FDIC v. Barton ( 1997 )


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  •                                      REVISED
    United States Court of Appeals,
    Fifth Circuit.
    No. 95-30926.
    FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION, in its Corporate Capacity,
    Plaintiff-Appellant,
    v.
    Gerald C. BARTON; Gerald G. Rothman; William W. Vaughan; Peter
    R. Kirwin-Taylor; Gilbert I. Newman; Jack G. Golsen; Norman L.
    Peck; Bernard Ille; Albert Reichmann; Joe W. Walser, Jr.; and
    Joseph V. Olree, Defendants-Appellees.
    Jan. 16, 1997.
    Appeals from the United States District Court for the Eastern
    District of Louisiana; Stanwood R. Duval, Jr., Judge.
    ON PETITION FOR REHEARING AND SUGGESTION OF REHEARING EN BANC
    (Opinion Sept. 26, 1996, 5th Cir.1996, 
    96 F.3d 128
    )
    Before REYNALDO G. GARZA, DeMOSS and PARKER, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:
    The Petition for Rehearing is DENIED and no member of this
    panel nor judge in regular active service on the court having
    requested that the court be polled on Rehearing En Banc (FRAP and
    Local Rule 35), the Suggestion for Rehearing En Banc is also
    DENIED.
    We write further because of the FDIC's suggestion that our
    opinion   conflicts      with   an    earlier     opinion,      Louisiana   World
    Exposition v. Federal Ins. Co., 
    858 F.2d 233
    (5th Cir.1988). While
    we did not discuss or cite this case in our opinion, we did take it
    into consideration.       Contrary to the FDIC's protestations, it is
    not   dispositive   of    the   issues      in   this   case.      We   found   it
    unpersuasive for several reasons.
    The language in Louisiana World to which the FDIC makes
    reference is dicta.   The opinion discussed the question of whether
    any one of the claims alleged by the plaintiff was sufficient to
    state cause of action.      In addition to a claim for breach of
    fiduciary duty, there were claims for gross negligence and for
    mismanagement.   These claims were always discussed as one and not
    apart from each other;      the panel was not asked to define the
    differences between them.   This was because a finding on one would
    be enough for the suit to go forward.   In our opinion in this case,
    however, we undertook a specific examination of the elements of a
    cause of action for breach of fiduciary duty under Louisiana law.
    Our opinion properly applied the relevant case law from our
    court on this point of Louisiana law.   As the opinions in Gerdes v.
    Estate of Cush, 
    953 F.2d 201
    (5th Cir.1992), and FDIC v. Duffy, 
    47 F.3d 146
    (5th Cir.1995), show, an allegation of gross negligence is
    insufficient to make out a claim for breach of fiduciary duty.
    Because the FDIC did not allege fraud, self-dealing, or other
    conduct beyond gross negligence in its complaint, it did not make
    out a claim for breach of fiduciary duty.         Accordingly, the
    one-year prescriptive period applied.     Moreover, the opinion in
    Louisiana World had nothing at all to do with the critical question
    of this case, the proper period of prescription for a claim
    asserting gross negligence.