United States v. Gace ( 2021 )


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  • Case: 20-40718     Document: 00516109272         Page: 1     Date Filed: 11/29/2021
    United States Court of Appeals
    for the Fifth Circuit                         United States Court of Appeals
    Fifth Circuit
    FILED
    November 29, 2021
    No. 20-40718
    Summary Calendar                   Lyle W. Cayce
    Clerk
    United States of America,
    Plaintiff—Appellee,
    versus
    Keith Prescott Gace,
    Defendant—Appellant.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Southern District of Texas
    USDC No. 3:19-CR-4-1
    Before Southwick, Oldham, and Wilson, Circuit Judges.
    Per Curiam:*
    Keith Prescott Gace was convicted by a jury of sexual exploitation of
    children by producing and attempting to produce child pornography (count
    one) after he pled guilty to distribution of child pornography (count two);
    receipt of child pornography (count three); possession of child pornography
    *
    Pursuant to 5th Circuit Rule 47.5, the court has determined that this
    opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited
    circumstances set forth in 5th Circuit Rule 47.5.4.
    Case: 20-40718      Document: 00516109272              Page: 2   Date Filed: 11/29/2021
    No. 20-40718
    (count four); and attempted destruction of property (count five). The
    district court sentenced him to a total of 1,020 months of imprisonment and
    a life term of supervised release.
    On appeal, Gace argues that the district court abused its discretion
    under Rule 403 of the Federal Rules of Evidence in admitting images and
    descriptions of child pornography that, he contends, were highly prejudicial
    and of limited probative value to count one. When an evidentiary objection
    has been properly preserved, it is reviewed for abuse of discretion. United
    States v. Dillon, 
    532 F.3d 379
    , 387 (5th Cir. 2008). A district court’s ruling
    regarding Rule 403 is reviewed “with an especially high level of deference to
    the district court, with reversal called for only rarely and only when there has
    been a clear abuse of discretion.” 
    Id.
     (internal quotation marks and citation
    omitted).
    The district court properly conducted the balancing test under Rule
    403 and did not abuse its discretion in determining that the probative value
    of the challenged evidence substantially outweighed the danger of unfair
    prejudice. See Dillon, 
    532 F.3d at
    387–89. The challenged evidence was
    probative of Gace’s intent to produce child pornography of his minor
    daughter, rather than an artistic family photo as Gace argued. See United
    States v. Lewis, 
    796 F.3d 543
    , 547–48 (5th Cir. 2015); Dillon, 
    532 F.3d at 389
    .
    Gace’s contention that the Government did not need to introduce the
    evidence because he offered to stipulate that he pled guilty to possessing and
    distributing child pornography is unavailing. See United States v. Naidoo, 
    995 F.3d 367
    , 376 (5th Cir. 2021); see also United States v. Caldwell, 
    586 F.3d 338
    ,
    343 (5th Cir. 2009). The risk of unfair prejudice was minimal as the
    challenged evidence was similar to the photographs at issue in count one. See
    Naidoo, 995 F.3d at 378; Dillon, 
    532 F.3d at 389
    . Gace did not show that the
    amount of time that elapsed between committing the child exploitation
    offense and the other offenses reduced the probative value of the challenged
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    No. 20-40718
    evidence. See United States v. Grimes, 
    244 F.3d 375
    , 384–85 (5th Cir. 2001).
    Finally, any potential for unfair prejudice was mitigated by the district court’s
    limiting instruction to the jury. See Naidoo, 995 F.3d at 378; Lewis, 796 F.3d
    at 548.
    Next, Gace argues that the district court erred by failing to give a
    specific instruction that the jury had to reach a unanimous decision as to
    whether he actually produced child pornography or attempted to do so.
    Because Gace did not raise this argument in the district court, our review is
    limited to plain error. See Puckett v. United States, 
    556 U.S. 129
    , 135 (2009).
    The district court gave a general unanimity instruction, and Gace has
    not presented any evidence “tending to show that the jury was confused or
    possessed any difficulty reaching a unanimous verdict.” United States v.
    Tucker, 
    345 F.3d 320
    , 337 (5th Cir. 2003). Absent such evidence, Gace has
    not shown that there is any reason to believe that the jury verdict was not
    unanimous. See 
    id.
     at 336–37. Therefore, he has not shown that the district
    court made any clear or obvious error by not giving a specific unanimity
    instruction. See id.; see also United States v. Creech, 
    408 F.3d 264
    , 269 (5th
    Cir. 2005).
    Lastly, Gace argues that in instructing the jury as to whether a
    depiction constitutes “sexually explicit conduct” under 
    18 U.S.C. § 2251
    (a),
    the district court erred in directing the jury to consider whether the depiction
    was designed to elicit a sexual response in the viewer as laid out in United
    States v. Dost, 
    636 F. Supp. 828
    , 832 (S.D. Cal. 1986), asserting that this Dost
    factor lacks any basis in statute. As he concedes, the district court’s
    instruction followed the Fifth Circuit Pattern Jury Instructions, and the
    district court did not abuse its discretion. See United States v. McCall, 
    833 F.3d 560
    , 563 (5th Cir. 2016); United States v. Steen, 
    634 F.3d 822
    , 826 (5th
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    Cir. 2011); United States v. Toure, 
    965 F.3d 393
    , 403 (5th Cir. 2020); Fifth
    Circuit Pattern Jury Instruction 2.84.
    AFFIRMED.
    4