United States v. Sam , 467 F.3d 857 ( 2006 )

United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
F I L E D
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FIFTH CIRCUIT October 11, 2006
Charles R. Fulbruge III
Clerk
No. 05-10341
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
BRIAN LERON SAM,
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Texas
(3:02-CR-29-ALL-G)
Before KING, BARKSDALE, and DENNIS, Circuit Judges.
RHESA HAWKINS BARKSDALE, Circuit Judge:
Primarily before us for Brian Leron Sam’s bank-robbery
conviction are sentencing issues related to his diminished mental
capacity. He challenges the sufficiency of the evidence underlying
that conviction and the district court’s refusal, at sentencing, to
grant: a downward departure for his diminished mental capacity; an
acceptance-of-responsibility reduction; and his Blakely (now
Booker) objection, concerning application of the Sentencing
Guidelines. The court erred only in its downward-departure ruling.
CONVICTION AFFIRMED; SENTENCE VACATED; REMANDED FOR RESENTENCING.
I.
The facts are not in dispute. For several years, Sam has
suffered from periods of schizophrenia and psychosis. On 30
January 2002, he entered a bank in Duncansville, Texas, and
presented a teller the following note: “I HAVE A GUN! SILENTLY AND
QUICKLY GIVE ME ALL YOUR MONEY”. Before the teller could comply,
and while she was reaching into her cash drawer to empty it, Sam
reached over the counter and seized money being counted by her and
another teller. Neither attempted to stop the robbery.
After seizing the money, Sam exited, leaving his note behind.
It was written on the back of his disability paperwork, which
contained information identifying him to the police. When
apprehended by the police, and after being advised of his rights,
he confessed to the robbery.
Sam was subsequently charged with a single count of bank
robbery, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a). In July 2002, after
a psychological examination was performed pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §
4247(b) and (c), Sam was declared mentally incompetent to stand
trial. In September 2003, after psychiatric treatment, he was
declared competent to do so.
At trial in October 2004, Sam conceded each element of the
offense but presented a narrow insanity defense through expert
medical testimony. That expert claimed: although Sam knew his
actions were wrong, his mental condition prevented his appreciating
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the seriousness of their consequences. Sam did not move for
judgment of acquittal under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 29.
On 21 October 2004, he was convicted by a jury.
At sentencing in February 2005, Sam objected to the pre-
sentence investigation report’s recommended sentencing range of 92
to 115 months, claiming: he should be awarded both a downward
departure for his diminished mental capacity and an acceptance-of-
responsibility reduction; and, pursuant to Blakely v. Washington,
542 U.S. 296 (2004), the court’s consideration of the Guidelines
was impermissible fact-finding. Those objections were denied.
The court held: a downward departure was precluded because
Sam’s offense was a crime of violence under U.S.S.G. § 5K2.13
(permitting a downward departure for crimes committed as a result
of a diminished mental capacity, except where the circumstances
surrounding the crime involved violence or a serious threat of
violence); his insanity defense was inconsistent with an
acceptance-of-responsibility reduction because that defense
challenged one of the factual elements the Government had to prove
— culpable mental state; and, concerning Sam’s Blakely objection,
although the Supreme Court invalidated the mandatory nature of the
Guidelines under its subsequent opinion in United States v. Booker,
543 U.S. 220 (2005), “in other respects[, it] left those Guidelines
intact”.
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II.
Sam contests his conviction and sentence. He claims: there
was insufficient evidence to convict him under § 2113(a) because,
while he may have used force and intimidation, those actions were
not the causal link that allowed him to seize the money; the
district court erred in failing to grant his requests for both a
downward departure based on his diminished capacity and a reduction
for acceptance of responsibility; and it erred in overruling his
Blakely (now Booker) objection.
A.
Concerning Sam’s conviction, the usual standard of review for
a sufficiency-of-the-evidence challenge is to consider the evidence
in the light most favorable to the verdict, accepting all
reasonable inferences that support it, in deciding whether a
rational jury could have found the elements of the offense beyond
a reasonable doubt. United States v. Baker, 17 F.3d 94, 96 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 857 (1994). Because Sam failed to
move for a judgment of acquittal, however, his claim is reviewed
“under a stricter than usual standard”. United States v. Green,
293 F.3d 886, 895 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 965 (2002).
“[R]eview is [only] for ‘a manifest miscarriage of justice,’ which
is found if the record is ‘devoid of evidence pointing to guilt’”,
id. (quoting United States v. Ruiz, 860 F.2d 615, 617 (5th Cir.
1988)), or if “the evidence on a key element of the offense was so
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tenuous that a conviction would be shocking”, Ruiz, 860 F.2d at 617
(internal quotation omitted).
