Trent v. National City Bank , 145 F. App'x 896 ( 2005 )

United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
F I L E D
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
August 17, 2005
FIFTH CIRCUIT
Charles R. Fulbruge III
____________ Clerk
No. 04-30883
____________
ROBERT TRENT,
Plaintiff-Appellant
versus
NATIONAL CITY BANK OF INDIANA
Defendant-Appellee
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Louisiana
USDC No. 2:03-CV-2128-C
Before DAVIS, JONES, and GARZA, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Robert Trent appeals the district court’s order dismissing his claim against National City Bank
of Indiana (“NCBI”) on grounds of abstention. Trent argues that the court erred in applying the
Brillhart abstention doctrine because his complaint sought both coercive and declaratory relief.
Brillhart v. Excess Ins. Co. of Am., 316 U.S. 491 (1942). He also argues that the district court erred
in applying the factors for abstaining from a federal court action under Brillhart.
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be
published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
I
This suit arises out of a trust established by Marie Dorothy Koffenberger with NCBI as the
trustee. After Koffenberger’s death, NCBI sought to wind down the trust to fulfill its administrative
duties. Trent, a principal beneficiary of the trust, refused to complete the waiver of accounting
request ed by NCBI, and filed an “Original Complaint for Declaratory Relief” in federal court.
Unaware of the federal suit, NCBI petitioned to have its final accounting of the trust agreement
approved by the Marion Superior Court, Probate Division, in Indiana.1 Several months later, Trent
served NCBI with his complaint. At the same time, he filed in the Indiana state court proceeding a
petition to rescind the trust agreement and objections to NCBI’s accounting. After conducting a trial,
the Indiana probate court approved NCBI’s amended final accounting and dismissed Trent’s petition
to rescind. The state court, however, permitted Trent to file an action contesting the validity of the
trust agreement.2 On the same day, Trent filed an “Amended Complaint” in the federal district court
raising nearly identical allegations. The district court dismissed Trent’s suit on abstention grounds.
II
We review a district court’s decision not to exercise jurisdiction for an abuse of discretion and
its underlying legal conclusions de novo. Safety Nat’l Cas. Corp. v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., 214
1
Article X of the Trust Agreement states that “[a]ll matters respecting the validity,
construction, interpretation, administration and enforcement of this Agreement shall be determined
in accordance with the laws of the State of Indiana from time to time existing without regard to the
conflicts of law rules of [Indiana].”
2
Trent’s complaint contesting the trust listed as defendants James Leonard Trent, Paula Leslie
Trent, National City Bank of Indiana as Trustee, Amy Elizabeth Herrick, Amanda Lee Herrick, and
Thomas P. Ewbank (as attorney for Krieg DeVault, LLC, counsel for Marie Dorothy Koffenberger).
Trent’s “Original Complaint for Declaratory Relief” and “Amended Complaint” in federal court listed
only NCBI as a defendant.
2
F.3d 562, 564 (5th Cir. 2000).
Trent contends that the district court erred in concluding t hat the amended complaint was
solely an action for declaratory relief. In support, he cites to the portion of the complaint that
requests the court to “declar[e] . . . all expenditures and distributions made by Defendant National
City Bank in the name of the Koffenberger Trust were improper and that such funds should be
returned either to the heirs or to the Succession of Marie Dorothy Koffenberger, together with a
judgment awarding Plaintiff all attorneys’ fees and costs of these proceedings.”
When a federal suit solely seeks declaratory relief, the district court’s discretion to stay or
dismiss the suit is governed by the standard derived from Brillhart. Wilton v. Seven Falls Co., 515
U.S. 277, 289-90 (1995). In contrast, when an action also involves a demand for monetary or other
relief, the district court’s discretion to dismiss the suit is “narrowly circumscribed” and the propriety
is governed by the broader “exceptional circumstances” standard articulated in Colorado River Water
Conservation District v. United States, 424 U.S. 800 (1976) and Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital
v. Mercury Construction Corporation, 460 U.S. 1 (1983). See Kelly Inv., Inc. v. Cont’l Common
Corp., 315 F.3d 494, 497 n. 4 (5th Cir. 2002) (“when an action contains any claim for coercive relief,
the Colorado River abstention doctrine is ordinarily applicable”) (citing Black Sea Inv., Ltd. v. United
Heritage Corp., 204 F.3d 647, 652 (5th Cir. 2000)).
