United States v. Maria De La Cruz , 514 F. App'x 511 ( 2013 )

Case: 12-50113 Document: 00512152003 Page: 1 Date Filed: 02/22/2013
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
FILED
February 22, 2013
No. 12-50113
Summary Calendar Lyle W. Cayce
Clerk
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee
v.
MARIA DE LA CRUZ,
Defendant-Appellant
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Texas
USDC No. 3:11-CR-791-1
Before BENAVIDES, HAYNES, and HIGGINSON, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Maria De La Cruz was convicted of importing marijuana, possessing with
intent to distribute marijuana, using a minor to assist in avoiding detection and
apprehension of a drug operation, and making a false statement to the
Department of Homeland Security. De La Cruz was sentenced within the
advisory guidelines range to 46 months in prison on each count, to be served
concurrently, and four years of supervised release. She argues that the district
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not
be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.
R. 47.5.4.
Case: 12-50113 Document: 00512152003 Page: 2 Date Filed: 02/22/2013
No. 12-50113
court erred in denying her request for a jury instruction on the affirmative
defense of duress.
We review the denial of a requested jury instruction for an abuse of
discretion. United States v. Storm, 36 F.3d 1289, 1294 (5th Cir. 1994). To raise
an issue of duress for consideration by the jury, a defendant must present proof
of the following four elements: (1) that the defendant or a member of her family
“was under an unlawful and present, imminent, and impending threat of such
a nature as to induce a well-grounded apprehension of death or serious body
injury”; (2) that she “had not recklessly or negligently placed [herself] in a
situation in which it was probable that [s]he would be forced to choose the
criminal conduct”; (3) that she “had no reasonable legal alternative to violating
the law,” that is, no chance “to refuse to do the criminal act and . . . to avoid the
threatened harm”; and (4) that there was “a direct causal relationship . . .
between the criminal action taken and the avoidance of the threatened harm.”
United States v. Posada-Rios, 158 F.3d 832, 873 (5th Cir. 1998) (internal
quotation marks, modifications, and citations omitted); United States v. Liu, 960
F.2d 449, 454 (5th Cir. 1992) (noting that the defense extends to threats
involving family members).
De La Cruz failed to introduce evidence of a sufficiently imminent threat
to her or her children’s safety or that she had no reasonable alternative to
violating the law. See Posada-Rios, 158 F.3d at 873-74. Thus, the district court
did not abuse its discretion by denying the requested jury instruction.
AFFIRMED.
2