Section 2113(a) states:
Whoever, by force and violence, or by
intimidation, takes or attempts to take, from
the person or presence of another, or obtains
or attempts to obtain by extortion any
property or money or any other thing of value
belonging to, or in the care, custody,
control, management, or possession of, any
bank, credit union, or any savings and loan
association, [is guilty of bank robbery].
(Emphasis added.) Because § 2113(a) is written in the disjunctive,
the Government need prove only that Sam took the money by use of
“force and violence” or by “intimidation”. United States v.
Higdon, 832 F.2d 312, 314 (5th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S.
1075 (1988).
Sam concedes he threatened the first teller and likely
intimidated her by use of his note. He maintains, however, his
threat and intimidation was not the causal link by which he robbed
the bank; because he seized the money, and neither of the two
tellers aided him, his intimidation and threat of force were
extraneous to that seizure. Sam relies exclusively on the first
teller’s trial testimony to support his claim. She testified that,
after Sam placed the note in front of her, “I looked at the
[second] teller and the cash drawer, and ... was going to react
because [the second teller] did not, but before I could open the
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cash drawer, the money that was on the counter that we were
verifying, he reached over and grabbed [it]”.
“[F]rom the perspective of the victim, a taking ‘by
intimidation’ under section 2113(a) occurs when an ordinary person
in the teller's position reasonably could infer a threat of bodily
harm from the defendant's acts.” Baker, 17 F.3d at 96 (quoting
Higdon, 832 F.2d at 315). Sam’s note stated he had a gun. The
first teller testified: as soon as she saw that note, she knew the
bank was being robbed; she was extremely fearful; she was trained
to follow the robber’s instructions; and, in doing so, she reached
for the cash drawer.
Accordingly, there is evidence that her response resulted
directly from Sam’s note. It is reasonable to infer that this
response permitted, in part, his seizing the money. In other
words, there was no manifest miscarriage of justice.
B.
In challenging his sentence, Sam maintains the court erred in
holding: (1) Guidelines § 5K2.13 precludes a downward departure
because bank robbery is a crime of violence; (2) his insanity
defense precluded an acceptance-of-responsibility reduction; and
(3) Booker requires, according to Sam, “a specific articulable
reason” to depart from the now-advisory Guidelines.
Although Booker eliminated the mandatory nature of the
Guidelines, “a sentencing court must still carefully consider the
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detailed statutory scheme created by [the Guidelines]”, and should
apply them “in the same manner as before [Booker]”. United States
v. Mares, 402 F.3d 511, 518-19 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct.
43 (2005). While we review a properly calculated Guidelines
sentence for reasonableness, we review de novo the interpretation
and application of the Guidelines. See United States v. Villegas,
404 F.3d 355, 359-61 (5th Cir. 2005).
1.
This court lacks jurisdiction to review a downward-departure
denial unless, as here, the district court held a mistaken belief
that the Guidelines do not give it the authority to depart. E.g.,
United States v. Barrera-Saucedo, 385 F.3d 533, 535 (5th Cir.
2004), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 1080 (2005). Our review is de novo.
Id.
At sentencing, the court correctly stated that, pursuant to
Guidelines § 5K2.13, Sam may not receive a downward departure “if
the facts and circumstances of [his] offense indicate a need to
protect the public because the offense involved actual violence or
a serious threat of violence”. Yet, the court went on to state it
did not believe a departure was permissible: “The reason that I am
forbidden by the Guidelines to grant such a downward departure is
that [bank robbery] is a crime of violence, even though there was
no overt violence utilized by ... Sam in the commission of this
crime”. In other words, although the court correctly stated it
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should consider the facts and circumstances of Sam’s crime in
ruling on the downward-departure request, it, instead, denied the
departure, as a matter of law, because bank robbery is a crime of
violence.
Section 5K2.13 states:
A downward departure may be warranted if (1)
the defendant committed the offense while
suffering from a significantly reduced mental
capacity; and (2) the significantly reduced
mental capacity contributed substantially to
the commission of the offense. Similarly, if
a departure is warranted under this policy
statement, the extent of the departure should
reflect the extent to which the reduced mental
capacity contributed to the commission of the
offense.
The section further provides, however, that the departure may not
be granted if “the facts and circumstances of the defendant’s
offense indicate a need to protect the public because the offense
involved actual violence or a serious threat of violence”.
U.S.S.G. § 5K2.13 (emphasis added).
