Carver v. Atwood ( 2021 )

Case: 21-40113 Document: 00516098948 Page: 1 Date Filed: 11/18/2021
United States Court of Appeals United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit Fifth Circuit
FILED
November 18, 2021
Lyle W. Cayce
No. 21-40113
Clerk
Tiffany Carver,
Plaintiff—Appellant,
versus
Rodrick Atwood, Sergeant; Herman Smith, Officer;
Keith Watson, Officer,
Defendants—Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Texas
USDC No. 1:19-CV-616
Before Jolly, Elrod, and Oldham, Circuit Judges.
Andrew S. Oldham, Circuit Judge:
Tiffany Carver brought suit in federal court against three corrections
officers, among other defendants. She sued them under both 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 and Texas common law, alleging the officers had sexually assaulted
her. The officers failed to respond to their summonses, so the clerk entered
default against them. Then the court—noting Carver had sued the officers in
their official rather than personal capacities—dismissed her suit sua sponte
for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. It did so with prejudice and without
giving Carver notice or an opportunity to respond. We reverse and remand.
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No. 21-40113
I.
Tiffany Carver was a corrections officer at the Stiles Unit of the Texas
Department of Criminal Justice (“TDCJ”). In December 2019, Carver sued
three of her former coworkers—Rodrick Atwood, Herman Smith, and Keith
Watson. Carver alleged the three men (the “individual defendants”) had
sexually assaulted her at the Stiles Unit. She brought causes of action under
both 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Texas common law. The complaint specified that
Carver was suing these defendants in their official capacities.
Carver also brought § 1983 claims against TDCJ and the Stiles Unit.
TDCJ moved to dismiss on sovereign-immunity grounds. On April 1, 2020,
the court granted that motion and also dismissed Carver’s claims against the
Stiles Unit. The court issued an opinion, but the opinion said nothing about
Carver’s claims against the individual defendants.
On December 22, 2020, none of the individual defendants had
responded to their summonses or defended the suit in any way. So the clerk
entered a default. Then on January 4, 2021, the court ordered the individual
defendants to “show cause . . . why a default judgment in favor of Plaintiff
Tiffany Carver should not be granted against them.” The court scheduled a
show cause hearing for January 20, 2021, but later canceled it for reasons not
in the record.
Then the court shifted course. Without giving Carver notice or an
opportunity to respond, the court dismissed her claims against the individual
defendants with prejudice. The court reasoned that, because Carver had sued
the three in their official capacities for money damages, the suits were prima
facie barred by sovereign immunity. And because no exception to that
immunity applied, the court lacked jurisdiction entirely. Carver timely
appealed. A dismissal with prejudice is a final decision, so we have
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jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 1291; see also Molina-Aranda v. Black Magic Enters.,
LLC, 983 F.3d 779, 783 (5th Cir. 2020).
II.
We review a district court’s dismissal under Rule 12(b)(1) de novo.
Spec’s Family Partners, Ltd. v. Nettles, 972 F.3d 671, 674–75 (5th Cir. 2020).
We accept the complaint’s well-pleaded factual allegations as true. Ibid.We first ask whether the district court has a general power to dismiss
cases sua sponte. It does. Then we ask whether the court has the power to
dismiss a case sua sponte, with prejudice, and without giving the plaintiff
notice or an opportunity to respond. It does not. We therefore reverse the
district court’s judgment and remand the case.
A.
District courts may, for appropriate reasons, dismiss cases sua sponte.
For example, sua sponte dismissal is appropriate when a plaintiff fails to
prosecute her case. See Griggs v. S.G.E. Mgmt., LLC, 905 F.3d 835, 844 (5th
Cir. 2018) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b)). It is also appropriate when a
complaint fails to state a claim. See Lozano v. Ocwen Fed. Bank, FSB, 489 F.3d
636, 642 (5th Cir. 2007) (“We have held that a district court is authorized to
consider the sufficiency of the complaint on its own initiative.” (quotation
omitted)). And sua sponte dismissal is mandatory when a court discovers that
it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3) (“If the court
determines at any time that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, the court
must dismiss the action.”); see also Ex parte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506,
514 (1869) (“Jurisdiction is power to declare the law, and when it ceases to
exist, the only function remaining to the court is that of announcing the fact
and dismissing the cause.”).
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This case fits into the final category: sua sponte dismissal for lack of
jurisdiction. The district court concluded it lacked jurisdiction because
Carver’s claims—against the defendants in their official capacities—were all
barred by sovereign immunity. Sovereign immunity is indeed a jurisdictional
bar. See Cambranis v. Blinken, 994 F.3d 457, 462 (5th Cir. 2021). So the
district court was quite correct that, as a general matter, it could sua sponte
dismiss the complaint.
B.
In this case, however, the court’s specific exercise of that general
power was erroneous: It dismissed the complaint sua sponte and with prejudice.
Both the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and our precedents preclude that.
1.
Let’s start with the Rules. They combine to give plaintiffs a variety of
ways to fix a defective complaint. If courts could dismiss any complaint at any
time on their own motion, with prejudice, and without prior notice, those
provisions would often be rendered nugatory.
