Tilden Holliday v. Commonwealth Brands, Inc. ( 2012 )


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  •      Case: 12-30278     Document: 00511944729         Page: 1     Date Filed: 08/03/2012
    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT  United States Court of Appeals
    Fifth Circuit
    FILED
    August 3, 2012
    No. 12-30278                          Lyle W. Cayce
    Summary Calendar                             Clerk
    TILDEN HOLLIDAY,
    Plaintiff–Appellant
    v.
    COMMONWEALTH BRANDS, INCORPORATED,
    Defendant–Appellee
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Eastern District of Louisiana
    USDC No. 2:10-CV-2785
    Before REAVLEY, SMITH, and PRADO, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:*
    Plaintiff–Appellant Tilden Holliday appeals the district court’s grant of
    summary judgment to Defendant–Appellee Commonwealth Brands, Inc. (“CBI”)
    on his claim under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”).
    Holliday claims that CBI terminated his employment because of his age and
    hired someone younger to replace him. The district court determined that even
    assuming Holliday had established a prima facie age discrimination claim, he
    *
    Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not
    be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.
    R. 47.5.4.
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    had not shown that CBI’s purported reason for terminating him—his poor
    performance—was a pretext for unlawful discrimination. We affirm.
    I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
    In August 2001, CBI hired Holliday as a Key Account Manager, a position
    in CBI’s sales team. Holliday was 48 years old at the time. His direct supervisor
    at CBI was Regional Manager Loren Trauth. Trauth reported to Bob Miller, a
    Sales Director, who in turn reported to Gary Ebert, Vice President of Sales. An
    interoffice memo from Miller to Ebert with a copy to Trauth in June 2003 cited
    Holliday’s “very slow” progress and proposed reassigning him to be a Territory
    Manager.    The parties dispute whether this reassignment—which became
    effective June 30, 2003—was a demotion; Holliday maintains that it was not a
    demotion because his salary was not reduced, while CBI claims it was a
    demotion based on his poor performance as a Key Account Manager. In any
    event, the parties agree that in April 2004, Holliday was promoted to a District
    Manager; his direct supervisor remained Trauth. He maintained that position
    until he was terminated in April 2008.
    CBI proffers evidence that it claims shows that Holliday had performance
    issues throughout his time at CBI. In January 2003, Miller sent Holliday a
    letter criticizing him for having improperly reported his activities by indicating
    on a log that a client had canceled an appointment when in fact no appointment
    had ever been set. The letter stated that if Holliday mislead Miller or Trauth in
    that way again it would “lead to further disciplinary action up to and including
    termination.” In May 2005, Trauth sent a memo to Holliday, with a copy to
    Miller, setting forth in writing guidelines for when and how Holliday was to have
    contact with the Territory Managers he supervised. This memo was prompted
    by complaints by Territory Managers that Holliday had been contacting them
    for non-work-related reasons during business hours, at home, and on weekends.
    In February 2006, Trauth sent a memo to Hoke Whitford, who was now
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    responsible for supervising Trauth and Holliday, explaining how Holliday had
    lied to her and Miller by claiming to have contacted another CBI District
    Manager as he had been instructed, when in fact he had not. The memo also
    stated that in May, October, and November 2005, Trauth had instructed
    Holliday to demonstrate leadership skills to earn the respect of the Territory
    Managers he supervised. In March 2006, Trauth sent a memo to Holliday
    informing him that, as previously discussed verbally and in writing, his
    performance had not been up to CBI’s standards in multiple areas. The memo
    gave Holliday 30 days to make improvements in those areas, and stated that
    “failure to improve your job performance will result in further disciplinary
    action, up to and including termination of employment.”
    CBI performed annual performance appraisals of its District Managers,
    which were completed by the supervising Regional Manager, subject to the Sales
    Director’s approval. The form used to evaluate District Managers rated a
    number of categories from one to five, with five as the highest score. Holliday’s
    June 2006 annual review, completed by Trauth, awards Holliday threes in half
    the categories and twos and ones in all the others. Holliday’s 2007 annual
    review awarded him threes in one-quarter of the categories, twos in more than
    half, and ones in the others.
    According to Holliday, these negative reviews and other incidents were
    part of a plan developed by Trauth to get him fired and have him replaced with
    someone younger. This plan, Holliday maintains, is evident from a number of
    age-related comments Trauth made to Holliday and others beginning in early
    2006. After Holliday had trouble with a computer program, for example, Trauth
    said to him: “Why can’t you grasp this?”; “You don’t understand”; You just don’t
    understand this, do you?”; and “Well, maybe you need to retire.” Holliday claims
    that Trauth referred to him and a Territory Manager as “you two old men” in
    late 2006, and described the Territory Manager to Holliday as “too old to grasp
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    the CBI hookup and too old to grasp to do a route list on his own. And it looks
    like he might be getting Alzheimer’s.” Holliday further alleges that Trauth told
    him he was “just getting too old for this job” twice, once after Holliday was
    unable to move a fully-stocked soda machine and again after he asked Trauth
    for a water break while “doing a reset,” which he claimed was a “very strenuous”
    process. Finally, Trauth told Ray Ozmont, a Territory Manager supervised by
    Holliday, on more than one occasion that Holliday was an old man and too old
    for his job, and Trauth criticized Holliday’s preparation of a report reviewing
    Ozmont’s performance, saying that Holliday was “not grasping this. You’re
    getting old.”
