Triplett v. Banks ( 2021 )

Case: 19-60770 Document: 00516101134 Page: 1 Date Filed: 11/19/2021
United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
FILED
November 19, 2021
No. 19-60770 Lyle W. Cayce
Summary Calendar Clerk
Robert Warren Triplett,
Plaintiff—Appellant,
versus
Jacqueline Banks, Superintendent; Marshall Turner, Warden;
Faytonia Johnson, Captain; Ronald Woodall, Doctor, Medical
Director; Kera Hardy; Joy Ross, Captain; Roderick Evans;
Sheneice Evans; Unknown Cooley, Captain; Mark Davis;
Karen Causey; Mitcheal Taylor; John Does; Charmine
McCleave; Gwendolyn Woodland,
Defendants—Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Mississippi
USDC No. 1:17-CV-65
Before Barksdale, Costa, and Engelhardt, Circuit Judges.
Per Curiam:*
*
Pursuant to 5th Circuit Rule 47.5, the court has determined that this
opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited
circumstances set forth in 5th Circuit Rule 47.5.4.
Case: 19-60770 Document: 00516101134 Page: 2 Date Filed: 11/19/2021
No. 19-60770
This action, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, by Robert Warren Triplett,
Mississippi prisoner # 126566, raised claims concerning: conditions of his
confinement, handling of his inmate trust account, denial of adequate
medical care, and denial of adequate food. The district court dismissed, as
frivolous, the claims against some defendants. The magistrate judge,
presiding with the consent of the parties, granted summary judgment in favor
of the remaining defendants and dismissed the action. Proceeding pro se,
Triplett presents numerous issues, all of which fail.
Dismissals of civil-rights claims as frivolous are reviewed for abuse of
discretion. Rogers v. Boatright, 709 F.3d 403, 407 (5th Cir. 2013) (citing Berry
v. Brady, 192 F.3d 504, 507 (5th Cir. 1999)). Summary judgments are
reviewed de novo, and the same standards used by the district court are
applied. Austin v. Kroger Tex., L.P., 864 F.3d 326, 328 (5th Cir. 2017). “The
court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no
genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment
as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The movant must demonstrate
the absence of a genuine dispute of material fact, but does not need to negate
the elements of nonmovant’s claim. Duffie v. United States, 600 F.3d 362,
371 (5th Cir. 2010). If the movant meets this initial burden, the burden shifts
to the nonmovant to set forth specific evidence to support his claims. See id.All facts and reasonable inferences must be construed in the light most
favorable to the nonmovant, and the court must not weigh evidence or make
credibility determinations. Deville v. Marcantel, 567 F.3d 156, 163–64 (5th
Cir. 2009).
For the first of his numerous issues, Triplett maintains the magistrate
judge erred in rejecting his assertion that summary judgment was improper
because defendants did not respond to his discovery requests or provide him
with relevant discovery. Because Triplett has not explained with specificity
how inadequate discovery prevented him from opposing defendants’
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summary-judgment motions, he has not shown the magistrate judge abused
his discretion by denying the request for additional discovery and declining
to dismiss the motions. See Robbins v. Amoco Prod. Co., 952 F.2d 901, 907 (5th
Cir. 1992) (explaining “[t]o obtain to the shelter of rule 56(f), the party
resisting summary judgment must present specific facts explaining the
inability to make a substantive response as required by rule 56(e) and must
specifically demonstrate how discovery will enable him to establish the
existence of a genuine [dispute] of material fact”); Richardson v. Henry, 902
F.2d 414, 417 (5th Cir. 1990) (explaining discovery matters within discretion
of district court); Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(d) (facts unavailable to nonmovant).
Regarding Triplett’s claims of denial of adequate medical care for his
sinus condition and vertigo, the magistrate judge did not abuse his discretion
in granting summary judgment. His medical records show Triplett received
ongoing medical treatment for these issues, including examinations and
medication. His disagreement with the medical treatment he received does
not constitute the requisite deliberate indifference. See Gobert v. Caldwell,
463 F.3d 339, 346 (5th Cir. 2006) (explaining “[a] prison official acts with
deliberate indifference only if . . . he knows that inmates face a substantial risk
of serious bodily harm and . . . he disregards that risk by failing to take
reasonable measures to abate it” (citation omitted)). He has also failed to
show any slight delay in receiving treatment resulted in substantial harm. See
Mendoza v. Lynaugh, 989 F.2d 191, 195 (5th Cir. 1993) (noting “delay in
medical care can only constitute an Eighth Amendment violation if there has
been deliberate indifference, which results in substantial harm”).
