Wilder v. Caliber Home Loans ( 2021 )

Case: 20-10314 Document: 00516122326 Page: 1 Date Filed: 12/08/2021
United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
FILED
December 8, 2021
No. 20-10314 Lyle W. Cayce
Summary Calendar Clerk
Bryan Wallace Wilder,
Plaintiff—Appellant,
Elizabeth M. Wilder,
Third Party Defendant—Appellant,
versus
Caliber Home Loans, Incorporated,
Defendant—Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Texas
No. 3:18-CV-3010
Before Smith, Stewart, and Graves, Circuit Judges.
Per Curiam:*
Bryan and Elizabeth Wilder appeal, pro se, a summary judgment that
*
Pursuant to 5th Circuit Rule 47.5, the court has determined that this opin-
ion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances
set forth in 5th Circuit Rule 47.5.4.
Case: 20-10314 Document: 00516122326 Page: 2 Date Filed: 12/08/2021
No. 20-10314
(1) dismissed their claim that the procedure for expedited nonjudicial fore-
closure under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 736 violates state law and is un-
constitutional and (2) granted a declaratory judgment, requested in a coun-
terclaim by Caliber Home Loans, Inc. (“Caliber”), allowing Caliber to fore-
close on property secured by a mortgage note on which the Wilders had
defaulted. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 736.1 et seq. We have jurisdiction over Eliz-
abeth Wilder’s appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 3(c)(2).
We first reject the Wilders’ conclusional assertion that the district
court improperly allowed Caliber to file a third-party claim against Elizabeth
Wilder and a counterclaim (collectively, the “Counterclaim”). Leave to file
was properly granted under the liberal standard of Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 15(a)(2).
Further, supplemental jurisdiction existed under 28 U.S.C. § 1367because original jurisdiction was based on the Wilders’ federal constitutional
claim and because that claim—which sought to thwart foreclosure under
Rule 736.11—and the Counterclaim seeking that foreclosure arose from the
same nucleus of operative facts. See § 1367; Hinkley v. Envoy Air, Inc.,
968 F.3d 544, 549 (5th Cir. 2020). The district court did not abuse its
discretion to exercise that supplemental jurisdiction under § 1367(c) and
“based on considerations of judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and com-
ity,” Cinel v. Connick, 15 F.3d 1338, 1344 (5th Cir. 1994), and to guard against
forum manipulation, see Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 357
(1988).
In so ruling, we reject the Wilders’ repetitive, conclusional, ill-
informed, or irrelevant assertions that the Counterclaim was not “germane”
to their challenge to Rule 736, that there was no diversity or federal question
jurisdiction over the Counterclaim itself, and that Caliber lacks “standing”
to defend the validity of Rule 736 because only the State of Texas may do so
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No. 20-10314
after the question is certified to the Texas Supreme Court.
The Wilders offer only conclusional assertions, unsupported by any
relevant authority, that Rule 736 violates Article XVI, § 50 of the Texas
Constitution or the procedural rule-making power of the Texas Supreme
Court under Texas Government Code § 22.004. Their equal protection
argument likewise fails because they do not allege intentional discrimination
against “because of membership in a protected class” or that they have been
“intentionally treated differently from others similarly situated.” Gibson v.
Texas Dep’t of Ins.―Div. of Workers’ Comp., 700 F.3d 227, 238 (5th Cir.
2012).
As to the Wilders’ allegation that Rule 736 denies them due process,
they merely recite general legal principles under the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments without explaining how those principles apply in this case. See
Brinkmann v. Dallas Cnty. Deputy Sheriff Abner, 813 F.2d 744, 748 (5th Cir.
1987) (declining to fashion theories and arguments for appellants). The abil-
ity to challenge Rule 736 foreclosure by filing a separate action—which the
Wilders have now done twice—gives the “opportunity to be heard at a
meaningful time and in a meaningful manner” needed to provide the requi-
site due process. Burciaga v. Deutsche Bank Nat’l Tr. Co., 871 F.3d 380, 390
(5th Cir. 2017) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
We reject the Wilders’ challenge to the declaratory judgment, which
again was based primarily on their meritless jurisdictional contentions. The
Wilders fail to identify any ground for denying a request for declaratory judg-
ment, raised in a counterclaim, and seeking to allow foreclosure. See
28 U.S.C. § 2201(a); Travelers Ins. Co. v. La. Farm Bur. Fed’n, Inc., 996 F.2d
774, 778 (5th Cir. 1993); cf. Doody v. Ameriquest Mortg. Co., 242 F.3d 286, 288
(5th Cir. 2001) (certifying a question to the Texas Supreme Court); Doody v.
Ameriquest Mortg. Co., 263 F.3d 435 (5th Cir. 2001) (ordering judgment for
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No. 20-10314
lender following answer to certified question); cf. also AG Acceptance Corp. v.
Veigel, 564 F.3d 695, 697 (5th Cir. 2009) (affirming declaratory judgment for
creditor). Moreover, the Wilders completely fail to contest the foreclosure
issue at the heart of the Counterclaim, and Caliber amply demonstrated that
there were no genuinely contested disputes of material fact and that it was
entitled to summary judgment allowing foreclosure under the applicable state
substantive law. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a), (b).
The Wilders have alleged that one of their pleadings “was tampered
with, falsified, and . . . willfully and unlawfully concealed and redacted by
someone in the District Court in violation of 18 U.S.C. 2071” and in “blatant
disregard for criminal law.” They assert that the magistrate judge and the
district court are responsible for “this deliberate criminal act.” The allegedly
concealed text was part of a quotation that recited the standard for deciding
a motion for summary judgment. It is evident that the text was merely
highlighted—by the Wilders—in a manner that darkened when photocopied.
There is no plausible basis for accusing anyone of deliberately con-
cealing this unremarkable legal exposition. The Wilders’ irresponsible and
inflammatory accusation is a contemptuous insult to the district court. We
therefore warn the Wilders that future filings with disparaging, abusive, or
contemptuous language will result in the imposition of monetary sanctions
and limits on access to the federal courts. See Theriault v. Silber, 579 F.2d
302, 303 (5th Cir. 1978) (dismissing appeal).
AFFIRMED.
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