Rule 18 allows plaintiffs to “join, as independent or alternative claims,
as many claims as [they have] against an opposing party.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
18(a). And Rule 20 gives plaintiffs latitude to join defendants. See Fed. R.
Civ. P. 20(a)(2) (“Persons . . . may be joined in one action as defendants if:
(A) any right to relief is asserted against them jointly, severally, or in the
alternative with respect to or arising out of the same transaction, occurrence,
or series of transactions or occurrences; and (B) any question of law or fact
common to all defendants will arise in the action.”).
Rules 18 and 20 say nothing about adding a claim or a party after the
original complaint’s filing. That is where Rule 15 comes in. See Douglas v.
Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 992 F.3d 367, 373 (5th Cir. 2021) (explaining that
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“[w]hen a party wishes to add a new claim after the deadline for amending
the pleadings has passed, the party generally must move for leave to amend”
under Rule 15); McLellan v. Miss. Power & Light Co., 526 F.2d 870, 872–73
(5th Cir. 1976) (holding that a plaintiff’s attempt to add a party after filing the
original complaint is governed by Rule 15 rather than Rule 21), vacated in part
on other grounds, 545 F.2d 919 (5th Cir. 1977). Rule 15 gives plaintiffs a
temporary right to amend their complaints. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(1)
(allowing amendment as a matter of course for pleadings “to which a
responsive pleading is required . . . 21 days after service of a responsive
pleading or 21 days after service of [certain motions], whichever is earlier”).
And Rule 15(a)(2) requires courts “freely give leave [to amend] when justice
so requires.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2).
This case illustrates how no-notice, with-prejudice dismissals
undermine the Rules’ edifice of interlocking procedural rights. Carver sued
the defendants in their official capacities for money damages under § 1983
and state tort law. As the district court explained, such claims are indeed
barred by sovereign immunity. See Alvarez v. Akwitti, 997 F.3d 211, 214–15
(5th Cir. 2021) (“[Sovereign immunity] bars recovering § 1983 money
damages from [TDCJ] officers in their official capacity.” (quotation
omitted)). But that does not mean Carver had no options. Perhaps she could
have amended her complaint to sue the individual defendants in their personal
capacities. See ibid. (dismissing a § 1983 money-damages claim against a
TDCJ officer in his official capacity on grounds of sovereign immunity but
remanding a personal-capacity § 1983 claim against the same officer for
further consideration). Or, depending on the underlying facts, perhaps
Carver could have avoided sovereign immunity by adding a new defendant or
a new claim.
The dismissal order pretermitted these possibilities. The Rules do not
allow that approach.
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2.
Our precedents confirm as much. The broad rule is that “a district
court may dismiss a claim on its own motion as long as the procedure
employed is fair.” Davoodi v. Austin Indep. Sch. Dist., 755 F.3d 307, 310 (5th
Cir. 2014) (quotation omitted). More specifically, “fairness in this context
requires both notice of the court’s intention and an opportunity to respond”
before dismissing sua sponte with prejudice. Carroll v. Fort James Corp., 470
F.3d 1171, 1177 (5th Cir. 2006) (quotation omitted); see also Lozano, 489 F.3d
at 643 (discussing precedents that generally require “both notice of the
court’s intention and an opportunity to respond” before sua sponte dismissal
with prejudice (quotation omitted)). *
Our precedents also make clear that a jurisdictional dismissal must be
without prejudice to refiling in a forum of competent jurisdiction. See Mitchell
v. Bailey, 982 F.3d 937, 944 (5th Cir. 2020) (explaining, in the context of
sovereign immunity, that “[a] court’s dismissal of a case resulting from a lack
of subject matter jurisdiction is not a determination of the merits and does
not prevent the plaintiff from pursuing a claim in a court that does have
proper jurisdiction. Accordingly, such a dismissal should be made without
prejudice.” (quotation omitted)). This rule applies with equal force to
sovereign-immunity dismissals. See, e.g., Warnock v. Pecos Cnty., 88 F.3d 341,
343 (5th Cir. 1996) (“Because sovereign immunity deprives the court of
*
There is one important exception, but it does not apply here. Pre-dismissal notice and
opportunity to respond are not needed “if the plaintiff has [already] alleged his best case.”
Brown v. Taylor, 829 F.3d 365, 370 (5th Cir. 2016). A plaintiff has “alleged his best case” if
the plaintiff (1) “repeatedly declared the adequacy of that complaint in . . . response to [the]
defendant’s motion to dismiss” and (2) “refused to file a supplemental complaint even in
the face of a motion to dismiss.” Ibid. (quotation omitted) (citing Lozano, 489 F.3d at 643).
Given that the defendants did not respond in any way to Carver’s complaint, the best-case
exception is inapplicable.
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jurisdiction, the claims barred by sovereign immunity can be dismissed only
under Rule 12(b)(1) and not with prejudice.”). Therefore, even if the district
court had afforded Carver the notice required by the Rules, it still should have
dismissed her complaint without prejudice.
* * *
The judgment of the district court is REVERSED, and the case is
REMANDED for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
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