    In December 2007, Ozmont heard from a coworker that Trauth had
    promised Holliday’s job to Mina Hernandez.        Hernandez was a Territory
    Manager supervised by Holliday, and Holliday alleges that Trauth and
    Hernandez were very close. Also in December 2007, Hernandez submitted a
    three-page, type-written complaint to Whitworth, detailing a history of trouble
    getting along with Holliday, and claiming that Holliday had spread rumors that
    she and Trauth were romantically involved. Hernandez’s complaint prompted
    a January 2008 letter from Whitworth to Holliday that listed five “items of
    concern”: (1) Holliday’s poor working relationship with Trauth; (2) Holliday’s
    poor communication with the Territory Managers he supervised; (3) Holliday’s
    unfair and inconsistent treatment of employees; (4) Holliday’s discussion of
    personnel information about past employees; and (5) allegations that Holliday
    had made “personal sexual comments” about CBI employees. Whitworth met
    with Holliday to deliver the letter, and followed up with an email the next day
    outlining further issues with Holliday’s job performance.
    In March 2008, Whitworth received from Trauth another report that
    Holliday’s job performance had not improved, that his communication with
    Trauth and his Territory Managers had not improved, that he was not effectively
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    training his Territory Managers, and that he had discussed confidential
    personnel information with one of his Territory Managers. In the middle of
    April 2008, Holliday received a negative interim performance review from
    Trauth. On April 21, 2008, Whitworth wrote a letter to Holliday detailing
    Holliday’s lack of improvement on any of the “items of concern” outlined in
    Whitworth’s January letter to Holliday. This April letter concluded: “It is my
    determination that [Human Resources Manager] Bonita McIntyre and myself
    terminate Mr. Holliday’s employment on 4-28-08.” Whitworth, McIntyre, and
    Russ Mancuso—the new Vice President of Sales—met with Holliday on April 28
    to inform him that he was being terminated based on his failure to improve his
    job performance. CBI replaced Holliday with Ozment, who was 42 years old at
    the time he was promoted.
    After receiving a right-to-sue letter from the Equal Employment
    Opportunity Commission, Holliday brought suit against CBI in the United
    States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana, alleging claims under
    the ADEA and Louisiana state law. The district court granted CBI’s motion for
    summary judgment on all of Holliday’s claims. Holliday timely appealed,1
    raising only his claim under the ADEA.
    II. JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
    We have jurisdiction under 
    28 U.S.C. § 1291
    . We review a grant of
    summary judgment de novo, applying the same legal standard as the district
    court. Dediol v. Best Chevrolet, Inc., 
    655 F.3d 435
    , 439 (5th Cir. 2011). “A
    1
    We disagree with CBI that Holliday’s appeal should be summarily rejected due to his
    technically appealing from the district court’s order denying Holliday’s motion to alter or
    amend the summary judgment. Although Holliday did not comply with Federal Rule of
    Appellate Procedure 3(c), this court is lenient in interpreting notices of appeal, maintaining
    “a policy of liberal construction . . . where the intent to appeal an unmentioned or mislabeled
    ruling is apparent and there is no prejudice to the adverse party.” In re Blast Energy Servs.,
    Inc., 
    593 F.3d 418
    , 424 n.3 (5th Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks omitted). It is apparent
    from the briefing that Holliday intended to appeal the entire case and that CBI has not
    suffered prejudice.
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    summary judgment motion is properly granted only when, viewing the evidence
    in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, the record indicates that
    there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is
    entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Barker v. Halliburton Co., 
    645 F.3d 297
    , 299 (5th Cir. 2011).
    III. DISCUSSION
    Under the ADEA, “[i]t shall be unlawful for an employer to . . . discharge
    any individual . . . because of such individual’s age.” 
    29 U.S.C. § 623
    (a)(1). To
    prevail, a plaintiff may use direct or circumstantial evidence to prove that “age
    was the ‘but-for’ cause of the employer’s” discharge decision. Gross v. FBL
    Financial Servs., Inc., 
    557 U.S. 167
    , 177 (2009). Where, as here, a plaintiff
    provides no direct evidence of age discrimination, we apply the familiar
    McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework. See Moss v. BMC Software,
    Inc., 
    610 F.3d 917
    , 922 (5th Cir. 2010) (citing McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green,
    
    411 U.S. 792
    , 802 (1973)).