This language resulted from an amendment to § 5K2.13 in its
pre-1998 form, which resolved a circuit split on whether § 5K2.13
permitted a departure for a “crime of violence” as defined by the
career offender guidelines. § 5K2.13 cmt. n.1 (1998). Compare
United States v. Poff, 926 F.2d 588 (7th Cir.) (en banc) (§ 5K2.13
categorically prohibits a departure for a crime of violence), cert.
denied, 502 U.S. 827 (1991), with United States v. Chatman, 986
F.2d 1446 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (§ 5K2.13 requires courts to look at all
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facts and circumstances surrounding a defendant’s crime to
determine whether it was non-violent, permitting a departure). As
a result, the district court should have considered the facts and
circumstances of Sam’s offense to determine whether it involved
“actual violence or a serious threat of violence”. U.S.S.G. §
5K2.13. As it noted, Sam did not use overt violence in robbing the
bank.
Although the court correctly stated the standard upon which it
should have based its review, it failed to consider all the facts
and circumstances of Sam’s crime, instead categorically denying the
departure because “bank robbery is considered a crime of violence”.
In sum, the district court erred in failing to perform § 5K2.13's
requisite factual inquiry.
2.
Generally, a district court’s refusal to grant an acceptance-
of-responsibility reduction is a factual finding, given even more
deference than review for clear error. E.g., United States v.
Ragsdale, 426 F.3d 765, 781 (5th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 126 S.
Ct. 1405 (2006). When that denial involves an interpretation of
the Guidelines, however, it is reviewed de novo. United States v.
Charon, 442 F.3d 881, 886-87 (5th Cir. 2006).
The denial of the requested acceptance-of-responsibility
reduction was premised on the court’s ruling that, because of his
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insanity defense at trial, Sam had not accepted responsibility for
his criminal conduct. It concluded:
[T]he insanity defense asserted by ... Sam at
trial really challenges one of the elements of
proof that the government has to establish;
namely, that ... Sam had a culpable mental
state at the time the offense was committed.
In essence, an insanity defense says that he
lacks the mental capacity to form a culpable
mental state, and so that is a challenge to
one of the factual elements that the
government had to prove at trial.
Guidelines § 3E1.1(a) permits the district court to grant a
two-level reduction if the defendant “clearly demonstrates
acceptance of responsibility for his offense”. U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1(a).
Application Note 2 states:
This adjustment is not intended to apply to a
defendant who puts the government to its
burden of proof at trial by denying the
essential factual elements of guilt ....
Conviction by trial, however, does not
automatically preclude a defendant from
consideration for such a reduction. In rare
situations a defendant may clearly demonstrate
an acceptance of responsibility for his
criminal conduct even though he exercises his
constitutional right to a trial.
Id. cmt. n.2 (emphasis added).
Sam claims his insanity defense did not challenge the factual
elements of his offense: upon arrest, he admitted guilt both
orally and in a voluntary written statement; and, at trial, he did
not move for a judgment of acquittal. Sam contends that, because
bank robbery under § 2113(a) is a general-intent crime, the
Government was required only to prove he knew he was taking the
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bank’s property by force and violence or by intimidation.
Maintaining it is possible to claim he is legally insane, without
challenging this mens rea element of § 2113(a), Sam relies on an
Eighth Circuit opinion, United States v. Barris, 46 F.3d 33 (8th
Cir. 1995), which held an insanity defense “does not as a matter of
law preclude a reduction for acceptance of responsibility”. Id. at
35 (emphasis added).
The Government counters that, although Sam conceded the actus
reus of his crime, his insanity defense was the same as denying he
had the culpable mens rea. It cites a subsequent First Circuit
opinion, United States v. Gorsuch, 404 F.3d 543 (1st Cir. 2005),
which held a bank-robbery insanity defense precluded an acceptance-
of-responsibility reduction. Gorsuch held the defendant “denied an
essential factual element of guilt when she asserted at trial that
she lacked the capacity to form the mens rea ... necessary for the
imposition of criminal responsibility”. Id. at 546 (second
emphasis added). Gorsuch further opined that Barris failed to
“explain how a defendant who has contested the government’s
allegation that she acted with the requisite mens rea has not at
the same time contested her factual guilt and thereby declined to
accept responsibility for the charged offense”. Id. (emphasis
added).
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Consistent with Gorsuch, we agree that, generally, an insanity
defense precludes an acceptance-of-responsibility reduction.
Pursuant to the above-quoted Guidelines § 3E1.1(a) cmt. n.2, we
leave open the possibility, however, that in a “rare situation[]”
a defendant may assert such a limited insanity defense that he is
eligible for the reduction. This is not one of those instances.
