Robert Tolan v. Jeffrey Cotton , 573 F. App'x 330 ( 2014 )


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  •      Case: 12-20296       Document: 00512666753         Page: 1     Date Filed: 06/17/2014
    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
    United States Court of Appeals
    Fifth Circuit
    FILED
    No. 12-20296                             June 17, 2014
    Lyle W. Cayce
    ROBERT R. TOLAN; MARIAN TOLAN,                                                      Clerk
    Plaintiffs - Appellants
    v.
    JEFFREY WAYNE COTTON,
    Defendant - Appellee
    Appeals from the United States District Court
    for the Southern District of Texas
    USDC No. 4:09-CV-1324
    ON REMAND FROM
    THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
    Before JONES, BARKSDALE, and SOUTHWICK, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:*
    In May 2009, Robert R. Tolan, Marian Tolan, Bobby Tolan, and Anthony
    Cooper filed this action, pursuant to 
    42 U.S.C. § 1983
    , against numerous
    defendants, arising out of, inter alia, claimed use of excessive force, in violation
    of the Fourth Amendment. When the summary judgment described infra was
    granted in 2012, however, to Officers Jeffrey Wayne Cotton and John C.
    * Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not
    be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir.
    R. 47.5.4.
    Case: 12-20296     Document: 00512666753     Page: 2   Date Filed: 06/17/2014
    No. 12-20296
    Edwards, on the basis of qualified immunity, the only other defendant in this
    action was the City of Bellaire, Texas. That summary judgment did not pertain
    to the City.
    As a result of the summary judgment, a final judgment under Federal
    Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b) (permitting appeal of final judgment for less than
    all parties or claims) dismissed all of plaintiffs’ claims against Officers Cotton
    and Edwards.
    Only two of the four plaintiffs appealed from that Rule 54(b) judgment:
    Robert and Marian Tolan. And, they challenged the judgment only as to
    Officer Cotton and only regarding his being accorded qualified immunity
    against their excessive-force claims.
    In April 2013, our court affirmed, holding summary judgment had been
    proper for Officer Cotton, on the basis of qualified immunity, against the
    excessive-force claims of Robert and Marian Tolan. Tolan v. Cotton, 
    713 F.3d 299
    , 309 (5th Cir. 2013).
    In May 2014, the Supreme Court vacated our judgment only as to Robert
    Tolan and remanded for further proceedings, consistent with its opinion,
    regarding his excessive-force claim against Officer Cotton. Tolan v. Cotton,
    
    134 S. Ct. 1861
    , 1868 (2014).
    Considering the summary-judgment record de novo in the light of the
    rulings in the Court’s opinion regarding that record, and pursuant to Federal
    Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a) (summary-judgment standard), a genuine dispute
    of material fact exists for whether Officer Cotton is entitled to summary
    judgment, based on qualified immunity, against Robert Tolan’s excessive-force
    claim. Therefore, we hold Officer Cotton is not entitled to summary judgment,
    on that basis, against that claim.
    It goes without saying that all other dismissals pursuant to the Rule
    54(b) judgment are not affected by this holding.
    2
    Case: 12-20296    Document: 00512666753     Page: 3   Date Filed: 06/17/2014
    No. 12-20296
    Accordingly, we VACATE only that part of the Rule 54(b) judgment
    dismissing Robert R. Tolan’s excessive-force claim against Officer Jeffrey
    Wayne Cotton and REMAND that one claim for further proceedings consistent
    with this opinion. These proceedings on remand are in addition to, or to be
    conducted with, proceedings, if any, against the City of Bellaire, Texas.
    AFFIRMED IN PART; VACATED and REMANDED IN PART.
    3
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 12-20296

Citation Numbers: 573 F. App'x 330

Judges: Jones, Barksdale, Southwick

Filed Date: 6/17/2014

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 11/6/2024