U.S. v. Kye Soo Lee ( 1992 )


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  •                IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
    ____________
    NO. 91-4762
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
    Plaintiff - Appellant
    v.
    KYE SOO LEE, MIN HO CHAY,
    and MIN SIK LEE
    Defendants - Appellees
    _________________________________________________________________
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Western District of Louisiana
    _________________________________________________________________
    (   May 22, 1992    )
    Before GARWOOD and DeMOSS, Circuit Judges, and SCHWARTZ, District
    Judge.1
    SCHWARTZ, District Judge:
    The Government appeals the judgment of the district court on
    remand, granting the defendants' motion to suppress predicated on
    its findings of lack of defendants' consent to accompany officers
    to state police headquarters and the absence of probable cause to
    arrest.   We reverse and remand.
    1
    District Judge of the Eastern District of Louisiana,
    sitting by designation.
    1
    FACTS AND PRIOR PROCEEDINGS
    The story of Kye Soo Lee, Min Ho Chay (Chay) and Min Sik Lee's
    indictment for trafficking counterfeit goods in violation of Title
    18, United States Code, Section 2320 begins on May 27, 1988, at
    approximately   5:50    p.m.,   when       Louisiana    State   Trooper   Bruce
    Vanderhoven (Vanderhoven), was patrolling westbound Interstate 20
    (I-20) near Bossier City, Louisiana.           A Ryder rental truck driven
    by Chay captured his attention, since it was swerving in and out of
    traffic without signalling, thus creating a traffic hazard.
    Utilizing the emergency lights on his patrol car, Vanderhoven
    pulled the defendants' truck over to the shoulder of I-20.                Prior
    to exiting his patrol car, he radioed a description of the truck
    and its license number to state police headquarters which was less
    that a mile away.        State Trooper Archie Griffin received the
    transmission at headquarters and proceeded to the scene to lend
    assistance.
    When Vanderhoven approached the Ryder truck, Chay was in the
    driver's seat and was unable to produce any driver's license or
    other identification.2        He was wearing a paging device and a
    "Gucci"   baseball     cap.     Chay   informed        Vanderhoven   that   his
    passenger, Kye Soo Lee rented the Ryder truck.              After "frisking"
    Chay and finding nothing, Vanderhoven asked Chay to have a seat in
    2
    Chay claimed to hold a valid Texas driver's license.
    Vanderhoven later confirmed that an individual by the name of Min
    Ho Chay held a valid driver's license in the state of Texas.
    However, without any identification on Chay whatsoever,
    Vanderhoven had no way of knowing that he was in fact the same
    Min Ho Chay.
    2
    the patrol car.
    Vanderhoven then approached Chay's passenger, Kye Soo Lee, who
    was the purported renter of the Ryder truck.       Vanderhoven then
    attempted to verify information gleaned from Chay with Kye Soo Lee.
    His attempt was unsuccessful as Kye Soo Lee could neither speak nor
    read English.3    So, Vanderhoven brought Chay back to the truck and
    asked Chay to assist him in communicating with his passenger, with
    which request Chay complied.     With Chay translating, Vanderhoven
    was successful in obtaining identification from Kye Soo Lee - that
    is, his driver's license and Social Security card.
    Upon further questioning by Vanderhoven, Kye Soo Lee stated
    that a third party Min Sik Lee had rented the Ryder truck, which
    was at odds with Chay's story.   Upon the initial "frisk" of Kye Soo
    Lee, Vanderhoven felt what later turned out to be a large wad of
    currency in his pant's pocket.    At that point Vanderhoven radioed
    for assistance, thinking it prudent to have a back up present
    before removing what he thought might be currency from Kye Soo
    Lee's pocket.    While awaiting the arrival of back up, Vanderhoven
    had Kye Soo Lee seat himself in the patrol car alongside of Chay.
    Upon further questioning prior to the arrival of the back up
    unit, Chay informed Vanderhoven of the rental agreement's location
    on the dashboard of the truck. The rental agreement indicated that
    a third party Min Sik Lee was the lessee of the Ryder truck, contra
    Chay's earlier statement.
    3
    Both Chay and Kye Soo Lee are Korean.
