United States v. Ignacio Andrade-Lopez ( 2019 )


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  •       Case: 18-20280          Document: 00515008080        Page: 1   Date Filed: 06/24/2019
    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
    United States Court of Appeals
    Fifth Circuit
    No. 18-20280
    FILED
    June 24, 2019
    Summary Calendar
    Lyle W. Cayce
    Clerk
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff-Appellee
    v.
    IGNACIO ANDRADE-LOPEZ, also known as Tio,
    Defendant-Appellant
    ---------------------------------------------------
    Consolidated with 18-20282
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff-Appellee
    v.
    IGNACIO ANDRADE-LOPEZ,
    Defendant-Appellant
    Appeals from the United States District Court
    for the Southern District of Texas
    USDC No. 4:15-CR-177-1
    USDC No. 4:16-CR-578-1
    Case: 18-20280      Document: 00515008080         Page: 2    Date Filed: 06/24/2019
    No. 18-20280
    c/w No. 18-20282
    Before STEWART, Chief Judge, and SOUTHWICK and GRAVES, Circuit
    Judges.
    PER CURIAM: *
    Ignacio Andrade-Lopez pleaded guilty in separate cases to one count of
    conspiracy to possess with the intent to distribute 50 grams or more of
    methamphetamine (Houston case) and one count of conspiracy to possess with
    the intent to distribute methamphetamine (Dallas case). He was sentenced to
    concurrent sentences of 262 months of imprisonment and four years of
    supervised release.       Andrade-Lopez timely appealed.              See FED. R. APP.
    P. 4(b)(1)(A)(i). The Government’s motion to consolidate the cases on appeal
    was granted.
    Andrade-Lopez argues that his guilty pleas in both cases were
    unknowing and involuntary due to the district court’s failure to properly
    admonish him pursuant to Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.
    As acknowledged by Andrade-Lopez, this court reviews his allegations of Rule
    11 error raised for the first time on appeal for plain error. See United States v.
    Vonn, 
    535 U.S. 55
    , 59 (2002). To prevail on plain error review, Andrade-Lopez
    must show (1) a forfeited error (2) that is clear or obvious, i.e., not “subject to
    reasonable dispute,” and (3) that affects his substantial rights. Puckett v.
    United States, 
    556 U.S. 129
    , 135 (2009). If Andrade-Lopez shows such an error,
    then this court “has the discretion to remedy the error . . . if the error seriously
    affect[s] the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” 
    Id. (internal quotation
    marks and citations omitted).
    * Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not
    be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH
    CIR. R. 47.5.4.
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    No. 18-20280
    c/w No. 18-20282
    Although the district court deviated from the requirements of
    Rule 11(b)(1)(O) in both of his cases, Andrade-Lopez was advised via his plea
    agreements about the potential immigration consequences he faced upon
    conviction. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(b)(1)(O); United States v. Cuevas-Andrade,
    
    232 F.3d 440
    , 444-45 (5th Cir. 2000). Moreover, Andrade-Lopez was advised
    via his presentence report (PSR) that his guilty pleas could result in
    immigration consequences if he was a noncitizen.          See United States v.
    Vasquez-Bernal, 
    197 F.3d 169
    , 171 (5th Cir. 1999). Thus, even assuming that
    the district court’s errors in failing to provide the Rule 11(b)(1)(O)
    admonishment at Andrade-Lopez’s rearraignments constituted clear or
    obvious errors, Andrade-Lopez has failed to demonstrate that he would have
    pleaded differently absent the errors. See United States v. Dominguez Benitez,
    
    542 U.S. 74
    , 83 (2004).
    Similarly, Andrade-Lopez was advised via his plea agreement in his
    Houston case of the district court’s obligation to calculate the guidelines range
    and to consider that range, any possible departures, and other sentencing
    factors under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). See FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(b)(1)(M); Cuevas-
    
    Andrade, 232 F.3d at 444-45
    . Additionally, he was informed at rearraignment
    that he faced a statutory minimum sentence of 10 years and a maximum of
    life. Thus, he was fully aware of the consequences of his plea. See United
    States v. Rivera, 
    898 F.2d 442
    , 447 (5th Cir. 1990).
    Additionally, the record indicates that Andrade-Lopez read and
    understood his plea agreement and raised no questions regarding the waiver-
    of-appeal provision. Moreover, the appeal-waiver provision was mentioned in
    Andrade-Lopez’s PSR. See 
    Vasquez-Bernal, 197 F.3d at 171
    . Thus, to the
    extent that Andrade-Lopez challenges the validity of the appeal-waiver
    provision in his plea agreement, the waiver is valid and enforceable. See
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    No. 18-20280
    c/w No. 18-20282
    United States v. McKinney, 
    406 F.3d 744
    , 746 (5th Cir. 2005). To the extent
    that he challenges the validity of his guilty plea, Andrade-Lopez fails to show
    that any purported Rule 11 error affected his substantial rights.              See
    Dominguez 
    Benitez, 542 U.S. at 83
    .
    With respect to Andrade-Lopez’s Dallas case, there was sufficient
    evidence to permit a finding that he was involved in a narcotics conspiracy.
    See FED. CRIM. P. 11(b)(3); United States v. Hildenbrand, 
    527 F.3d 466
    , 474-75
    (5th Cir. 2008). However, even if the district court erred by failing to elicit
    Andrade-Lopez’s admission of facts sufficient to establish that he conspired to
    possess with the intent to distribute methamphetamine, he has failed to show
    that he was prejudiced by the district court’s error. Andrade-Lopez did not
    attempt to withdraw his guilty plea at any time before the district court and
    he does not do so on appeal. He does not request the opportunity to go to trial
    nor has he directed this court to any portion of the record demonstrating that
    his plea decision was affected by the alleged error. Thus, he has failed to
    demonstrate a reasonable probability that he would not have pled guilty if the
    district court had solicited his admission of additional facts to support his plea.
    See Dominguez 
    Benitez, 542 U.S. at 83
    .
    The Government concedes that the district court imposed a sentence
    above the statutory maximum in Andrade-Lopez’s Dallas case, Case No. 18-
    20282. See 21 U.S.C. §§ 846, 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(C). Applying the concurrent
    sentence doctrine, we vacate the sentence in Andrade-Lopez’s Dallas case and
    remand with instructions to the district court to suspend imposition of this
    sentence. See United States v. Stovall, 
    825 F.2d 817
    , 824, 827 (5th Cir.),
    amended on other grounds by 
    833 F.2d 526
    (5th Cir. 1987).
    Additionally, the district court is instructed to correct a clerical error
    with respect to the offense of conviction in the written judgment in Andrade-
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    Lopez’s Dallas case. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 36. The district court’s judgment
    misidentifies the offense of conviction as one for conspiracy to possess with the
    intent to distribute 500 grams or more of methamphetamine whereas the
    offense of conviction is correctly identified as a conviction for conspiracy to
    possess with the intent to distribute methamphetamine, a violation of §§ 846,
    841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(C).
    AFFIRMED IN PART; VACATED IN PART; AND REMANDED WITH
    INSTRUCTIONS.
    5