Brown v. Lafayette Gen Med ( 1996 )

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
For the Fifth Circuit
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No. 96-30612
Summary Calendar
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ELLEN SALLY BROWN,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
VERSUS
LAFAYETTE GENERAL MEDICAL CENTER,
Defendant-Appellee.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
For the Western District of Louisiana
(94-CV-186)
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November 22, 1996
Before DAVIS, EMILIO M. GARZA, and STEWART, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:1
After being terminated from her position as a nursing director
at Lafayette General Medical Center, Ellen Sally Brown filed suit
against her former employer alleging that she was discriminated
against on the basis of her age in violation of the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”), 29 U.S.C. § 623 (1994).
The district court found that Brown failed to meet her burden of
showing her employer’s age-neutral reasons for the termination were
pretextual and granted summary judgment in favor of Lafayette
1
Pursuant to Local Rule 47.5, the court has determined
that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent
except under the limited circumstances set forth in Local Rule
47.5.4.
General. We affirm the district court’s order.
I.
The district court made detailed findings of facts, which are
fully supported by the record and which we need not repeat here.
The record established that Brown and her immediate supervisor,
Camille Claibourne, vice president of nursing, had a difficult
working relationship for some time prior to Brown’s termination,
stemming in part from Browns disagreement with several policies
instituted by Claibourne, particularly those regarding the staffing
of nurses. The tension between the two grew worse when, in mid-
December 1992, Brown admittedly failed to follow specific
instructions Claibourne gave her regarding the posting of a new
staffing policy.
On December 30, 1992, Claibourne met with Brown and told her
that she could no longer work with her because Brown had become
untrustworthy. Claibourne informed Brown that she had the option
of resignation or termination. Brown responded that she would be
eligible for early retirement in June of 1993 and requested that
Claibourne allow her to remain employed until that time.
Claibourne said that she would defer her decision for the time
being and meet with her again on January 3, 1993.
However, Brown decided not to attend the scheduled meeting
with Claibourne and instead met with John J. Burdin, Jr., the
president of Lafayette General. Brown admitted that she violated
the hospital’s chain-of-command policy by going directly to the
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hospital president rather than Claibourne’s immediate supervisor.
On January 5, 1993, Burdin informed Brown that she was terminated.
Claibourne confirmed Brown’s termination in a letter dated the same
day and stated that the grounds for termination were “ineffective
communication to staff and Vice President; insubordination.” At
the time of her termination, Brown was 61 years old.
II.
We review de novo the district court’s grant of summary
judgment. Topalian v. Ehrman, 954 F.2d 1125, 1131 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 506 U.S. 825 (1992); Bodenheimer v. PPG Industries,
Inc., 5 F.3d 955, 956 (5th Cir. 1993). The parties do not contest
that Brown has stated a prima facie case of age discrimination
under the ADEA. See O’Connor v. Consolidated Coin Caterers Corp.,
116 S. Ct. 1307, 1310 (1996) (clarifying the elements of a prima
facie case under ADEA); Bodenheimer, 5 F.3d at 957. The only issue
on appeal is whether Brown has successfully rebutted Lafayette
General’s age-neutral justifications for her termination.
Under the framework this Court recently articulated Rhodes v.
Guiberson Oil Tools, 75 F.3d 989, 994 (5th Cir. 1996) (en banc),
once a plaintiff has made out a prima facie case of age
discrimination under the ADEA, the burden shifts to the defendant
to proffer a non-discriminatory reason for the action. The
defendant satisfies this burden by producing evidence that “if
believed by the trier of fact, would support a finding that
unlawful discrimination was not the cause of the employment
action.” Id. at 993. Once the defendant has proffered
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nondiscriminatory reasons for the action, a plaintiff can only
avoid summary judgment “if the evidence taken as a whole (1)
creates a fact issue as to whether each of the employer’s stated
reasons was what actually motivated the employer and (2) creates a
reasonable inference that age was a determinative factor in the
actions of which plaintiff complains.” Id. at 994.
Lafayette General successfully proffered an age-neutral
justification for terminating Brown, namely her failure to
communicate adequately with her staff and supervisor and
insubordination. Because the employer has come “forward with a
reason which, if believed, would support a finding that the
challenged action was nondiscriminatory,” the inference raised by
the prima facie case drops out and the burden returns to the
plaintiff to show the reasons given are mere pretext for
discrimination. LaPierre v. Benson Nissan, Inc., 86 F.3d 444, 448
(5th Cir. 1996).
Brown has failed to make such a showing. The only evidence
Brown relies on to demonstrate that the hospital’s reasons are
pretextual are (1) her allegations that several other employees
over the age of forty have been “forced to resign” and replaced
with younger employees and (2) a letter signed by many of her
coworkers in which they stressed Brown’s many accomplishments and
expressed their regret at her dismissal. As for her allegations
that other employees have been forced to resign because of their
age, we agree with the district court that Lafayette General’s
unrebutted evidence concerning these employment actions remove any
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inference that age played a determinative role in Brown’s firing.2
Nor does the letter from her coworkers raise an inference that
age played a role in her termination. At best, this letter shows
that she was well liked by her staff and others. However, “to
demonstrate pretext, the plaintiff must do more than ‘cast doubt on
whether [the employer] had just cause for its decision’”; she must
produce “some proof that age motivated the employer’s actions,
otherwise the law has been converted from one preventing
discrimination because of age to one ensuring dismissals only for
just cause to all people over 40.” Moore v. Eli Lilly & Co., 990
F.2d 812, 815 (5th Cir.) (citations omitted), cert. denied, 510
U.S. 976 (1993).
In Rhodes, we stated that “if the evidence put forth by the
plaintiff to establish the prima facie case and to rebut the
employer’s reasons is not substantial, a jury cannot reasonably
infer discriminatory intent.” 75 F.3d at 994. We conclude that
the evidence presented by Brown was insubstantial and inadequate to
support a finding of age discrimination.
Accordingly, the district court’s order granting summary
judgment in favor of Lafayette Medical is AFFIRMED.
2
Brown lists seven employees who she claims were either
terminated or forced to resign from Lafayette General during a
three-year period. During that period, Lafayette General employed
an average of 1,500 to 1,600 employees. Lafayette General also
produced unrebutted evidence that, of the seven employees Brown
names, one was discharged because his position was eliminated, a
second took medical leave and never returned, a third resigned to
relocate to another city, and a fourth resigned and was replaced
with an older employee.
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AFFIRMED.
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