    3
    State Trooper Griffin arrived at the scene approximately ten
    minutes after the initiation of the stop. After Griffin's arrival,
    Vanderhoven again "frisked" Kye Soo Lee, noting that the bulk of
    what was he earlier surmised was a roll of currency had diminished
    considerably over the short period of time that Kye Soo Lee
    occupied his patrol car with Chay while awaiting assistance.   The
    then smaller bulge removed from Kye Soo Lee's pants pocket proved
    to be a roll of United States currency.       The missing bulk of
    currency was recovered from Chay.    The previous "frisk" of Chay's
    person revealed nothing.    In other words, all of the money that
    Vanderhoven felt in Kye Soo Lee's pants pocket upon his initial
    "frisk" had been split up between the two of them while they
    occupied the patrol car together.     Between the two, Vanderhoven
    confiscated an unusually large amount of cash, $8,900.26 to be
    exact.
    Chay then gave Vanderhoven the "okay" to search the truck, but
    indicated that neither he nor Kye Soo Lee, knew what was in the
    truck nor did they have a key to the cargo section of the truck.
    Contrary to that statement, in Vanderhoven's clear view was the
    key that appeared to fit the door's lock.   It was on the same key
    ring as the ignition key.
    Vanderhoven then opened the truck and found boxes, some of
    which had spilled open which contained "Gucci" baseball caps and
    "Louis Vuitton" handbags.   The "Gucci" cap which Chay was wearing
    when the truck was stopped was just like those contained in the
    boxes which spilled open and about which Chay previously claimed no
    4
    knowledge.
    At this juncture, Trooper Don Campbell and Special Agent Terry
    Baldwin   (Baldwin)   of   the   Drug       Enforcement   Administration   had
    arrived at the scene.      Baldwin stated that he believed that the
    caps and handbags were "probably counterfeit" and "in the country
    illegally."4   Vanderhoven was more concerned that Chay and Kye Soo
    Lee were transporting narcotics or weapons.
    Considering that it was getting dark and that traffic was
    heavy on I-20 at the time,5 the troopers decided it was much too
    hazardous to remain on the shoulder of I-20 to complete a thorough
    search of the myriad of boxes, 289 in all, which comprised the
    truck's cargo.    Vanderhoven decided it would be safer for all
    concerned to continue the search of the truck at headquarters which
    was in their estimation only a short distance away.             The duration
    of the roadside stop was no more than forty-five minutes.
    Vanderhoven told Chay and Kye Soo Lee that he intended to take
    the truck to the police station to conclude the search and that
    they could accompany the truck to the station if they so chose.
    Vanderhoven remained in possession of Kye Soo Lee's identification
    and the currency confiscated from both Kye Soo Lee and Chay.               They
    accompanied Vanderhoven to the station parking lot.
    4
    Transcript of the October 17, 1988 Suppression Hearing,
    pp. 90, 136 (Record, Vol. 4).
    5
    Vanderhoven testified that there was quite a bit of
    traffic on the highway at the time, explaining that is was
    "racetrack traffic between the racetrack and Bossier City."
    Transcript, at p. 70 (Record, Vol. 4).
    5
    Once at headquarters, the officers unloaded the truck and the
    Bossier City drug sniffing dog sniff-searched the contents of the
    boxes and the truck's interior. Then Special Agent Jacques Duck of
    the Customs Agency arrived and examined the counterfeit merchandise
    found in the truck, i.e., the "Louis Vuitton" handbags and "Gucci"
    baseball   caps.6      Agent   Duck   concluded   the    merchandise     was
    counterfeit as did SA Baldwin earlier at the roadside.                  Their
    conclusions were subsequently confirmed with the Customs Service
    Fraud Team in New Orleans.7
    On June 23, 1988, a Federal Grand Jury indicted both Kye Soo
    Lee and Chay, along with the defendant Min Sik Lee, with conspiracy
    in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 371 and with
    trafficking counterfeit goods, 
    18 U.S.C. §2320
    . Prior to trial all
    of the defendants plead not guilty and filed motions to suppress
    the evidence seized during the search of the truck.
    Concluding that all three defendants had standing to challenge
    the search, the district court granted their motions to suppress
    adopting   the      magistrate's   October   28th,      1988   report    and
    recommendation as its opinion in addition to holding that all three
    6
    Vanderhoven testified that Duck and two or three other
    agents from Customs got samples/materials out of the handbags,
    examined them and concluded they were counterfeit. Transcript,
    at p. 91 (Record, Vol. 4).
