Foster v. Anheuser Busch Co ( 2000 )


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  •                IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
    _____________________
    No. 99-30347
    Summary Calendar
    _____________________
    JOSEPH V. FOSTER, JR.,
    Plaintiff-Appellant,
    versus
    ANHEUSER BUSCH COMPANIES, INC., and
    all subsidiaries, either marketing,
    manufacturing, transporting, and/or
    selling its product known, hereinafter
    as Budweiser Beer,
    Defendant-Appellee.
    _________________________________________________________________
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Middle District of Louisiana
    USDC No. 95-CV-327-C
    _________________________________________________________________
    February 10, 2000
    Before JOLLY, JONES, and BENAVIDES, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:*
    Joseph Foster, Louisiana prisoner #75808, proceeding pro se
    and in forma pauperis (IFP), appeals the district court’s dismissal
    of his products liability suit against Anheuser Busch for its
    manufacturing and marketing of Budweiser Beer.     Foster’s district
    court pleadings demonstrate his ability to adequately present his
    claims.   His motion for the appointment of counsel is DENIED.   See
    Ulmer v. Chancellor, 
    691 F.2d 209
    , 212 (5th Cir. 1982).
    *
    Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that
    this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except
    under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
    Foster asserted a wrongful death action and a survival action
    based upon his wife’s alcoholism, her alcohol-related problems, and
    her death in 1994.       Adopting the magistrate judge’s report, the
    district court dismissed the wrongful death action by a grant of a
    motion to dismiss and the court dismissed the survival action by
    summary judgment.      The district court concluded that the wrongful
    death   action   was   without   merit   under   the   Louisiana   Products
    Liability Act (the “LPLA”) and that the survival action was without
    merit because 1) Anheuser Busch was not liable under the LPLA, 2)
    the claim was prescribed because Anheuser Busch’s actions ceased to
    be tortious with the enactment of the LPLA (September 1, 1988) and
    Foster failed to file his suit within a year thereof, and 3) the
    claim was without merit under pre-LPLA law.
    On appeal, Foster argues that 1) the district court erred by
    not granting his request to recuse certain district court judges
    and all the magistrate judges, 2) the district court prematurely
    dismissed Foster’s claims without requiring Anheuser Busch to
    answer and without allowing discovery, 3) Foster’s survival action
    was not prescribed under a continuous tort theory, 4) the Prison
    Litigation Reform Act (the “PLRA”) does not apply to Foster, his
    appellate filing fees should be returned, and the district court
    was in error for sua sponte raising the prescription issue, and 5)
    the PLRA violates Equal Protection and a prisoner’s right of access
    to the courts.
    2
    Foster’s recusal argument is conclusional and without merit.
    The denial of his motion in the district court was not an abuse of
    discretion.    See United States v. MMR Corp., 
    954 F.2d 1040
    , 1044
    (5th Cir. 1992).        With respect to Foster’s challenges to the
    premature dismissal of his case, Foster has not shown what evidence
    he would have presented had he been able to conduct discovery; nor
    did the district court have to wait for an answer to Foster’s
    complaint to address the merits of his claims.             See Fed. R. Civ. P.
    12(b)(6); 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2); Ali v. Higgs, 
    892 F.2d 438
    , 440
    (5th Cir. 1980).
    Although Foster argues that his survival action has not
    prescribed    because   the   tort   alleged    in   his    complaint   was   a
    continuing one, Foster does not challenge the district court’s
    conclusions that his claims were without merit under both the LPLA
    and the law in effect before the LPLA.         Foster has thus waived this
    challenge, and he is not entitled to relief even if his claims were
    not prescribed.    See Yohey v. Collins, 
    985 F.2d 222
    , 224-25 (5th
    Cir. 1993) (appellant’s failure to brief issue constitutes a waiver
    of the issue).    Foster’s challenges to the PLRA are without merit.
    See Strickland v. Rankin County Correctional Facility, 
    105 F.3d 972
    , 974 (5th Cir. 1997); Carson v. Johnson, 
    112 F.3d 818
    , 821-22
    (5th Cir. 1997); Norton v. Dimazana, 
    122 F.3d 286
    , 290 (5th Cir.
    1997).
    The district court’s dismissal of Foster’s suit is
    AFFIRMED;
    3
    MOTION DENIED.
    4