Roper v. Exxon Corporation ( 2000 )

No. 99-30894
-1-
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
No. 99-30894
Summary Calendar
JOHN M. ROPER,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
EXXON CORPORATION,
Defendant-Appellee.
--------------------
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Louisiana
USDC No. 97-CV-829-C
--------------------
April 18, 2000
Before HIGGINBOTHAM, DeMOSS, and STEWART, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
John M. Roper appeals the district court’s grant of summary
judgment against him on a complaint he brought against his former
employer, Exxon Corporation. Having considered the issue sua
sponte, we conclude that the district court’s exercise of federal
jurisdiction over the complaint was proper. See Giles v. NYLCare
Health Plans, Inc., 172 F.3d 332, 336-37 (5th Cir. 1999).
Roper argues that Exxon violated LA. REV. STAT. ANN. 23:631 by
failing to pay him for six days of illness occurring during a
vacation. We agree with the district court that Roper never had
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined
that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent
except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.
R. 47.5.4.
No. 99-30894
-2-
a vested right to payment for those days because he never
provided Exxon with the required medical certification of illness
for the days. See Beard v. Summit Inst. for Pulmonary Med. &
Rehabilitation, Inc., 707 So. 2d 1233, 1235 (La. 1998) (holding
that an employer is obligated to pay only amounts “due under the
terms of employment”).
Roper argues that Exxon is obliged to pay him penalty wages
and attorney’s fees under LA. REV. STAT. ANN. 23:632. Because
Exxon owed Roper nothing for the six uncertified days of illness,
no penalties or fees are due him for those days. In addition, we
conclude that summary judgment against Roper was proper as to six
days of illness that were properly certified. Roper’s principal
piece of evidence, a pay stub showing that he had reported
disability days during vacation, is not probative of when Exxon
exercised its discretion under the terms of employment to
reclassify Roper’s vacation time.
Finally, Roper argues that Exxon should have made a seven
percent contribution to his thrift fund account on all amounts it
paid him at his discharge in lieu of vacation. The district
court held, and we agree, that this is an Employee Retirement
Income Security Act claim governed by the terms of Exxon’s Thrift
Plan. See 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a). We also agree that Roper
presented no evidence that Exxon’s Thrift Plan involved
contributions for vacation days.
AFFIRMED.