    7
    Agent Duck testified that he called Agent Lew Bock, who
    had worked several cases involving counterfeit Louis Vuitton
    merchandise, to get confirmation on what he knew. Transcript, at
    p. 195 (Record, Vol. 4).
    6
    defendants had standing to challenge the search.8
    The Government appealed the district court's February 2nd,
    1989 ruling on defendants' motion to suppress, which is the subject
    of an opinion of a prior panel of this Circuit.     United States v.
    Kye Soo Lee, 
    898 F.2d 1034
     (5th Cir.), reh'g denied, 
    905 F.2d 1536
    (5th Cir. 1990).    Therein, the prior panel held inter alia that the
    initial stop and detention of the defendants Lee and Chay was
    justified under Terry v. Ohio, and their consent to search the
    truck at the roadside was valid.9      Thus, the panel reversed the
    original order of the district court suppressing the evidence and
    remanded the case for findings as to whether Chay and Kye Soo Lee
    consented to accompany the officers to the Louisiana State Police
    Headquarters and/or whether there was probable cause to arrest the
    pair at the roadside.10
    On remand, the district court referred the matter to the
    magistrate for findings and a report and recommendation based
    thereon. All of the parties agreed that the issues were adequately
    8
    See, Order and Reasons entered February 2, 1989 (Record,
    Vol. 2, Doc. No. 161).
    9
    See, United States v. Kye Soo Lee, 
    898 F.2d 1034
    , 1040
    (5th Cir. 1990) stating:
    We are persuaded that there was no
    illegal detention in this case. When
    Vanderhoven first pulled the Ryder truck over
    on the interstate highway, it was because the
    truck was weaving between lanes and speeding.
    Thus, the initial detention, as evaluated
    under Terry, was proper because Vanderhoven
    had reasonable articulable facts which
    warranted the intrusion.
    10
    
    Id. at 1041
    .
    7
    addressed in the October 17th, 1988 suppression hearing and thus,
    there was no necessity for an additional hearing.                     On May 15th,
    1991 the magistrate issued his findings with respect to the issues
    on remand.11      The district court adopted the magistrate's May 15th,
    1991 report and recommendation as its opinion and granted the
    defendants' motion to suppress finding neither probable cause to
    arrest nor valid consent to accompany the officers to state police
    headquarters.12
    As    to    the     existence    of   probable     cause   to   arrest,    the
    magistrate's May 15th, 1991 report merely refers to the reasons
    outlined     in    his    prior    report   and   recommendation,      stating    he
    "continues to believe no probable cause to arrest was present at
    the time the defendants were taken to the police station."13                     The
    magistrate concluded with the statement that he "would have never
    issued a search warrant to enter the truck based upon the evidence
    in possession of the police at that time."14 This concluding remark
    reflects utter disregard of the exigencies/realities of a roadside
    stop as they unfold in a situation such as this, i.e., "that police
    officers,        unlike    .   .   .   judges,    must    make   probable    cause
    determinations under the pressure of time and in the immediate
    11
    See, Magistrate's Report and Recommendation, entered May
    15th, 1991 (Record Excerpt No. 4).
    12
    See, Judgement entered August 1, 1991 (Record Excerpt No.
    3).
    13
    See, supra note 11.
    14
    Id.
    8
    context of fast-developing events."15
    Moreover, the magistrate's May 15th report16 wholly ignores
    certain facts which unquestionably materialized during the lawful
    roadside search as significant to the determination of probable
    cause to arrest in the case at bar, to wit: (1) Chay was wearing a
    "Gucci" baseball cap identical to those found in the truck during
    the roadside search; (2) both Chay and Kye Soo Lee lied about their
    knowledge of the commercial cargo and their ability to gain access
    to it; (3) neither Chay nor Kye Soo Lee could produce any evidence
    of written consignment or bill of lading with respect to the
    apparently expensive "designer" merchandise which comprised their
    load and which they were not inclined to abandon; (4) the method of
    packaging    such   merchandise   for   transportation   was   sloppy   and
    haphazard - that is, inconsistent with the type of cargo; (5)
    15
    United States v. Mendoza, 
    722 F.2d 96
    , 102 (5th Cir.
    1983).
