Stafford v. CIR ( 1998 )

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
No. 97-60592
Summary Calendar
CHAROL L. STAFFORD,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE,
Defendant-Appellee;
JAMES E. STAFFORD,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE,
Defendant-Appellee.
Appeal from the United States Tax Court
(7275-96)
April 7, 1998
Before KING, HIGGINBOTHAM, and DAVIS, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
James E. Stafford and Charol L. Stafford appeal from the entry
of summary judgment against them on their action in Tax Court
seeking a redetermination of tax deficiencies assessed against them
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that
this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except
under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
by the I.R.S. The Staffords make no effort to dispute the amount
of the deficiencies calculated by the I.R.S. Rather, they argue
that the I.R.S. is generally without the authority to issue notices
of deficiency, that the BATF and not the Commissioner possesses
authority over collection and assessment, and that Title 26 of the
U.S. Code was not enforceable against them because it had not been
enacted into positive law and because it lacks implementing
regulations
We find the Staffords’ arguments to be frivolous. Section
6212(a) of the Internal Revenue Code specifically empowers the
Commissioner to send notices of deficiency to taxpayers. Moreover,
the Commissioner clearly had authority under Title 26 of the
Internal Revenue Code to pursue collection. The BATF’s
jurisdiction is irrelevant to this case. Additionally, we do not
hesitate to conclude that the Internal Revenue Code constitutes
enforceable law, even if it has not been enacted into “positive
law,” see Ryan v. Bilby, 764 F.2d 1325, 1328 (9th Cir. 1985).
Finally, the Staffords misstate the law when they contend that the
provisions of the Internal Revenue Code generally require
implementing regulations before they become enforceable. See
Occidental Petroleum Corp. v. Commissioner, 82 T.C. 819, 829
(1984). Regardless, a quick perusal of the Code of Federal
Regulations makes it more than clear that numerous enforcement
regulations have been so promulgated.
2
The government has petitioned us to impose sanctions on the
Staffords for their frivolous appeal. We agree with the government
that the Staffords’ pro se appeal is baseless, but we are reluctant
to conclude that the Staffords have litigated this appeal in the
bad-faith manner that we have previously found justifies sanctions.
See, e.g., Parker v. Commissioner, 117 F.3d 785 (5th Cir. 1997).
This opinion, however, should serve as a warning to the Staffords.
We note that the Staffords have long had problems with the I.R.S.
If they continue to pursue meritless, frivolous claims in this
court, we will not hesitate in later cases to sanction them for
their conduct. The Staffords benefit today from our tolerance for
pro se litigants; they are advised not to press the limits of our
patience in the future.
AFFIRMED.
3