    Under that framework, a plaintiff must first establish a prima facie case
    that: “(1) he was discharged; (2) he was qualified for the position; (3) he was
    within the protected class at the time of discharge; and (4) he was either
    i) replaced by someone outside the protected class, ii) replaced by someone
    younger, or iii) otherwise discharged because of his age.” Jackson v. Cal-Western
    Packaging Corp., 
    602 F.3d 374
    , 378 (5th Cir. 2010).         The only element of
    Holliday’s prima facie case disputed by CBI is that Holliday was qualified for the
    position. Because “a plaintiff challenging his termination or demotion can
    ordinarily establish a prima facie case of age discrimination by showing that he
    continued to possess the necessary qualifications for his job at the time of the
    adverse action,” Bienkowski v. American Airlines, Inc., 
    851 F.2d 1503
    , 1506 (5th
    Cir. 1988), and Holliday “had not suffered physical disability or loss of a
    necessary professional license or some other occurrence that rendered him unfit
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    for the position for which he was hired,” 
    id.
     at 1506 n.3, we determine that
    Holliday met his prima facie burden on this element.
    Once a plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, the burden shifts to the
    employer to articulate a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for terminating
    the plaintiff. See Moss, 
    610 F.3d at 922
    . Holliday does not dispute that CBI has
    satisfied its burden; CBI maintains that it terminated Holliday because of “his
    persistent unsatisfactory performance.”
    Once an employer articulates a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason, the
    burden shifts back to the plaintiff to “rebut the employer’s purported
    explanation, to show that the reason given is merely pretextual.” 
    Id.
     “A plaintiff
    may show pretext either through evidence of disparate treatment or by showing
    that the employer’s proffered explanation is false or unworthy of credence.” 
    Id.
    (internal quotation marks omitted). “But a reason cannot be proved to be a
    ‘pretext for discrimination’ unless it is shown both that the reason was false, and
    that discrimination was the real reason.” St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 
    509 U.S. 502
    , 515 (1993).
    Holliday’s only evidence that age discrimination was the real reason for
    his termination are Trauth’s comments. Holliday concedes that Trauth did not
    have actual authority over CBI’s decision to terminate him, but relies on
    Palasota v. Haggar Clothing Co., 
    342 F.3d 569
    , 578 (5th Cir. 2003), in arguing
    that age-related remarks by someone other than the formal decision-maker are
    probative of the employer’s discriminatory intent if that person is in a position
    to influence the decision. Assuming that this “cat’s paw” theory of liability is
    available under the ADEA,2 it is not appropriate here. Holliday has not offered
    2
    Although we have recognized this “cat’s paw” theory of liability under the ADEA, it
    is entirely unclear whether our decisions remain good law in the wake of Gross v. FBL
    Financial Services, Inc., 
    557 U.S. 167
     (2009), and Staub v. Proctor Hospital, 
    131 S. Ct. 1186
    (2011). Staub recognized “cat’s paw” liability under the Uniformed Services Employment and
    Reemployment Rights Act (“USERRA”). 
    131 S. Ct. at 1194
    . In so holding, the Court construed
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    any evidence showing that Trauth had “influence or leverage” over Whitworth,
    McIntire, or Mancuso—the CBI employees who made the decision to terminate
    Holliday. See Russell v. McKinney Hosp. Venture, 
    235 F.3d 219
    , 226 (5th Cir.
    2000). The record is unequivocal that Whitworth independently investigated
    any complaints about Holliday’s performance and communicated directly with
    Holliday about improving his performance. Whitworth only determined that
    Holliday’s employment should be terminated after Holliday failed to improve his
    performance in response to a letter from Whitworth.                        As Holliday has no
    evidence that Whitworth possessed any discriminatory motive, nor any evidence
    that Whitworth was influenced or leveraged by Trauth,3 he has failed to sustain
    his burden of showing that CBI’s purported reason for terminating him was
    pretextual. Thus, the district court appropriately granted CBI’s motion for
    summary judgment.
    IV. CONCLUSION
    For the foregoing reasons, the district court’s summary judgment in favor
    of CBI is affirmed.
    AFFIRMED.
    the phrase “motivating factor in the employer’s action,” which is in the texts of USERRA and
    Title VII. 
    Id.
     at 1190–91. That phrase is not, however, in the text of the ADEA, and
    specifically because the ADEA does not include that phrase, the Court in Gross held that
    plaintiffs could not proceed under a “mixed motive” theory in ADEA cases. See 
    557 U.S. at
    174–78. Because the “motivating factor” phrase is not in the ADEA, and because the Court
    construed that phrase in recognizing “cat’s paw” liability under USERRA, and finally, because
    the Court has focused closely on the text of the antidiscrmination statutes in authorizing
    theories of liability, it could very well be that our prior recognition of “cat’s paw” liability under
    the ADEA was incorrect.
    3
    Also unavailing is Holliday’s attempt to show pretext by arguing that CBI could not
    have actually terminated him for poor performance because sales had increased during his
    tenure as District Manager. The record is clear that CBI’s complaints about Holliday’s
    performance were related to his unprofessional behavior and poor management, not his lack
    of sales acumen.
    8