    16
    The magistrate's initial report and recommendation
    entered October 28th, 1988, makes only one finding which bears on
    the issue of probable cause to arrest - which is, that none of
    the officers suspected the defendants' cargo was counterfeit
    merchandise. See, Magistrate's Report and Recommendation dated
    October 28th, 1990, at p. 4. (Record, Vol. 2, Doc. No. 150).
    The magistrate's finding in this regard is not supported by any
    evidence and is belied by the uncontroverted testimony of
    Vanderhoven that SA Baldwin stated at the roadside his belief
    that the merchandise was "probably counterfeit" and "in the
    country illegally." (Transcript, pp. 90, 134, 136). Moreover,
    the magistrate's report does recount that Agent Jacques Duck was
    present in the parking lot of the police station and made a
    determination there that the merchandise was counterfeit, which
    was later confirmed by Customs Service in New Orleans. See,
    Magistrate's October 28th, 1990 Report and Recommendation, supra,
    at pp. 5-6. These uncontroverted facts evidence that from the
    outset, a customs violation was considered highly likely,
    otherwise, Customs would not have been called into the
    investigation.
    9
    neither Chay nor Kye Soo Lee offered any explanation, much less any
    reasonable one, for their "secrecy" with respect to such cargo; and
    (6) neither Chay nor Kye Soo Lee could produce any documentation
    tending to establish any lawful connection with either the truck or
    its cargo either as consignee, lessee, or owner.                  All of the
    aforementioned facts are significant to any determination regarding
    the existence of probable cause to arrest at the roadside.17
    In its Objection to the Magistrate's May 15th, 1991 Report and
    Recommendation (Record Excerpt No. 6) the Government conceded
    without     further    explanation     that   the   defendants'   consent   to
    accompany the officers to the Louisiana State Police Headquarters
    was not voluntary.           However, the Government asserted therein its
    original position that there was probable cause to arrest Chay and
    Kye Soo Lee when the truck's cargo doors were opened at the
    roadside revealing "probably counterfeit" merchandise - that is, at
    that    point   in    time    strong   reasonable   suspicion   ripened   into
    probable cause. As previously mentioned, the district court simply
    adopted the magistrate's May 15th report without addressing the
    Government's objections which were based on the undisputed facts
    17
    Generally in reviewing a district court's ruling on a
    motion to suppress based on testimony at a suppression hearing,
    the reviewing court accepts the district court's factual findings
    unless they are clearly erroneous or influenced by an incorrect
    view of the law. United States v. Maldonado, 
    735 F.2d 809
    , 814
    (5th Cir. 1984). However, in the instant case the factual
    findings predicate to the determination of probable cause are
    wholly absent. Where, as here, the determinative facts are
    undisputed, the question of whether or not they establish
    probable cause is a question of law freely reviewable on appeal.
    See e.g., United States v. Martinez-Perez, 
    941 F.2d 295
    , 297 (5th
    Cir. 1991).
    10
    reiterated above and which were not addressed by either of the
    magistrate's reports and recommendations in connection with a
    determination of lack of probable cause to arrest.
    [A] showing of probable cause requires much
    less evidence than a finding of guilt, United
    States v. Beck, 5 Cir., 1970, 
    431 F.2d 536
    ,
    538. Probable cause must be judged not with
    the logic of cold steel, but with a common
    sense view to the realities of everyday life.
    Brinegar v. United States, 1949, 
    338 U.S. 160
    ,
    175, 
    69 S.Ct. 1302
    , 1310, 
    93 L.Ed. 1879
    , 1890.
    United States v. Agostino, 
    608 F.2d 1035
    , 1037 (5th Cir. 1979).
    Because we have determined for the reasons set out herein
    below that probable cause to arrest developed at the roadside and
    thus, the district court erred in granting the motion to suppress,
    we need not and do not decide whether the defendants voluntarily
    consented to accompany the police officers to their headquarters
    and/or whether the Government waived its right to appeal that issue
    by conceding it to the district court.
    PROBABLE CAUSE TO ARREST
    The Government argues that probable cause to arrest Chay and
    Kye Soo Lee existed when they opened the cargo section of the truck
    and it revealed "probably counterfeit" merchandise, i.e., the
    "Louis Vuitton" handbags and "Gucci" baseball caps. The Government
    concedes that Vanderhoven himself did not know all the facts
    constituting probable cause; rather, the Government argues that the
    arrest was legal because the collective knowledge of the agents
    working the case at the roadside amounted to probable cause to
    arrest the pair.   We agree because it is clear to us that the
    collective knowledge of the officers working the case at the
    11
    roadside did establish probable cause to arrest the pair then and
    there.
