Tittle v. Raines ( 2003 )

United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
F I L E D
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS May 27, 2003
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT Charles R. Fulbruge III
Clerk
No. 02-11138
Summary Calendar
DONALD A. TITTLE, JR.,,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
MARK RAINES, ET AL.,
Defendants,
MARK RAINES and STEVE ROONEY,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Texas
USDC No. 3:99-CV-478-L
Before GARWOOD, JOLLY and SMITH, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Donald A. Tittle, Jr., appeals the summary judgment dismissal
of his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 false arrest and malicious prosecution
claims against Mark Raines and Steve Rooney, police officers of the
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5 the Court has determined that this
opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under
the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
town of Addison, Texas. The district court, in a thorough and well
considered opinion, concluded that the defendants acted with
probable cause at all times, and that they enjoyed qualified
immunity.
With respect to his false arrest claim, Tittle argues that the
defendants not only lacked probable cause to arrest him, but also
misled the judge who issued his arrest warrant. In an appeal from
summary judgment, we review the record de novo, “examining the
evidence in the light most favorable to [Tittle], the nonmovant
below.” Duckett v. City of Cedar Park, Tex., 950 F.2d 272, 276
(5th Cir. 1992). Once the defendant moves for summary judgment on
qualified immunity, the burden is on the plaintiff to come forward
with proper summary judgment evidence sufficient to sustain a
finding that qualified immunity is lacking. Salas v. Carpenter,
940 F.2d 299, 306 (5th Cir. 1992).
There is no cause of action for false arrest under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 unless the arresting officers lacked probable cause.
Duckett at 278. A review of the record reveals that at the time
that the defendants arrested Tittle, they had trustworthy
information sufficient to warrant a prudent person, or one of
reasonable caution, to believe that an offense had been committed.
See United States v. Fortna, 796 F.2d 724, 739 (5th Cir. 1985).
Probable cause to arrest requires no more than information
sufficient to warrant a reasonable officer’s belief that there is
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a “fair probability”–not that it is more likely than not or that
there is not less than a fifty percent chance–that the prospective
arrestee has committed an offense. USA v. Garcia, 179 F.3d 265,
269 (5th Cir. 1999). The record reflects that, as the district
court concluded, the defendants acted with probable cause when they
arrested Tittle.
Moreover, for purposes of qualified immunity, the question is
not simply whether there was probable cause to arrest but is rather
whether all similarly situated reasonable officers would conclude
(contrary to the district court) that probable cause was lacking.
See, e.g., Anderson v. Creighton, 107 S.Ct. 3034, 3040 (1987);
Blackwell v. Barton, 34 F.3d 298, 303-05 (5th Cir. 1994). On the
undisputed facts here it is clear as a matter of law that not all
reasonable officers would so conclude.
Tittle also brought a claim against Raines and Rooney for
malicious prosecution, alleging that they acted without probable
cause to prosecute him and omitted exculpatory information from the
case report submitted to the district attorney’s office. We need
only consider the elements of the tort of malicious prosecution as
defined under the Texas law to determine whether Tittle has
established a claim of malicious prosecution. See Gordy v. Burns,
294 F.3d 722, 726 (5th Cir. 2002). In determining whether probable
cause existed for purposes of a malicious prosecution claim, we ask
“whether a reasonable officer–at the time when criminal proceedings
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were instituted and based solely on the facts as the officers
honestly believed them to be–would believe to a ‘fair probability’
that a crime had been committed.” Gordy, 294 F.3d at 728 (citing
Piazza v. Mayne, 218 F.3d 239, 245-46 (5th Cir. 2000)).
Although Raines and Rooney had already met with Tittle and his
counsel and were aware of the existence of certain exculpatory
evidence, at the time of Tittle’s prosecution, the officers
nevertheless possessed sufficient evidence from which they could
conclude there was a fair probability that Tittle had committed an
offense. See id. at 729 (“[T]he probable cause inquiry does not
require a showing that the officer’s belief was correct or that it
was more likely true than false.”) The district court held that
when the prosecution was instituted the officers had probable cause
to believe Tittle had committed the offense charged. We agree.
The defendants acted with probable cause to cause the case against
Tittle to go forward and they are, therefore, entitled to qualified
immunity on Tittle’s malicious prosecution claim.
The summary judgment of the district court is
AFFIRMED.
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