Oliver v. Champion ( 2021 )


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  • Case: 20-20438     Document: 00516069346         Page: 1     Date Filed: 10/26/2021
    United States Court of Appeals
    for the Fifth Circuit
    United States Court of Appeals
    Fifth Circuit
    FILED
    October 26, 2021
    No. 20-20438                           Lyle W. Cayce
    Clerk
    Mari Leigh Oliver,
    Plaintiff—Appellant,
    versus
    Bret Champion; Brian Greeney; Thomas Hensley;
    Kimberley Walters; Lance Alexander; Stephen
    Naetzker; Jennifer Walton; Klein Independent School
    District; Angie Richard,
    Defendants—Appellees.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Southern District of Texas
    USDC No. 4:17-CV-3234
    Before Smith, Stewart, and Willett, Circuit Judges.
    Per Curiam:*
    The Texas Education Code mandates that school districts “require
    students, once during each school day,” to recite the “pledge of allegiance to
    the United States.” Tex. Educ. Code § 25.082(b)(1). The Code contains
    *
    Pursuant to 5th Circuit Rule 47.5, the court has determined that this
    opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited
    circumstances set forth in 5th Circuit Rule 47.5.4.
    Case: 20-20438        Document: 00516069346              Page: 2       Date Filed: 10/26/2021
    No. 20-20438
    a parental opt-out provision whereby parents or guardians, upon “written
    request,” may excuse their children from reciting the pledge. Id. § 25.082(c).
    The Klein Independent School District has adopted a district-wide policy
    that tracks the state’s pledge mandate.
    Mari Oliver attended a high school within Klein ISD. She has sued
    teachers, administrators, and Klein ISD under 
    42 U.S.C. § 1983
    , claiming
    they all violated her First Amendment right against compelled speech by
    requiring her to recite the pledge. 1 Importantly, Oliver admits that her claim
    is not predicated on a contention that the pledge mandate, itself, is
    unconstitutional. 2 Rather, Oliver’s claim is predicated on her contention that
    her mother complied with the parental opt-out provision—something the
    parties vigorously dispute. We express no opinion on that dispute.
    Nonetheless, we AFFIRM summary judgment for Defendants.
    We review summary judgment de novo. S. ex rel. E.H.F. v. Garza, 
    912 F.3d 778
    , 783 (5th Cir. 2019). We will reverse only if a genuine dispute of
    material fact exists or if the nonmovant was not entitled to judgment as a
    matter of law. 
    Id.
     A material-fact dispute is “genuine” only “if the evidence
    is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving
    party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 
    477 U.S. 242
    , 248 (1986).
    1
    On appeal, Oliver adequately briefs only her compelled-speech claim—that the
    Defendants violated her right “to not participate in the pledge.” Though her complaint
    alleged other claims as well, Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 28 requires appellants to
    provide “reasons,” with “citations to the authorities and parts of the record” supporting
    them, that warrant reversal. Fed. R. App. P. 28(a)(8)(A). Only Oliver’s compelled-
    speech claim meets Rule 28’s standard. Therefore, Oliver has waived appellate review of
    any other claims against the Defendants. Trevino v. Johnson, 
    168 F.3d 173
    , 181 n.3 (5th Cir.
    1999) (holding “undeveloped,” “inadequately argued” issues waived on appeal).
    2
    Because Oliver does not challenge the pledge mandate’s constitutionality, we
    must presume its constitutionality. See McDonald v. Bd. of Election Comm’rs, 
    394 U.S. 802
    ,
    809 (1969) (“Legislatures are presumed to have acted constitutionally . . . .”).
    2
    Case: 20-20438     Document: 00516069346          Page: 3    Date Filed: 10/26/2021
    No. 20-20438
    Despite Oliver’s belief otherwise, a reasonable jury could not return a
    verdict in her favor. Even if her mother complied with the parental opt-out
    provision, the record demonstrates that none of the Defendants ever
    compelled Oliver to recite the pledge. Cf. Tex. Educ. Code § 25.082(b)–
    (c) (excusing a student from reciting the pledge upon written request of a
    parent). Since Oliver “has failed to make a sufficient showing on an essential
    element of her case with respect to which she has the burden of proof,”
    Defendants were entitled to summary judgment. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 
    477 U.S. 317
    , 323 (1986).
    AFFIRMED.
    3