    Probable   cause      to   arrest   exists   "where    'the    facts   and
    circumstances within [the arresting officers'] knowledge and of
    which they had reasonably trustworthy information [are] sufficient
    in themselves to warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief
    that' an offense has been or is being committed."           United States v.
    Preston, 
    608 F.2d 626
    , 632 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 
    446 U.S. 940
    , 
    100 S.Ct. 2162
    , 
    64 L.Ed.2d 794
     (1980)(quoting Draper v. United
    States, 
    358 U.S. 307
    , 313, 
    79 S.Ct. 329
    , 333, 
    3 L.Ed.2d 327
    (1950)).
    It is not necessary that the arresting officer himself have
    personal knowledge of all of the facts.           The Government correctly
    points out that "probable cause can rest upon the collective
    knowledge of the police, rather than solely on that of the officer
    who actually makes the arrest,' when there is 'some degree of
    communication between the two.'" United States v. Ashley, 
    569 F.2d 975
    , 983 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 
    439 U.S. 853
    , 
    99 S.Ct. 163
    , 
    58 L.Ed.2d 159
     (1978).
    One   scenario   in    which   we    have   applied   this    "collective
    knowledge" doctrine, is where the arresting officer has personal
    knowledge of facts which standing alone do not establish probable
    cause for an arrest but, when added to information known by other
    officers involved in the investigation, tips the balance in favor
    12
    of the arrest.18   In such cases, the "laminated total" of the
    information known by officers who are in communication with one
    another must amount to probable cause to arrest.19
    Unquestionably, no one item of the government's evidence,
    considered in isolation, would have been sufficient to justify a
    reasonable man in the belief that the truck in Chay and Kye Soo
    Lee's possession contained contraband.   Nonetheless, the totality
    of the circumstances, including the stated belief of DEA Special
    Agent Baldwin that the truck's cargo was "probably counterfeit" and
    "in the country illegally" did establish probable cause to believe
    that Chay and Kye Soo Lee were transporting seizable contraband.20
    18
    See e.g., United States v. Nieto, 
    510 F.2d 1118
    , 1120
    (5th Cir.)(per curiam), cert. denied, 
    423 U.S. 854
    , 
    96 S.Ct. 101
    ,
    
    46 L.Ed.2d 78
     (1975); United States v. Agostino, 
    608 F.2d 1035
    ,
    1037 (5th Cir. 1979).
    19
    United States v. Edwards, 
    577 F.2d 883
    , 895 (5th Cir.)(en
    banc), cert. denied, 
    439 U.S. 968
    , 
    99 S.Ct. 458
    , 
    58 L.Ed.2d 427
    (1978); Agostino, 
    608 F.2d at 1037
    .
    20
    The Government argues that the sum total of the
    following information available to the state troopers at the time
    they decided to continue the search at headquarters was "rather
    substantial" and amounts to probable cause, to wit: (1) Chay was
    driving without a valid license and without any other
    identification; (2) Kye Soo Lee, who had identification, was
    unable to communicate with the troopers; (3) the Ryder truck had
    Florida license plates, yet Chay and Kye Soo Lee stated they were
    travelling from New York to Dallas, Texas; (4) the truck rental
    agreement was in the name of a third party, Min Sik Lee, with a
    California address; (5) Chay had a "beeper" on his person at all
    pertinent times; (6) Chay lied when he initially told Vanderhoven
    that Kye Soo Lee was the lessee of the truck; (7) Chay and Kye
    Soo Lee were travelling with an unusually large amount of cash;
    (8) Chay and Kye Soo Lee lied about their knowledge of the
    contents of the truck and their ability to gain access to it; (9)
    the contents of the truck was expensive "designer" merchandise
    but was packaged in a manner inconsistent with its character;
    (10) though this was apparently commercial cargo, neither Chay
    nor Kye Soo Lee could show any registration, permit, bill of
    13
    The initial stop of the truck was a valid traffic stop which
    did not violate the defendants' constitutional rights, as the prior
    panel held.21   Because Chay was driving without a driver's license
    and had no other identification to support his contention that he
    was the same Min Ho Chay who was licensed to drive in Texas,
    undeniably Louisiana law enforcement authorities had a right to
    arrest him.22   See, L.S.A.- R.S. 32:52 and 402.