Triplett has further failed to show the magistrate judge erred by not
considering his claims concerning the denial of medical treatment for a
hernia, psoriasis, arthritic pain, and a fungus condition he raised after his
complaint was filed. He has not shown the magistrate judge abused his
discretion by declining to allow him to supplement his pleadings to raise these
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new claims. See Burns v. Exxon Corp., 158 F.3d 336, 343 (5th Cir. 1998)
(explaining whether supplemental pleadings permitted within district court’s
discretion); Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(d). The motions in which he raised these
claims did not add anything of substance to his original complaint and were
not germane to it. See Lewis v. Knutson, 699 F.2d 230, 239 (5th Cir. 1983)
(explaining courts consider whether “proposed pleading is futile”).
Triplett’s claims of denial of medical care for a facial lesion and of
unauthorized medical charges are unexhausted. Because exhaustion is
mandatory under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), the magistrate
judge did not err in granting summary judgment for failure to exhaust. See
Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 211 (2007) (explaining unexhausted claims may
not be brought in court).
Summary judgment was also properly granted against Triplett’s
conditions-of-confinement claims. The evidence viewed in the light most
favorable to Triplett did not establish defendants knew he was at substantial
risk of serious harm and failed to take reasonable actions to correct the
conditions. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 847 (1994) (holding “a
prison official may be held liable under the Eighth Amendment for denying
humane conditions of confinement only if he knows that inmates face a
substantial risk of serious harm and disregards that risk by failing to take
reasonable measures to abate it”). The magistrate judge did not err in
granting summary judgment on Triplett’s claims against the supervisory
officials because Triplett did not show they were personally involved in or
their actions were causally connected to the claimed constitutional violations.
See DeMarco v. Davis, 914 F.3d 383, 390 (5th Cir. 2019) (dismissing plaintiff’s
claim because defendants not personally involved in constitutional violation
of subordinate). Moreover, Triplett did not exhaust his claim concerning
bathroom ventilation.
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Triplett also contends the magistrate judge did not address his claim
against Captain Debbie Cooley. In district court, Triplett maintained
Captain Cooley and others supervised the serving of meals. As noted above,
the magistrate judge correctly rejected Triplett’s claims against supervisors
who had no personal involvement in the alleged constitutional violations. See
id. at 390. Further, the magistrate judge did not err in determining Triplett
did not show adequately that the meals provided by Cooley and the other
defendants lacked sufficient nutritional or caloric value to preserve his
health. See Berry, 192 F.3d at 507 (explaining “deprivation of food
constitutes cruel and unusual punishment only if it denies a prisoner the
minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities” (citation omitted)).
The district court did not abuse its discretion in applying the
Parratt/Hudson doctrine to dismiss, as frivolous, Triplett’s claims
concerning charges to his inmate account for legal mail. See Parratt v. Taylor,
451 U.S. 527 (1981), overruled in part on other grounds by Daniels v. Williams,
474 U.S. 327, 330 (1986), and Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517 (1984). Under
the Parratt/Hudson doctrine, “a deprivation of a constitutionally protected
property interest caused by a state employee’s random, unauthorized
conduct does not give rise to a § 1983 procedural due process claim, unless
the State fails to provide an adequate postdeprivation remedy”. Zinermon v.
Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 115 (1990). The district court did not abuse its discretion
in determining Triplett could not bring a claim against prison librarians
because Mississippi provides an adequate postdeprivation remedy for the
loss of property. See id. (explaining post-deprivation tort remedy
constitutionally sufficient); Nickens v. Melton, 38 F.3d 183, 185 (5th Cir. 1994)
(noting prisoner’s potential conversion action against prison employee in
state court satisfied due process).
Further, contrary to Triplett’s assertion, the magistrate judge
considered his claim that Joseph Cooley mishandled his prison grievances,
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lost his grievances, and failed to process second-step requests. The
magistrate judge did not err in concluding Triplett did not have a federally-
protected interest in having his grievances resolved to his satisfaction. See
Hawes v. Stephens, 964 F.3d 412, 418 (5th Cir. 2020) (explaining “prisoners
do not have a federally protected liberty interest in having their grievances
resolved to their satisfaction”).
Moreover, the action was properly transferred to the Southern
Division of the Southern District of Mississippi. At the time the complaint
was filed, Triplett was an inmate at the Southern Mississippi Correctional
Institution in Leaksville, Greene County, Mississippi, and Greene County is
located within the above-described division.
Because Triplett has not identified any specific error in the district
court’s denial of the motion that specific precedent be designated as the law
of the proceeding, he has abandoned this claim by failing to brief it
adequately. See Yohey v. Collins, 985 F.2d 222, 225 (5th Cir. 1993).
Moreover, the magistrate judge considered and denied all Triplett’s motions
and implicitly considered all his pleadings.
Finally, Triplett maintains a statement made by a witness at his
hearing was perjured. This conclusional assertion is insufficient to show the
magistrate judge erred in disposing of any of his claims. See Carnaby v. City
of Houston, 636 F.3d 183, 187 (5th Cir. 2011) (stating “conclusional
allegations and unsubstantiated assertions may not be relied on as evidence
by the nonmoving party”).
AFFIRMED.
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