed with the ARD committee members if they were
given the opportunity prior to the 1985-86 term. Our review of the
record reveals that CCISD provided the Busers numerous
opportunities to participate in the educational development of
their son, and that the Busers did actively participate in their
son's special education program. Therefore, we conclude that CCISD
provided the Busers equal opportunity to participate in the
development of their son's IEP in compliance with the procedural
requirements under the IDEA.8
IV.
For the reasons articulated above, the judgment of the
district court is AFFIRMED.
8
We decline to address the remaining issues raised on
appeal because our disposition of the issues addressed above
render the remaining issues unnecessary for the proper
determination of this appeal or without merit.
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