    Louisiana law authorizes warrantless misdemeanor arrests if an
    officer   has   probable   cause   to    believe   that   the   suspect    has
    committed a crime in his presence.         There is no question but that
    Officer   Vanderhoven   had   probable     cause   to   believe   that    Chay
    violated a criminal statute, in this case L.S.A.-R.S. 32:52 which
    requires the driver of a motor vehicle to be licensed.23
    lading, consignment or other documents tending to demonstrate
    their lawful connection either with the cargo or the truck; and
    (11) at the roadside when the cargo doors were opened SA Baldwin
    stated his belief that the merchandise was "probably
    counterfeit." The Court agrees with the Government, that
    considering these factors, Chay and Kye Soo Lee's conduct can
    hardly be characterized as "innocuous" as appellees suggest or as
    consistent with the operation of a legitimate commercial
    enterprise. Rather, their conduct was to the opposite effect -
    that is, consistent with that of individuals involved in illegal
    activity, specifically transporting stolen goods and/or
    contraband.
    21
    Kye Soo Lee, 
    898 F.2d at 1039
    .
    22
    Vanderhoven testified that his normal procedure for an
    offense such as Chay's was to transport the individual to the
    Bossier Parish Jail for fingerprinting and either posting a bond
    or paying a citation. Transcript, at p. 106 (Record, Vol. 4).
    23
    See, La.C.Cr.P. Art. 933(4); L.S.A.-R.S. 14:2; State v.
    Pickering, 
    432 So.2d 1067
    , 1070 (La.App. 3rd Cir.), cert. denied,
    
    438 So.2d 574
     (La.1988)(a violation of L.S.A.-R.S. 32:52 is
    considered a criminal act).
    14
    The Court disagrees with appellee's contention that L.S.A.-
    R.S. 32:391 requires the issuance of a summons in lieu of arrest.
    Summons is only required after arrest if the conditions of R.S.
    32:391(A) can be met and only in the case that the individual
    complies with R.S. 32:41124 is he given the option of release
    pending bail.25      Given the circumstances that Chay did not have a
    driver's license in his possession to give to the arresting officer
    in lieu of bail, the mandate of R.S. 32:391 (i.e., the issuance of
    a summons in lieu of arrest) is not applicable.
    Upon stopping Chay and Kye Soo Lee on I-20, Vanderhoven was
    confronted    with    information   that   these   two   individuals   were
    transporting some cargo through the state, in a truck rented to a
    third person, and neither could explain why they had the truck,
    what the cargo was, and why they had no access to the cargo, all of
    which was wholly inconsistent with the operation of a legitimate
    business.26   Moreover as previously mentioned, they had lied to
    24
    L.S.A.-R.S. 32:411 requires deposit of license in lieu
    of security upon arrest.
    25
    See, State v. Gardner, 
    476 So.2d 938
    , 941-42 (La.App.
    2nd Cir.), cert. denied, 
    478 So.2d 1233
     (La. 1985) stating that
    R.S. 32:391 provides for the mandatory issuance of a summons in
    lieu of full custody arrest if certain provisos are met. The
    Gardner court further notes that R.S. 32:391(C) provides specific
    authorization for the arresting officer's traditional discretion
    to institute full custody arrest.
    26
    We make special mention here of Louisiana law regulating
    motor carriers - that is, L.S.A.-R.S. 45:161 et seq. Section
    163.1A(1)(a) explains that motor carriers include common
    carriers, contract carriers and private carriers. It further
    sets out registration/permit requirements for all motor carriers
    entering, leaving or crossing the state of Louisiana. Section
    163C(1) states that any of the Louisiana Public Service
    Commission's duly appointed officers have the authority to make
    15
    Vanderhoven about certain significant facts: (1) Chay lied when he
    originally told Vanderhoven that his passenger Kye Soo Lee rented
    the truck (i.e., the rental agreement indicated a third person Min
    Sik Lee was the lessee of the vehicle); (2) Chay lied about his
    knowledge of the contents of the truck, which became apparent to
    the officers        when   they   accessed   the   cargo   and    found   "Gucci"
    baseball caps just like the one he was wearing; and (3) both Chay
    and Kye Soo Lee lied when they claimed that they could not open the
    cargo section of the truck, when the key to the cargo section was
    on the key ring along with the truck's ignition key.
