United States v. Prince ( 2021 )

Case: 21-40135 Document: 00516062690 Page: 1 Date Filed: 10/20/2021
United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
FILED
October 20, 2021
No. 21-40135
Summary Calendar Lyle W. Cayce
Clerk
United States of America,
Plaintiff—Appellee,
versus
Clovis Prince,
Defendant—Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Texas
No. 4:09-CR-161-1
Before Smith, Stewart, and Graves, Circuit Judges.
Per Curiam:*
Clovis Prince, federal prisoner #09329-064, appeals the dismissal, for
want of jurisdiction, of his motion for compassionate release under the First
Step Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-391, 132 Stat. 5194 (2018), and 18 U.S.C.
§ 3582(c)(1)(A)(i). This court reviews de novo whether the district court had
*
Pursuant to 5th Circuit Rule 47.5, the court has determined that this opin-
ion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances
set forth in 5th Circuit Rule 47.5.4.
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No. 21-40135
jurisdiction to modify Prince’s sentence. See United States v. Bridges,
116 F.3d 1110, 1112 (5th Cir. 1997).
In United States v. Shkambi, 993 F.3d 388, 389−90 (5th Cir. 2021), we
invalidated the district court’s legal reasoning for dismissing Prince’s motion
for lack of jurisdiction. Although Shkambi invalidated the district court’s jur-
isdictional ruling, the court also addressed the merits of Prince’s motion
insofar as it determined that he had failed to demonstrate that the 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(a) factors supported compassionate release. Thus, if the district
court’s merits ruling is correct, this court can affirm on that ground. See
United States v. Chacon, 742 F.3d 219, 220 (5th Cir. 2014).
Prince challenges the district court’s consideration of the § 3553(a)
factors, especially with respect to his criminal history. The court considered
Prince’s “long criminal history” and specifically mentioned his prior convic-
tions for assault and battery, robbery, embezzlement, grand larceny, and mail
fraud. Prince claims that he did not commit the assault and battery and that
his robbery conviction was dismissed. As the district court explained, how-
ever, “[e]ven if [Prince] is correct that these convictions are errors, the result
is still the same. Based upon a totality of the circumstances, [Prince] is a
danger to society.” Because the district court made clear that the disputed
prior convictions were not dispositive, Prince has failed to show an abuse of
discretion in the court’s consideration of his criminal history. See United
States v. Chambliss, 948 F.3d 691, 693 (5th Cir. 2020).
Prince disputes the district court’s statement regarding the extent of
his involvement with the criminal justice system and reasons that his criminal
history is limited to two prior convictions from 1983−85. A review of the
presentence report, though, supports the district court’s assessment. Prince
also contends that the district court gave too much weight to his criminal
conduct and failed adequately to consider his involvement in various phil-
anthropic activities and community service. Prince’s argument amounts to a
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No. 21-40135
mere disagreement with the court’s balancing of the § 3553(a) factors, which
“is not a sufficient ground for reversal.” Id. at 694.
The district court considered the kinds of sentences available and the
applicable sentencing range under the Sentencing Guidelines. See
§ 3553(a)(3)−(4). The court noted that Prince had served only 10 years of his
30-year sentence and that there was no other type of sentence available out-
side of a sentence reduction, which the court found inappropriate given
Prince’s offense conduct.
With respect to § 3553(a)(4), the district court accurately noted that
with a total offense level of 44 and a criminal history category of III, the
guideline sentence was life imprisonment; the applicable statutory maximum
was 30 years. 18 U.S.C. § 1344. Because Prince had already benefited from
the statutory maximum, the court concluded that this factor weighed against
a sentence modification. Prince has failed to show an abuse of discretion in
the court’s consideration of this factor. See Chambliss, 948 F.3d at 693.
Prince challenges the district court’s consideration of the sentencing-
disparity factor in § 3553(a)(6). According to Prince, his 30-year sentence
“is the most severe sentence ever, and the harshest sentence imposed for
bank fraud in the Eastern District of Texas.” He collects several district and
appellate court cases in which the defendants received lower sentences for
bank fraud. The sentencing-disparity factor, though, requires district courts
to consider “the need to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities among
defendants with similar records who have been found guilty of similar con-
duct.” § 3553(a)(6) (emphasis added). A review of the cases cited by Prince
reveals that the defendants are dissimilar from him, especially with respect
to their criminal records.
We thus MODIFY the district court’s judgment, which was dis-
missed for lack of jurisdiction, to deny Prince’s motion, and the judgment, as
modified, is AFFIRMED.
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