As discussed supra, Sam’s expert testified at trial that Sam could
appreciate the wrongfulness of his actions, just not the
seriousness of their consequences. Moreover, Sam’s position on
appeal undermines his claimed acceptance of responsibility. For
the first time on appeal, he challenges the sufficiency of the
evidence, claiming the Government failed to prove one of the
factual elements of its case – causation. This claim is difficult
to reconcile with Sam’s contention that he is eligible for a
sentencing reduction based on acceptance of responsibility.
In any event, Sam contends Guidelines § 3E1.1(a) allows a
sentencing reduction unless a defendant denies an element of the
offense; however, “guilt”, as used in the Guidelines commentary, is
a broader term than “offense”. Accordingly, we must determine
whether sanity is an “essential factual element[] of guilt”.
U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1(a) cmt. n.2 (emphasis added). “Guilty” is defined
as “justly liable to or deserving of a penalty”, and it is
synonymous with “blameworthy”. WEBSTER’S NINTH NEW COLLEGE DICTIONARY
542 (1990). This definition is reflected in our criminal justice
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system: “‘Our collective conscience does not allow punishment
where it cannot impose blame’”. United States v. Lyons, 739 F.2d
994, 994-95 (5th Cir.) (quoting Holloway v. United States, 148 F.2d
665, 666-67 (D.C. Cir. 1945)), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 930 (1984).
Significantly, the legal terminology used to refer to one who has
committed wrongful acts, but lacks the mental capacity to
understand their wrongfulness, is “not guilty by reason of
insanity”. This “is a judgment that the defendant is not guilty
because, as a result of his mental condition, he is unable to make
an effective choice regarding his behavior”. Id. at 995 (emphasis
in original).
In criminal law, “[t]he presumption of sanity is ... universal
in some variety or other, being (at least) a presumption that a
defendant has the capacity to form the mens rea necessary for a
verdict of guilt and the consequent criminal responsibility”.
Clark v. Arizona, 126 S. Ct. 2709, 2729-30 (2006). The insanity
defense raises “the kinds of mental differences that overcome the
presumption of sanity or capacity and therefore excuse a defendant
from customary criminal responsibility”. Id. at 2731. Sanity
became a disputed issue, essential to finding guilt, when Sam
challenged the presumption of sanity by raising insanity as an
affirmative defense. See Davis v. United States, 160 U.S. 469, 486
(1895) (if “presumption [of sanity] were not indulged, the
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government would always be under the necessity of adducing
affirmative evidence of the sanity of an accused”).
This interpretation of § 3E1.1(a) is further compelled by our
precedent holding affirmative defenses ordinarily challenge factual
guilt and therefore make a defendant ineligible for an acceptance-
of-responsibility reduction. In United States v. Brace, 145 F.3d
247, 265 (5th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 973 (1998),
we held a defendant’s assertion of entrapment was a denial of
factual guilt and made him ineligible for that reduction because it
was a “challenge to criminal intent and thus to culpability”.
Similarly, in United States v. Branch, 91 F.3d 699, 742 (5th Cir.
1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1185 (1997), we affirmed the denial
of that reduction for a defendant who contested his factual guilt
by claiming he acted in self-defense. These affirmative defenses
are not analogous to the examples in the commentary to § 3E1.1(a)
of issues “that [are unrelated] to factual guilt” such as
“constitutional challenge[s] to a statute” and “challenge[s] to the
applicability of a statute to [the defendant’s] conduct”. U.S.S.G.
§ 3E1.1(a) n.2. See also United States v. Fells, 78 F.3d 168, 171
(5th Cir.) (holding defendant was not precluded from receiving
acceptance-of-responsibility reduction where he asserted underlying
facts did not legally constitute possession under statute and
challenged court’s venue), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 847 (1996).
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3.
Finally, Sam claims the district court erred in overruling
his Blakely/Booker objection when it stated that, notwithstanding
the now-advisory nature of the Guidelines, there was no need to
depart from them. According to Sam, this misconstrues Booker’s
holding; he claims a district court need not find a specific
reason to depart from the Guidelines.
“Even in the discretionary sentencing system established by
[Booker], a sentencing court must still carefully consider the
detailed statutory scheme created by [the Guidelines], which are
designed to guide the judge toward a fair sentence while avoiding
serious sentence disparity.” Mares, 402 F.3d at 518-19 (emphasis
added). When the district court imposes a sentence falling
within a properly calculated Guidelines range, that sentence is
presumptively reasonable and “little explanation is required”.
Id. at 519.
III.
For the foregoing reasons, the conviction is AFFIRMED; the
sentence is VACATED; and this matter is REMANDED for
resentencing.
CONVICTION AFFIRMED; SENTENCE VACATED; REMANDED
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