    The   "laminated     total"   of   these    factors      when   considered
    together     with    the   haphazard   manner      in   which    the   "designer"
    merchandise was packaged, the lack of any written evidence of
    consignment or a bill of lading and no explanation whatsoever for
    the secrecy maintained by the two with regard to the contents of
    the truck amounted to probable cause to arrest Chay and Kye Soo
    Lee.    This is so, particularly in light of the fact that upon
    viewing the cargo at the roadside, SA Baldwin had the distinct
    impression that the cargo was probably counterfeit, i.e.
    arrests for violations of any of the provisions of R.S. 45:161
    through 45:178, and Section 163C(4) extends that authority with
    respect to anyone who procures, aids, or abets any motor carrier
    in his failure to observe and or comply with the aforementioned
    provisions. There is no question but that the state may regulate
    commercial trucking, and logically the reasonable expectation of
    privacy guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment is implicated to a
    lesser degree when dealing with searches of commercial cargo than
    with searches on one's person for personal possessions. Cf.
    United States v. Hernandez, 
    901 F.2d 1217
    , 1221 n.4 (5th Cir.
    1990).
    16
    contraband, and said so at the time. That Vanderhoven continued to
    suspect drugs is irrelevant.27
    Whereas here, Chay and Kye Soo Lee produced no documentation
    whatsoever, nothing indicated either of them owned/leased the truck
    or that they were employed by the truck's lessee Min Sik Lee, there
    was probable cause to arrest as it appeared to the officers that
    they were unlawfully in possession of a truck and/or merchandise
    which from all appearances was counterfeit.
    In Chambers v. Maroney, 
    399 U.S. 42
    , 
    90 S.Ct. 1975
    , 
    26 L.Ed.2d 419
     (1970), the Supreme Court refined the exigency requirement and
    held    that   the   existence   of   exigent   circumstances      was    to   be
    determined at the time the automobile is seized.          In Chambers, the
    car search at issue took place at the police station, where the
    vehicle     was   immobilized    sometime   after   the   driver    had    been
    arrested.      Given probable cause and exigent circumstances at the
    time the vehicle was first stopped, the Chambers court held that
    the later warrantless search at the station passed constitutional
    27
    This is so because we analyze what the law objectively
    authorized Vanderhoven to do based on the facts known to him at
    the pertinent time and not on the basis of his subjective intent.
    United States v. Hernandez, 
    901 F.2d 1217
    , 1219 (5th Cir.
    1990)(quoting United States v. Causey, 
    834 F.2d 1179
    , 1184 (5th
    Cir. 1987)(en banc) for the proposition that "so long police do
    no more than they are objectively authorized and legally
    permitted to do, their motives in doing so are irrelevant and
    hence not the subject of inquiry."); see also, United States v.
    Basey, 
    816 F.2d 980
    , 990 (5th Cir.), reh'g denied, 
    820 F.2d 1223
    (5th Cir. 1987)(en banc). In other words, it is irrelevant that
    Vanderhoven strongly suspected that the contraband was drugs
    somewhere hidden in the cargo, because he was unquestionably
    aware of the fact that the cargo itself was "probably
    counterfeit."
    17
    muster.28
    In Michigan v. Thomas, 
    458 U.S. 259
    , 
    102 S.Ct. 3079
    , 3080, 
    73 L.Ed.2d 750
     (1982)(per curiam), the Supreme Court reaffirmed its
    earlier holding in Chambers, inter alia, stating:
    We firmly reiterate this holding in Texas v.
    White, 
    423 U.S. 67
    , 
    96 S.Ct. 304
    , 
    46 L.Ed.2d 209
     (1975). See also, United States v. Ross,
    
    456 U.S. 798
    , 807, n.9, 
    102 S.Ct. 2157
    , 2163,
    n.9, 
    72 L.Ed.2d 572
     (1982). It is thus clear
    that the justification to conduct such a
    warrantless search does not vanish once the
    car has been immobilized; nor does it depend
    upon a reviewing court's assessment of the
    likelihood in each particular case that the
    car would have been driven away, or that its
    contents would have been tampered with, during
    the period required for the police to obtain a
    warrant.
    Id. at 3080-81.   The Supreme Court in Michigan made mention of the
    facts in Chambers and Texas, 
    supra,
     that the searches at issue in
    those cases were conducted at the station house.    Id. at n.2.
