Ramon v. Lanier ( 1998 )

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
____________________
No. 97-21015
Summary Calendar
____________________
JOE B. RAMON,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
BOB LANIER, Mayor; CITY OF HOUSTON,
Defendants-Appellees.
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JOE B. RAMON,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
CITY OF HOUSTON,
Defendant-Appellee.
_________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Texas, Houston
(H-96-CV-2996 & H-96-CV-3685)
_________________________________________________________________
August 3, 1998
Before KING, WIENER, and BARKSDALE, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
The district court granted summary judgment for the
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that
this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except
under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
defendants in these consolidated cases filed by Joe B. Ramon
alleging that he was refused employment in violation of Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et
seq, and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), 29
U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1994). Ramon claimed that he applied for
employment with the City of Houston on two different occasions
and that his applications were rejected in favor of other
applicants who were non-Hispanic, younger males even though he
possessed job qualifications that were superior to those of the
successful applicants. The defendants contended that Ramon was
not qualified for the first job that he applied for, and that his
poor performance during a job interview eliminated him from
consideration for the second job.
The district court, in a careful, detailed opinion, assumed,
without deciding, that Ramon had made a prima facie case of
discrimination under Title VII or the ADEA, but concluded that
Ramon had not demonstrated that a genuine issue of material fact
remained on whether the defendants’ reasons for refusing his
employment applications were pretexts for unlawful
discrimination. As the district court correctly noted, an
employer’s proffered reason cannot be proven to be a “‘pretext
for discrimination’ unless it is shown both that the reason was
false, and that discrimination was the real reason,” citing
Walton v. Bisco Indus. Inc., 119 F.3d 368, 369 (5th Cir.
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1997)(quoting St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 515
(1993)). The district court noted that the only evidence
proferred by Ramon on both topics was his own affidavit which
makes only conclusory allegations that he was refused the jobs at
issue because of his national origin and age. The district court
concluded that Ramon had pointed to no evidence which showed that
a genuine issue of material fact existed on whether the
defendants’ stated reasons for not hiring him were false and that
discrimination was the real reason and granted summary judgment
for the defendants.
On appeal, Ramon remains unable to point to any evidence
that discrimination was the real reason that he was not hired.
The only evidence he discusses is his own belief that
discrimination was at work and the fact that the hirees were not
Hispanic and were younger than he. As the district court
correctly concluded, that evidence is not sufficient to raise a
fact question.
The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.
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