Raul Rojo Calderon v. Eric Holder, Jr. , 571 F. App'x 280 ( 2014 )


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  •      Case: 13-60486      Document: 00512656198         Page: 1    Date Filed: 06/09/2014
    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
    United States Court of Appeals
    No. 13-60486
    Fifth Circuit
    FILED
    Summary Calendar                          June 9, 2014
    Lyle W. Cayce
    RAUL ROJO CALDERON,                                                            Clerk
    Petitioner
    v.
    ERIC H. HOLDER, JR., U. S. ATTORNEY GENERAL,
    Respondent
    Petition for Review of an Order of the
    Board of Immigration Appeals
    BIA No. A200 889 515
    Before JOLLY, DeMOSS, and ELROD, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM: *
    Raul Rojo Calderon (Rojo), a native and citizen of Mexico, admitted that
    he had entered this country without being admitted or paroled and that he was
    removable under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i). He requested relief in the form of
    cancellation of removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b). The immigration judge (IJ)
    found that Rojo was not eligible for cancellation of removal because he had not
    established the requisite 10 years of continuous physical presence, see
    * Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not
    be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH
    CIR. R. 47.5.4.
    Case: 13-60486     Document: 00512656198     Page: 2   Date Filed: 06/09/2014
    No. 13-60486
    § 1229b(b)(1)(A), and he had not established that his qualifying relatives would
    suffer the requisite level of hardship upon his removal, see § 1229b(b)(1)(D).
    Thus, the IJ denied Rojo’s application for cancellation of removal but granted
    him voluntary departure under 8 U.S.C. § 1229c. On appeal, the Board of
    Immigration Appeals (BIA) conducted a de novo review and agreed that Rojo
    had not established the requisite level of hardship for purposes of
    § 1229b(b)(1)(D).    Because the BIA concluded that Rojo was ineligible for
    cancellation of removal by virtue of that deficiency, the BIA did not reach the
    issue whether he had established the 10 years of continuous physical presence
    required by § 1229b(b)(1)(A), and it dismissed Rojo’s appeal. Rojo now petitions
    for review of the BIA’s order dismissing his appeal.
    Rojo first challenges the BIA’s hardship determination.           We lack
    jurisdiction over Rojo’s challenge to the BIA’s factual determination that he did
    not establish the level of hardship required by § 1229b(b)(1)(D). See Sattani v.
    Holder, ___ F.3d ___, 
    2014 WL 1420288
    , 3 (5th Cir. 2014); 8 U.S.C.
    § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i), (a)(2)(D). Rojo’s argument that the BIA applied an improper
    legal standard by considering the hardship currently being suffered by Rojo’s
    children without considering the future hardship they would suffer could have
    been raised before the BIA in a motion for reconsideration. See Omari v.
    Holder, 
    562 F.3d 314
    , 320 (5th Cir. 2009). Because Rojo’s legal claim was not
    raised before the BIA, it is unexhausted, and we lack jurisdiction to consider
    it. See 
    id. at 318-20;
    § 1252(d)(1).
    Rojo next challenges the IJ’s determination that he had not established
    10 years of continuous physical presence for purposes of § 1229b(b)(1)(A). That
    determination is a nondiscretionary decision that we do have jurisdiction to
    consider. See Mireles-Valdez v. Ashcroft, 
    349 F.3d 213
    , 217 (5th Cir. 2003).
    However, a court should generally remand a case to the BIA for consideration
    2
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    No. 13-60486
    of an issue the BIA did not reach in the first instance. See, e.g., INS v. Orlando
    Ventura, 
    537 U.S. 12
    , 16-17 (2002). A remand is unnecessary here, though. As
    the decision that Rojo is not eligible for cancellation of removal on hardship
    grounds would not be altered even if we were to rule favorably on his challenge
    to the determination on his continuous physical presence, we need not address
    Rojo’s argument that the IJ held him to too high an evidentiary burden on this
    issue. See Capital Concepts Properties 85-1 v. Mutual First, Inc., 
    35 F.3d 170
    ,
    176 (5th Cir. 1994).
    Accordingly, Rojo’s petition for review is DISMISSED to the extent that
    it contains claims and arguments over which we lack jurisdiction. In all other
    respects, the petition for review is DENIED.
    3
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 13-60486

Citation Numbers: 571 F. App'x 280

Judges: Jolly, Demoss, Elrod

Filed Date: 6/9/2014

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 11/6/2024