    In the case at bar, that the officers neither "arrested" nor
    insisted that Chay and Kye Soo Lee be detained along with the truck
    does not negate the existence of probable cause to arrest the
    28
    See also, California v. Acevedo, 
    111 S.Ct. 1982
    , 1986,
    
    114 L.Ed.2d 619
     (1991) explaining Chambers as follows:
    The validity of the later search derived from
    the ruling of Carroll that an immediate
    search without a warrant at the moment of
    seizure would have been permissible. See,
    Chambers, 
    399 U.S., at 51
    , 
    90 S.Ct., at 1981
    .
    The Court reasoned in Chambers that the
    police could search later whenever they could
    have searched earlier, had they so chosen.
    
    Id. at 51-52
    , 
    90 S.Ct., 1981
    . Following
    Chambers, if the police have probable cause
    to justify a warrantless seizure of an
    automobile on a public roadway, they may
    conduct either an immediate or a delayed
    search of the vehicle.
    18
    defendants at the time of the initial roadside search of the
    truck.29   At that point the focus was contraband believed to be
    either the cargo itself or secreted within the cargo of the truck
    and not interrogation or physical investigation of the defendants.
    Moreover, the officers were given no reason to exert any of the
    types of restraints commonly associated with "custodial arrest"
    because Chay and Kye Soo Lee opted to accompany the truck to
    headquarters without exhibiting any qualms about doing so.
    The first case cited by appellees, Hayes v. Florida, 
    470 U.S. 811
    , 
    105 S.Ct. 1643
    , 
    84 L.Ed.2d 705
     (1985) serves as no bar to this
    Court's    ruling   in   the   instant    case.   The   holding   of   Hayes
    proscribes forcibly removing a person from a place where he is
    entitled to be and transporting him to the police station where he
    is detained, without probable cause to arrest or a warrant.            Id. at
    1647-48.    Our holding that probable cause to arrest Chay and Kye
    Soo Lee existed at the time of the roadside search obviates the
    applicability of the Hayes case.
    Another case cited by appellees, United States v. Place, 
    462 U.S. 696
    , 
    103 S.Ct. 2637
    , 
    77 L.Ed.2d 110
     (1983), did not involve an
    automobile at all.       In Place, the court considered the temporary
    detention of luggage in an airport.           Not only was no automobile
    29
    See, United States v. Galberth, 
    846 F.2d 983
    , 993 n.18
    (5th Cir. 1988)(citing, Hoffa v. United States, 
    385 U.S. 293
    ,
    310, 
    87 S.Ct. 408
    , 417, 
    17 L.Ed.2d 374
     (1966) for the proposition
    that police officers are not required to effectuate an arrest at
    the moment probable cause arises because "officers are under no
    constitutional duty to call a halt to a criminal investigation
    the moment that they have minimum evidence to establish probable
    cause, a quantum of evidence which may fall short of the amount
    necessary to support a criminal conviction").
    19
    involved, but the defendant, Place, was waiting at the airport to
    board his plane, not preparing to leave the airport in a car.     The
    search in Place involved personal luggage, whereas here the search
    focussed on a Ryder rental truck with commercial cargo which
    appeared to be counterfeit and thus, in the country illegally.30
    Finally, in Place the narcotics agents detained the luggage for the
    very purpose of obtaining probable cause.     In the case at bar, the
    officers had ample indicia of criminal enterprise establishing
    probable cause to arrest Chay and Kye Soo Lee and to search their
    truck for contraband.
    CONCLUSION
    The prior panel determined that initial detention of Chay and
    Kye Soo Lee was justified under Terry v. Ohio and their consent to
    search at the roadside was valid.      We hold that probable cause to
    arrest the pair existed at the time the roadside search revealed
    "probably counterfeit" merchandise.     Accordingly, there being both
    probable cause to arrest and probable cause to believe that the
    vehicle contained contraband extant at the time of the roadside
    search, the later search of the truck at the state troopers'
    headquarters passes constitutional muster.         The order of the
    district court suppressing the evidence is reversed and the case is
    remanded for further proceedings.
    REVERSED AND REMANDED.
    30
    See, California v. Acevedo, 
    111 S.Ct. at 1990
     (stating,
    "from Carroll through Ross, this Court has explained that
    automobile searches differ from other searches").
    20