In reviewing the complaint, we agree with the district court’s assessment of the claims
presented by Trent. When a party seeks both coercive and declaratory relief, we may still apply
Brillhart if the request for coercive relief is “frivolous.” Black Sea Inv., Ltd., 204 F.3d at 649-50.
See also PPG Indus., Inc. v. Cont’l. Oil Co., 478 F.2d 674, 679 (5th Cir. 1973) (“If the prayer for
injunctive relief could be determined to be frivolous or premature or otherwise ‘wanting in equity,’
3
then the suit could be considered solely a declaratory judgment action and the Brillhart holding would
clearly apply.”). Here, the coercive relief requested, namely the return of funds to the “heirs or to the
Succession of Marie Dorothy Koffenberger” is frivolous because the federal court “has no jurisdiction
to probate a will or administer an estate.” Markham v. Allen, 326 U.S. 490, 494 (1946). See also
Moore v. Lindsey, 662 F.2d 354, 361 (5th Cir. 1981) (quoting Markhan, 326 U.S. at 494) (“federal
courts of equity have jurisdiction to entertain suits ‘in favor of creditors, legatees and heirs’ and other
claimants against a decedent’s estate ‘to establish their claims’ so long as the federal court does not
interfere with the probate proceedings or assume general jurisdiction of the probate or control of the
property in the custody of the state court.”). Since restitution of the funds would effectively require
the court to interfere with the probate proceedings and administer the estate, we hold that the
coercive relief requested is frivolous and the amended complaint is solely an action for declaratory
relief.3
Trent also contends that the district court erred in applying the factors for abstaining from a
declaratory action. A district court enjoys broad discretion under the Federal Declaratory Judgment
Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201, to stay or dismiss a declaratory judgment action when parallel state court
proceedings are pending. See Brillhart, 316 U.S. at 494; Wilton, 515 U.S. at 288. The district court,
in making its determination, “should ascertain whether the questions in controversy between the
3
We note that the amended complaint also requests “attorneys’ fees and all costs of these
proceedings.” However, this court has never held that a request solely for attorney’s fees constitutes
a request for coercive relief and we decline to so here. C.f. Southwind Aviation, Inc. v. Bergen
Aviation, Inc., 23 F.3d 948, 951 (5th Cir. 1994) (holding that Brillhart abstention did not apply
because plaintiff’s declaratory action also sought “coercive remedies for the breach of contract in the
form of damages, attorney’s fees, and injunctive relief.”). To rule otherwise would essentially
swallow the entire Brillhart doctrine since most complaints contain boiler plate requests for costs and
attorney’s fees.
4
parties to the federal suit, and which are not foreclosed under the applicable substantive law, can
better be settled in the proceeding pending in the state court.” Brillhart, 316 U.S. at 495. In
determining whet her to dismiss a declaratory judgment action, a district court must look to three
broad category of factors: (1) proper allocation of decision-making between state and federal courts,
(2) fairness/improper forum shopping, and (3) efficiency. Sherwin-Williams Co. v. Holmes County,
343 F.3d 383, 390-91 (5th Cir. 2003). When “the federal declaratory judgment action raises only
issues of state law and a state case involving the same state law issue is pending, generally the state
court should decide the case and the federal court should exercise its discretion to dismiss the federal
suit.” Id. at 390-91. Moreover, “[a] federal court should be less inclined to hear a case if necessary
parties are missing from the federal forum, because that leads to piecemeal litigation and duplication
of effort in state and federal courts.” Id. Here, Trent concedes that this case only involves Indiana
state law issues. Thus, the state court addressing the same state law issues would appear to be the
more appropriate forum for resolving this dispute. Similarly, as the district court correctly noted,
certain parties whose interests may be affected by the district court’s ruling are not participants in the
federal suit and judicial economy would be served by having all the issues determined in one
proceeding. Accordingly, we find that the district court did not abuse its discretion in applying the
factors for abstaining under Brillhart.
III
For the above stated reasons, we hold that the district court did not abuse its discretion in
abstaining from this action and AFFIRM the dismissal of the complaint.
5