United States v. Oscar Garcia-Hernandez ( 2015 )


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  •      Case: 14-40226       Document: 00513166392         Page: 1     Date Filed: 08/24/2015
    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
    No. 14-40226
    Summary Calendar
    United States Court of Appeals
    Fifth Circuit
    FILED
    August 24, 2015
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Lyle W. Cayce
    Clerk
    Plaintiff - Appellee
    v.
    OSCAR GARCIA-HERNANDEZ,
    Defendant - Appellant
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Southern District of Texas
    USDC No. 2:13-CR-865-1
    Before BARKSDALE, DENNIS, and SOUTHWICK, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM: *
    Oscar Garcia-Hernandez pleaded guilty to being found unlawfully in the
    United States following deportation, in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326. He was
    sentenced within the applicable advisory sentencing range under the
    Sentencing Guidelines to 37 months’ imprisonment.
    Garcia     challenges     the    district   court’s    applying     an       eight-level
    enhancement for his 2002 Illinois conviction for possession of cocaine, with
    * Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not
    be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir.
    R. 47.5.4.
    Case: 14-40226     Document: 00513166392      Page: 2    Date Filed: 08/24/2015
    No. 14-40226
    intent to deliver, which the court characterized as a “drug trafficking offense”
    under Guideline § 2L1.2(b)(1)(B). He also asserts: the Illinois offense is not
    an “aggravated felony” under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(B); and, therefore, the
    court erred in entering judgment against him under 8 U.S.C. § 1326(b)(2).
    Although post-Booker, the Guidelines are advisory only, and a properly
    preserved objection to an ultimate sentence is reviewed for reasonableness
    under an abuse-of-discretion standard, the district court must still properly
    calculate the advisory Guidelines-sentencing range for use in deciding on the
    sentence to impose. Gall v. United States, 
    552 U.S. 38
    , 51 (2007). In that
    respect, for issues preserved in district court, its application of the Guidelines
    is reviewed de novo; its factual findings, only for clear error. E.g., United States
    v. Cisneros-Gutierrez, 
    517 F.3d 751
    , 764 (5th Cir. 2008).
    As Garcia concedes, however, he did not raise these issues in district
    court; accordingly, review is only for plain error.         E.g., United States v.
    Broussard, 
    669 F.3d 537
    , 546 (5th Cir. 2012). Under that standard, Garcia
    must show a forfeited plain (clear or obvious) error that affected his substantial
    rights. Puckett v. United States, 
    556 U.S. 129
    , 135 (2009). If he does so, we
    have the discretion to correct the error, but should do so only if it seriously
    affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of the proceedings. 
    Id. In his
    first point of error, Garcia asserts the Illinois offense does not
    qualify as a “drug trafficking offense”, U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b)(1)(B), because the
    Illinois statute criminalizes the giving away of drugs without remuneration
    and, therefore, defines “drug trafficking offense” more broadly than the
    Guideline. United States v. Martinez-Lugo, 
    782 F.3d 198
    , 204-05 (5th Cir.),
    petition for cert. filed (23 June 2015) (No. 14-10355), however, forecloses this
    contention. As a result, Garcia has not demonstrated the court plainly erred
    2
    Case: 14-40226     Document: 00513166392     Page: 3   Date Filed: 08/24/2015
    No. 14-40226
    in applying the Guideline § 2L1.2(b)(1)(B) enhancement based on his prior
    Illinois conviction.
    Regarding Garcia’s second contention (the court erred in sentencing him
    under 8 U.S.C. § 1326(b)(2) (being previously removed following a conviction
    for an aggravated felony)), it is not necessary to decide, under the plain-error
    standard, whether the Illinois offense of possession of a controlled substance
    with intent to deliver constitutes an aggravated felony under 8 U.S.C.
    § 1101(a)(43)(B). Instead, Garcia’s sentence may be affirmed because, prior to
    his removal, he was convicted of the Illinois offense of unlawful use of a firearm
    by a felon, which qualifies as an aggravated felony under 8 U.S.C.
    § 1101(a)(43)(E)(ii). See Nieto-Hernandez v. Holder, 
    592 F.3d 681
    , 685-86 (5th
    Cir. 2009); see also United States v. Ho, 
    311 F.3d 589
    , 602 n.12 (5th Cir. 2002)
    (stating judgment may be affirmed on any basis appearing in the record).
    AFFIRMED.
    3
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 14-40226

Judges: Barksdale, Dennis, Per Curiam, Southwick

Filed Date: 8/24/2015

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 11/6/2024