Fred Haag v. Infrasource Corporate Services ( 2013 )


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  •      Case: 12-60259       Document: 00512148695         Page: 1     Date Filed: 02/20/2013
    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT  United States Court of Appeals
    Fifth Circuit
    FILED
    February 20, 2013
    No. 12-60259
    Lyle W. Cayce
    Clerk
    FRED M. HAAG,
    Plaintiff-Appellant
    v.
    INFRASOURCE SERVICES, INCORPORATED; DAVID R. HELWIG,
    Individually; INFRASOURCE CORPORATE SERVICES L.L.C., also known as
    Infrasource Corporate Services, Incorporated,
    Defendants-Appellees
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Southern District of Mississippi
    USDC No. 3:07-CV-387
    Before KING, SOUTHWICK, and GRAVES, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:*
    Fred M. Haag sued his former employer, Infrasource Services, Inc., after
    he was terminated for “gross misconduct.” Pursuant to the employment contract
    Infrasource compelled arbitration under Pennsylvania law. The arbitrator found
    that Haag had accepted reimbursements for housing and other expenses to
    which he should have known he was not entitled. Haag’s claims were dismissed.
    *
    Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not
    be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.
    R. 47.5.4.
    Case: 12-60259     Document: 00512148695      Page: 2   Date Filed: 02/20/2013
    No. 12-60259
    The district court entered a judgment that denied Haag’s motion to vacate and
    confirmed the arbitrator’s decision. We AFFIRM.
    Review of arbitration decisions made under the Federal Arbitration Act is
    “extraordinarily narrow” and “exceedingly deferential.” Rain CII Carbon, LLC
    v. ConocoPhillips Co., 
    674 F.3d 469
    , 471-72 (5th Cir. 2012). Our review of the
    district court’s denial of a motion for vacatur is de novo. Laws v. Morgan Stanley
    Dean Witter, 
    452 F.3d 398
    , 399 (5th Cir. 2006).
    There are limited grounds established by statute for vacating and
    modifying an arbitration award. See 9 U.S.C. §§ 10 & 11. A modification is
    permitted if “there was an evident material miscalculation of figures or an
    evident material mistake in the description of any person, thing, or property
    referred to in the award.” § 11(a). The statutory authority for vacating an
    award refers only to such defects as fraud, partiality, and misconduct or misuse
    of power by the arbitrator. § 10(a). Despite those limits, this court has held that
    “a material mistake of fact” can also be grounds for vacatur. Valentine Sugars,
    Inc. v. Donau Corp., 
    981 F.2d 210
    , 214 (5th Cir. 1993). The fact must be
    unambiguous and undisputed: “We interpret the term ‘undisputed’ to mean we
    should look to see whether there is any rational basis for disputing the truth of
    the fact.”   
    Id. That mistake must
    also be material: “‘the record must
    demonstrate[ ] strong reliance on that mistake.’” 
    Id. The parties disagree
    whether Valentine remains good law. We need not decide Valentine’s vitality as
    we conclude that Haag’s arguments for vacatur fail even if Valentine applies.
    Haag contends that the relevant material mistake was the arbitrator’s
    statement in his initial ruling that “[t]he facts are not in dispute that [Haag]
    submitted improper requests for expense reimbursement.” That statement is
    correct, but the statement does not apply to all of the relevant expenses. As to
    the housing expenses, Haag did not need to submit claims. He was reimbursed
    automatically with monthly deposits into his bank account. Haag’s misconduct
    2
    Case: 12-60259     Document: 00512148695     Page: 3     Date Filed: 02/20/2013
    No. 12-60259
    on housing expenses was not taking steps to stop the deposits once he knew or
    should have known he was still receiving them after they were supposed to end.
    We agree that Haag did not “submit” claims for housing reimbursement,
    but there is no indication that the arbitrator strongly relied on any distinction
    between claims improperly “submitted” versus those that were not stopped. The
    arbitrator found cause for termination based on Haag’s misstatement that he
    was paying for “all of [his] personal expenses and housing now,” “improper
    expense reimbursement” generally, including for travel, and a company audit
    that disclosed Haag “misappropriated in excess of $80,000,” in addition to the
    “improper” “funds [Haag] received” for housing.            There was neither an
    unambiguous factual mistake by the arbitrator about submission of claims, nor
    strong or material reliance on any mistaken understanding of those facts.
    This analysis is not changed by the arbitrator’s holding that Infrasource
    was not entitled to prevail on its counterclaims. Each of the seven counterclaims
    that Infrasource asserted required proof of discrete elements; the claim of
    fraudulent misrepresentation, for example, requires proof of a representation,
    that is material, made falsely, with knowledge or recklessness as to that falsity,
    with the intent to mislead, with justifiable reliance on that representation, and
    injury proximately caused by that reliance. Ira G. Steffy & Son, Inc. v. Citizens
    Bank of Penn., 
    7 A.3d 278
    , 290 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2010). The arbitrator found a lack
    of adequate proof as to the various counterclaims. The arbitrator’s finding is not
    inconsistent with the determination of “cause,” which under the employment
    agreement only required a finding of “willful engaging . . . in gross misconduct
    materially and demonstrably injurious to the Company.”
    AFFIRMED.
    3
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 12-60259

Judges: King, Southwick, Graves

Filed Date: 2/20/2013

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 10/19/2024