Diop v. Garland ( 2021 )


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  • Case: 20-60678     Document: 00516039121         Page: 1     Date Filed: 10/01/2021
    United States Court of Appeals
    for the Fifth Circuit                        United States Court of Appeals
    Fifth Circuit
    FILED
    October 1, 2021
    No. 20-60678
    Summary Calendar                  Lyle W. Cayce
    Clerk
    Modou Diop,
    Petitioner,
    versus
    Merrick Garland, U.S. Attorney General,
    Respondent.
    Petition for Review of an Order of the
    Board of Immigration Appeals
    BIA No. A201 750 016
    Before Southwick, Oldham, and Wilson, Circuit Judges.
    Per Curiam:*
    Modou Diop, a native and citizen of Senegal, petitions this court for
    review of a decision by the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) dismissing
    his appeal from the denial of his application for relief from removal and
    denying his alternate motion to remand. He argues that the BIA abused its
    *
    Pursuant to 5th Circuit Rule 47.5, the court has determined that this
    opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited
    circumstances set forth in 5th Circuit Rule 47.5.4.
    Case: 20-60678      Document: 00516039121          Page: 2   Date Filed: 10/01/2021
    No. 20-60678
    discretion by declining to take administrative notice of the 2019 version of
    the United States Department of State’s Human Rights Report for Senegal
    and failing to order a remand in light of that report. Diop further argues that
    the record compels the conclusion that he is entitled to asylum, withholding
    of removal and relief under the Convention Against Torture (CAT), and
    humanitarian asylum.
    The BIA’s denial of a motion to remand is reviewed by this court
    “under a highly deferential abuse-of-discretion standard.” Milat v. Holder,
    
    755 F.3d 354
    , 365 (5th Cir. 2014) (internal quotation marks and citation
    omitted). A motion seeking a remand for the immigration judge to consider
    new evidence may be granted only if the “evidence sought to be offered is
    material and was not available and could not have been discovered or
    presented at the former hearing.” 
    Id.
     Any change in country conditions was,
    at best, incremental and not material. See Nunez v. Sessions, 
    882 F.3d 499
    ,
    508 (5th Cir. 2018). Therefore, the BIA did not abuse its discretion by
    implicitly refusing to consider the 2019 Report and denying the motion for
    remand. See Milat, 755 F.3d at 365; Qorane v. Barr, 
    919 F.3d 904
    , 912 (5th
    Cir. 2019).
    With respect to the denial of the underlying requested relief, we
    review for substantial evidence. See Zhang v. Gonzales, 
    432 F.3d 339
    , 344 (5th
    Cir. 2005). Under that standard, reversal is improper unless this court
    decides “not only that the evidence supports a contrary conclusion, but also
    that the evidence compels it.” Chen v. Gonzales, 
    470 F.3d 1131
    , 1134 (5th Cir.
    2006) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted) (emphasis in original).
    The record does not compel the conclusion that Diop established his
    eligibility for asylum because he failed to demonstrate that he suffered past
    persecution or has a well-founded fear of persecution if removed to Senegal.
    See Gjetani v. Barr, 
    968 F.3d 393
    , 397 (5th Cir. 2020); Zhao v. Gonzales, 404
    2
    Case: 20-60678     Document: 00516039121          Page: 3   Date Filed: 10/01/2021
    No. 20-
    60678 F.3d 295
    , 307 (5th Cir. 2005). Because Diop did not establish his eligibility
    for asylum, he cannot satisfy the higher standard required for withholding of
    removal. See Chen, 
    470 F.3d at 1138
    .
    To obtain relief under the CAT, an alien must show “that it is more
    likely than not that he or she would be tortured if removed to the proposed
    country of removal.” 
    8 C.F.R. § 1208.16
    (c)(2); Efe v. Ashcroft, 
    293 F.3d 899
    ,
    907 (5th Cir. 2002). Diop’s fear of torture is speculative and, as such, does
    not meet this standard.
    Finally, any error in the BIA’s treatment of Diop’s claim for
    humanitarian asylum was harmless. See, e.g., Cantu-Delgadillo v. Holder, 
    584 F.3d 682
    , 690 (5th Cir. 2009) (overlooking harmless error in the Board’s
    decision).   The legal standard for humanitarian asylum requires either
    (A) severe “past persecution” or (B) a “reasonable possibility” of “serious
    harm” if the alien is removed to his home country.                 
    8 C.F.R. § 1208.13
    (b)(1)(iii). Diop cannot meet these standards for the same reasons
    he cannot meet the others in his petition. Accordingly, even if the BIA erred
    by overlooking this claim, any error was harmless.
    DENIED.
    3
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 20-60678

Filed Date: 10/1/2021

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 10/2/2021