United States v. Francisco Trevino-Rodriguez , 463 F. App'x 305 ( 2012 )


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  •      Case: 11-40662     Document: 00511769939         Page: 1     Date Filed: 02/28/2012
    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT  United States Court of Appeals
    Fifth Circuit
    FILED
    February 28, 2012
    No. 11-40662
    Summary Calendar                        Lyle W. Cayce
    Clerk
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff-Appellee
    v.
    FRANCISCO TREVINO-RODRIGUEZ, also known as Francisco de Jesus
    Trevino,
    Defendant-Appellant
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Southern District of Texas
    USDC No. 7:10-CR-1896-1
    Before GARZA, SOUTHWICK, and HAYNES, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:*
    Francisco Trevino-Rodriguez (Trevino) appeals the 57-month sentence
    imposed upon him following his guilty plea conviction of being found illegally
    present in the United States following deportation, in violation of 
    8 U.S.C. § 1326
    (a), (b). Trevino argues that the district court committed reversible plain
    error when it enhanced his offense level by 16 levels pursuant to U.S.S.G.
    § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(ii) based on his prior conviction in Texas for burglary of a
    *
    Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not
    be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.
    R. 47.5.4.
    Case: 11-40662    Document: 00511769939      Page: 2    Date Filed: 02/28/2012
    No. 11-40662
    habitation, which the district court characterized as a crime of violence (COV).
    He argues that the statute under which he was convicted, TEX. PENAL CODE
    ANN. § 30.02(a), includes a means to commit the offense that does not meet the
    definition of a generic burglary as required by the Guidelines to impose such an
    enhancement. More specifically, he asserts that the offense of which he was
    convicted is not equivalent to the enumerated offense of burglary of a dwelling.
    He contends that his sentence should be vacated and his case remanded for
    resentencing. The Government agrees.
    Because Trevino did not object to the enhancement in the district court,
    we review for plain error. See Puckett v. United States, 
    556 U.S. 129
    , 
    129 S. Ct. 1423
    , 1429 (2009). To prevail under plain-error review, Trevino must show an
    error that is “clear or obvious, rather than subject to reasonable dispute.” 
    Id.
     He
    also must show that the error affected his substantial rights. See 
    id.
     If he makes
    these showings, we have the discretion to correct the error if it “seriously affects
    the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” 
    Id.
     (internal
    quotation marks, alteration, and citation omitted).
    “[T]he generic, contemporary meaning of burglary contains at least the
    following elements: an unlawful or unprivileged entry into, or remaining in, a
    building or other structure, with intent to commit a crime.” Taylor v. United
    States, 
    495 U.S. 575
    , 598 (1990); United States v. Ortega-Gonzaga, 
    490 F.3d 393
    ,
    394 (5th Cir. 2007) (using the Taylor definition to determine whether a burglary
    offense was equivalent to the enumerated offense of burglary of a dwelling for
    purposes of the 16-level COV enhancement under § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(ii)).
    Under TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 30.02(a)(1), a person commits burglary of
    a habitation if, without the effective consent of the owner, he “enters a
    habitation, or a building . . . with the intent to commit a felony, theft, or an
    assault.” Id. (emphasis added). A conviction under TEX. PENAL CODE ANN.
    § 30.02(a)(1) is equivalent to the enumerated offense of burglary of a dwelling.
    United States v. Garcia-Mendez, 
    420 F.3d 454
    , 456-57 (5th Cir. 2005). Under
    2
    Case: 11-40662    Document: 00511769939      Page: 3   Date Filed: 02/28/2012
    No. 11-40662
    TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 30.02(a)(3), a person commits burglary of a habitation
    if he “enters a building or habitation and commits or attempts to commit a
    felony, theft, or an assault.”    A conviction under TEX. PENAL CODE ANN.
    § 30.02(a)(3) is not equivalent to the enumerated offense of burglary of a
    dwelling. United States v. Constante, 
    544 F.3d 584
    , 587 (5th Cir. 2008) (holding
    that § 30.02(a)(3) was not equivalent to a “violent felony” for purposes of the
    Armed Career Criminal Act, 
    18 U.S.C. § 924
    (e)); see also United States v.
    Herrera-Montes, 
    490 F.3d 390
    , 391-92 (5th Cir. 2007) (holding that a Tennessee
    statute, identical in relevant part to § 30.02(a)(3), was not equivalent to the
    enumerated offense of burglary of a dwelling for purposes of § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(ii)).
    Because TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 30.02 contains multiple, disjunctive
    subsections, we may consider certain state court records to determine whether
    Trevino’s burglary conviction is equivalent to the enumerated offense of burglary
    of a dwelling. See United States v. Garza-Lopez, 
    410 F.3d 268
    , 273 (5th Cir.
    2005). In the instant case, the indictment against Trevino tracked the language
    of TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 30.02(a)(3), alleging that Trevino entered a
    habitation and attempted to commit or committed theft of property. It did not
    allege that Trevino entered the habitation with the intent to commit theft
    therein, as required to meet the generic definition of burglary. See Taylor, 
    495 U.S. at 598
    ; see also Constante, 
    544 F.3d at 586-87
    .
    The Government thus failed to carry its burden of proving that Trevino’s
    burglary conviction was equivalent to the enumerated offense of burglary of a
    dwelling. See Constante, 
    544 F.3d at 587
    ; see also Herrera-Montes, 
    490 F.3d at 392
    . Accordingly, the district court committed an error that was obvious when
    it applied the 16-level COV enhancement under § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(ii). See Herrera-
    Montes, 
    490 F.3d at 392
    .
    Trevino also has shown that his substantial rights were affected because
    there is “a reasonable probability that, but for the district court’s error, [he]
    would have received a lower sentence.” United States v. Davis, 
    602 F.3d 643
    ,
    3
    Case: 11-40662    Document: 00511769939      Page: 4   Date Filed: 02/28/2012
    No. 11-40662
    647 (5th Cir. 2010). In the absence of the erroneous 16-level enhancement,
    Trevino would have been subject to, at most, an eight-level aggravated felony
    enhancement under § 2L1.2(b)(1)(C). His total offense level would have been
    reduced from 21 to 14, and, with a criminal history category of IV, his Guidelines
    range would have been 27 to 33 months, much less than the 57-month sentence
    imposed. See § 3E1.1(b). We have repeatedly held that where, as here, a
    Guidelines error results in the imposition of a sentence that is greater than the
    maximum permitted under the correct Guidelines range, the error has affected
    the defendant’s substantial rights, and it would seriously affect the fairness,
    integrity, and public reputation of the judicial proceedings to leave the error
    uncorrected. See United States v. Andino-Ortega, 
    608 F.3d 305
    , 311-12 (5th Cir.
    2010).
    In light of the foregoing, the district court committed reversible plain error
    when it enhanced Trevino’s offense level by 16 levels pursuant to
    § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(ii). See id. at 312. Accordingly, we vacate Trevino’s sentence
    and remand the case for resentencing.
    AFFIRMED, in part; VACATED, in part; REMANDED for resentencing.
    4