Jones v. EEOC ( 2021 )


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  • Case: 21-10914     Document: 00516102010          Page: 1    Date Filed: 11/19/2021
    United States Court of Appeals
    for the Fifth Circuit                            United States Court of Appeals
    Fifth Circuit
    FILED
    November 19, 2021
    No. 21-10914
    Lyle W. Cayce
    Clerk
    Woodrow J. Jones, Sr.,
    Plaintiff—Appellant,
    versus
    Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, In Their
    Official Capacity; Belinda McCallister, District
    Director Official Capacity; Elizabath Roaslez,
    Official Capacity; Robert Canino, Official Capacity;
    Tammy Johnson, Official Capacity; Janet Elizondo,
    Official Capacity; Travis Hicks, Official Capacity;
    Lowell Keig, Director, Official Capacity,
    Defendants—Appellees.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Northern District of Texas
    USDC No. 3:21-CV-1953
    Before Jolly, Willett, and Engelhardt, Circuit Judges.
    Per Curiam:*
    *
    Pursuant to 5th Circuit Rule 47.5, the court has determined that this
    opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited
    circumstances set forth in 5th Circuit Rule 47.5.4.
    Case: 21-10914      Document: 00516102010           Page: 2   Date Filed: 11/19/2021
    No. 21-10914
    Woodrow J. Jones, Sr. previously sued his employer, the Texas
    Juvenile Justice Department, and its interim executive director for
    employment discrimination and retaliation seeking recovery pursuant to 
    42 U.S.C. §§ 1981
     and 1983. The district court held that Jones’s claims were
    barred by the statute of limitations, and this Court affirmed. Jones v. Tex.
    Juv. Just. Dep’t, No. 9:14-CV-60, 
    2017 WL 5634637
    , at *10 (E.D. Tex. Apr.
    17, 2017), aff’d, Jones v. Tex. Juv. Just. Dep’t, 698 F. App’x 215 (5th Cir.
    2017), cert denied, 
    138 S. Ct. 1566
     (2018).
    Several years later, Jones, appearing pro se, filed the current action
    against the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) and
    employees of the EEOC’s Dallas field office in their official capacities
    alleging that by failing to timely investigate his prior claims, the EEOC and
    its employees violated his constitutionally-protected right to equal protection
    under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, U.S.
    Const. amend. XIV, and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title
    VII”), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. The United States Magistrate Judge issued
    findings, conclusions, and a recommendation as to Jones’s suit.            He
    recommended that the district court dismiss Jones’s action for lack for
    subject matter jurisdiction because the EEOC and its employees sued in their
    official capacities are immune from suit. Jones timely objected. The district
    court accepted the Findings, Conclusions, and Recommendation of the
    United States Magistrate Judge and dismissed the action for lack of subject
    matter jurisdiction. Jones now appeals that dismissal, arguing that the
    district court erred in dismissing his suit. We disagree and affirm.
    We review the district court’s dismissal for lack of subject matter
    jurisdiction de novo, using the same standard applied by the district court.
    Gulf Petro Trading Co. v. Nigerian Nat’l Petroleum Corp., 
    512 F.3d 742
    , 746
    (5th Cir. 2008). We will uphold a dismissal for lack of jurisdiction where “it
    appears certain that the plaintiff cannot prove any set of facts in support of
    2
    Case: 21-10914      Document: 00516102010           Page: 3    Date Filed: 11/19/2021
    No. 21-10914
    his claims entitling him to relief.” In re FEMA Trailer Formaldehyde Prods.
    Liab. Litig. (Miss. Plaintiffs), 
    668 F.3d 281
    , 287 (5th Cir. 2012).
    “Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction,” Gunn v. Minton,
    
    568 U.S. 251
    , 256 (2013) (quotation omitted), and “the burden of
    establishing federal jurisdiction rests on the party seeking the federal forum,”
    Howery v. Allstate Ins. Co., 
    243 F.3d 912
    , 916 (5th Cir. 2001). “Federal courts
    have jurisdiction over suits against the United States and its agencies only to
    the extent that sovereign immunity has been waived.” Charles v. McHugh,
    613 F. App’x 330, 332 (5th Cir. 2015) (unpublished) (citing F.D.I.C. v. Meyer,
    
    510 U.S. 471
    , 475 (1994)). “A waiver of the Federal Government’s sovereign
    immunity must be unequivocally expressed in statutory text and will not be
    implied.” Lane v. Pena, 
    518 U.S. 187
    , 192 (1996) (internal citations omitted).
    “Moreover, a waiver of the Government’s sovereign immunity will be
    strictly construed, in terms of its scope, in favor of the sovereign.” 
    Id.
    We first address Jones’s Title VII claims. To the extent that Jones
    attempts to invoke Title VII as a jurisdictional basis for suing the EEOC or
    its employees in their official capacities, he cannot do so. This Court has
    previously held that “Title VII does not confer on a charging party a right of
    action against the EEOC.” Newsome v. EEOC, 
    301 F.3d 227
    , 232 (5th Cir.
    2002) (citing Gibson v. Mo. Pac. R.R. Co., 
    579 F.2d 890
    , 891 (5th Cir. 1978));
    see also Ward v. EEOC, 
    719 F.2d 311
    , 312 (9th Cir. 1983) (concluding that
    “Congress neither expressly nor impliedly provided for an action against the
    EEOC for negligence”); Baba v. Japan Travel Bureau Int’l, 
    111 F.3d 2
    , 6 (2d
    Cir. 1997) (“Title VII provides no express or implied cause of action against
    the EEOC for claims that the EEOC failed properly to investigate or process
    an employment discrimination charge.”). Only present or former employees
    of the EEOC (or applicants for employment) who allege an unlawful
    employment practice committed by the EEOC as an employer may bring a
    Title VII action against the EEOC. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–16(c). Jones,
    3
    Case: 21-10914       Document: 00516102010             Page: 4     Date Filed: 11/19/2021
    No. 21-10914
    however, had no direct employment relationship with the EEOC. Rather,
    Jones asserted that the EEOC and its employees failed to properly investigate
    his prior claim of workplace discrimination and retaliation. Therefore, it was
    proper for the district court to dismiss Jones’s Title VII claims for lack of
    subject matter jurisdiction.
    Jones also alleged that the EEOC and several of its employees in their
    official capacities deprived him of his right to equal protection under the
    Fourteenth Amendment. However, the Fourteenth Amendment applies
    only to state actors, not federal actors. See Bolling v. Sharpe, 
    347 U.S. 497
    ,
    499 (1954). Jones therefore cannot bring a Fourteenth Amendment claim
    against the EEOC or EEOC officials in their official capacities. Accordingly,
    Jones’s Equal Protection claim was properly dismissed. 1
    For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court is
    AFFIRMED.
    1
    Although Jones’s Equal Protection claim was not discussed in the Findings,
    Conclusions, and Recommendation of the United States Magistrate Judge, we “may affirm
    a judgment upon any basis supported by the record.” Davis v. Scott, 
    157 F.3d 1003
    , 1005
    (5th Cir. 1998).
    4