Mays v. Yusuff ( 2000 )


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  •                      UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
    __________________
    No. 99-60518
    Summary Calendar
    __________________
    GREGORY MAYS,
    Petitioner-Appellant,
    versus
    KHURSHID Z. YUSUFF,
    Respondent-Appellee.
    _________________________________________________________________
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Southern District of Mississippi
    (5:99-CV-92-BrS)
    _________________________________________________________________
    May 3, 2000
    Before SMITH, BARKSDALE, and PARKER, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:1
    Gregory C. Mays (federal prisoner #84949-01) appeals the
    dismissal of his 28 U.S.C. § 2241 habeas petition, contending
    primarily that his § 2241 petition is proper, because a 28 U.S.C.
    § 2255 petition would be dismissed as successive and, therefore, §
    2255 is      inadequate or ineffective.2
    Mays was convicted in the Northern District of California of
    conspiring to possess with intent to distribute cocaine, and
    1
    Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the Court has determined that
    this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except
    under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
    2
    This case was considered with Tolliver v. Dobre, No. 99-
    41420, ___ F.3d ___ (5th Cir. 2000), which also concerns whether
    the dismissal of a § 2255 motion as successive makes § 2255
    inadequate or ineffective.    The opinion in that case is being
    issued simultaneously with this opinion.
    attempting to possess cocaine.            On direct appeal, his conviction
    was affirmed. United States v. Mays, Nos. 91-10482, 91-10502, 
    1993 WL 272467
    , at *1 (9th Cir. 20 July 1993).
    Mays filed a § 2255 motion in July 1994; it was denied.                  He
    filed a second § 2255 motion; it was dismissed.            The Ninth Circuit
    affirmed the dismissal, holding the motion was repetitive of Mays’
    direct appeal and an abuse of the writ.               United States v. Mays,
    Nos. 95-16837, 96-10188, 
    1996 WL 711433
    , at *1 (9th Cir. 5 Dec.
    1996).
    Mays filed a third § 2255 motion that was dismissed by the
    district court, because Mays had not received permission from the
    Ninth Circuit to file a successive motion.                 (Pursuant to the
    Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA) Pub.
    L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996), permission must be received
    from a court of appeals to file a successive § 2255 motion.                   28
    U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(A).) The Ninth Circuit affirmed the dismissal.
    United States v. Mays, Nos. 98-10163, 98-10204, 
    1999 WL 191386
    , at
    *1 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, ___U.S.___, 
    119 S. Ct. 2057
    (1999).
    Mays next filed the § 2241 petition in issue in the Southern
    District    of   Mississippi.       The    district    court   dismissed      the
    petition,   because    Mays   had    not   demonstrated    that    §   2255   was
    inadequate or ineffective as a remedy.                Therefore, § 2241 was
    unavailable      to   collaterally     attack    the    validity       of   Mays’
    conviction.
    Section § 2255 is the primary means of collaterally attacking
    a federal sentence.      Cox v. Warden, Fed. Detention Ctr., 911 F.2d
    - 2 -
    1111, 1113 (5th Cir. 1990).     Section § 2241 is used to attack the
    manner in which a sentence is executed.        United States v. Cleto,
    
    956 F.2d 83
    , 84 (5th Cir. 1992).         A petition filed under § 2241
    which attacks errors that occur at trial or sentencing is properly
    construed as a § 2255 motion.    Solsona v. Warden, F.C.I., 
    821 F.2d 1129
    , 1131-32 (5th Cir. 1987).      Nevertheless, a § 2241 petition
    which attacks a federally imposed sentence may be considered if the
    petitioner establishes the remedy under § 2255 is inadequate or
    ineffective.    
    Cox, 911 F.2d at 1113
    .
    Needless to say, a prior unsuccessful § 2255 petition or the
    inability to meet AEDPA’s “second or successive” requirement does
    not make § 2255 ineffective.    See Tolliver v. Dobre, 
    note 2 supra
    .
    Mays is attempting simply to circumvent the limitations on filing
    successive § 2255 motions.    Correspondingly, his contention that §
    2255 is inadequate or ineffective is without merit.
    In the alternative, Mays contends his § 2241 petition should
    be transferred to the Northern District of California.      A district
    court has the authority to transfer a case in the interest of
    justice to another district in which the action might have been
    brought.   28 U.S.C. §§ 1404, 1406.      “The district court has broad
    discretion in deciding whether to order a transfer.”       Caldwell v.
    Palmetto State Sav. Bank of South Carolina, 
    811 F.2d 916
    , 919 (5th
    Cir. 1987).
    The Northern District of California lacks jurisdiction over
    Mays’ § 2241 petition.    Hooker v. Sivley, 
    187 F.3d 680
    , 682 (5th
    Cir. 1999).    And, if the petition is construed as a § 2255 motion,
    - 3 -
    Mays’ lack of success in § 2255 proceedings in California suggests
    that any transfer of a § 2255 motion would lead to yet another
    dismissal.   Accordingly, the district court did not abuse its
    discretion in refusing the transfer.
    AFFIRMED
    - 4 -
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 99-60518

Filed Date: 5/4/2000

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 12/21/2014