Shaw v. United States ( 1994 )


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  •                       United States Court of Appeals,
    Fifth Circuit.
    No. 93-8405.
    Billie A. SHAW, Plaintiff-Appellant,
    v.
    UNITED STATES of America, Defendant-Appellee.
    May 9, 1994.
    Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western
    District of Texas.
    Before REAVLEY and JOLLY, Circuit Judges, and PARKER,* District
    Judge.
    E. GRADY JOLLY, Circuit Judge:
    This taxpayer and appellant, who filed suit against the
    government under 
    26 U.S.C. § 7433
     (1989),1 argues that the district
    court    erred   in    concluding   that   she   failed   to   exhaust   her
    administrative remedies, thus barring her claim.          Although we find
    that the taxpayer exhausted her administrative remedies, we affirm
    the district court's judgment because the taxpayer has failed to
    demonstrate that the IRS engaged in conduct that is actionable
    *
    Chief Judge of the Eastern District of Texas, sitting by
    designation.
    1
    Section 7433 provides in pertinent part that
    [i]f, in connection with any collection of Federal tax
    with respect to a taxpayer, any officer or employee of
    the Internal Revenue Service recklessly or
    intentionally disregards any provision of this title,
    or any regulation promulgated under this title, such
    taxpayer may bring a civil action for damages against
    the United States in a district court of the United
    States.
    
    26 U.S.C. § 7433
     (1989).
    1
    under 
    26 U.S.C. § 7433
     (1989).
    I
    On November 10, 1988, the Internal Revenue Service wrongfully
    assessed a penalty against Mrs. Billie A. Shaw for her failure to
    pay taxes owed by her husband's separately owned company.                The IRS
    notified Mrs. Shaw of the assessment, detailing the amount of the
    assessment as well as the procedures Mrs. Shaw should follow if she
    wished to contest the assessment.           Mrs. Shaw hired an attorney to
    assist her in contesting the wrongful assessment. Although several
    letters were sent and several inquiries were made, Mrs. Shaw and
    her attorney failed to follow the formal appeal procedure outlined
    in the IRS notice.        Because Mrs. Shaw failed to properly contest
    the assessment,     the    IRS   prepared    a    levy   against   her   private
    residence, eventually sold the property at auction, and thus
    partially satisfied the tax liability assessed against her.                 Mrs.
    Shaw later repurchased the property from the buyer. She then filed
    a notice of claim with the IRS, seeking a refund of the amount she
    had paid to repurchase her home as well as an abatement of further
    tax liability.      Eventually, the IRS recognized that the original
    tax assessment was improper, and Mrs. Shaw received a refund of all
    money   collected    and   the   remaining       tax   liability   was   abated.
    However, as a result of her problems with the IRS, Mrs. Shaw's
    credit rating was adversely affected, and she was unable to obtain
    extensions of credit needed to pay off loans on other parcels of
    property.
    On April 16, 1991, Mrs. Shaw sued the United States for
    2
    damages under 
    26 U.S.C. § 7433
    , alleging that the IRS wrongfully
    assessed tax penalties against her for the tax liabilities of her
    husband's corporation.             After a bench trial, the district court
    held that although the IRS agent who initially assessed the penalty
    disregarded 
    26 U.S.C. § 6672
    ,2 Mrs. Shaw was not entitled to
    recover damages because she failed to exhaust her administrative
    remedies.       Mrs. Shaw appeals this judgment.
    II
    A
    On appeal, Mrs. Shaw contends that the district court erred
    in   concluding       that   she    failed       to   exhaust    her   administrative
    remedies.       Title 
    26 U.S.C. § 7433
     was enacted to allow a taxpayer
    to sue the United States if the IRS intentionally or recklessly
    disregards a statute or regulation in connection with collection of
    federal taxes.        Gonsalves v. IRS, 
    975 F.2d 13
    , 16 (1st Cir.1992).
    However, § 7433 specifically states that "[a] judgment for damages
    shall     not    be   awarded   under   [this         section]    unless   the   court
    determines that the plaintiff has exhausted the administrative
    remedies available to such plaintiff within the Internal Revenue
    2
    Section 6672 provided in pertinent part that
    [a]ny person required to collect, truthfully account
    for, and pay over any tax imposed by this title who
    willfully fails to collect such tax, or truthfully
    account for and pay over such tax, or willfully
    attempts in any manner to evade or defeat any such tax
    or the payment thereof, shall, in addition to other
    penalties provided by law, be liable to a penalty equal
    to the total amount of the tax evaded, or not
    collected, or not accounted for and paid over.
    
    26 U.S.C. § 6672
    (a) (Supp.1994).
    3
    Service."   
    26 U.S.C. § 7433
    (d)(1)    (1989).     Title   26   C.F.R.
    301.7433-1(e) sets forth the specific administrative procedures a
    taxpayer must follow to take advantage of a § 7433 claim.                This
    regulation, however, applies only to those civil actions filed
    after January 30, 1992.       Prior to the enactment of § 301.7433-1,
    there were no administrative procedures to exhaust before filing
    suit on a § 7433 claim in federal court.          Information Resources,
    Inc. v. United States, 
    950 F.2d 1122
    , 1128 (5th Cir.1992).            In this
    case, because Mrs. Shaw filed her civil action before January 30,
    1992, she was not required to exhaust any administrative remedies
    connected to § 7433.
    Although    the   government    concedes     that   there    were    no
    administrative remedies to exhaust with respect to § 7433, the
    government argues that Mrs. Shaw's supposed failure3 to exhaust the
    remedies associated with the improper assessment claim bars this §
    7433 suit for improper collection practices.        After consideration,
    we conclude that the two claims are separate, each having its own
    administrative remedies to exhaust.         First, each claim is based on
    different conduct—improper assessment deals with the decision to
    impose tax liability while improper collection activities involves
    conduct of an agent trying to collect the taxes owed.            Miller v.
    3
    It is questionable whether the government can reasonably
    argue that Mrs. Shaw failed to exhaust her remedies for the
    improper assessment claim. Although Mrs. Shaw failed to properly
    take full advantage of every step of the formal appeal process,
    she was ultimately successful in her effort to obtain a refund
    and an abatement of the remaining liability. Thus, as far as the
    improper assessment of taxes is concerned, it appears that Mrs.
    Shaw did exhaust her administrative remedies.
    4
    United   States,    
    763 F.Supp. 1534
    ,   1543    (N.D.Cal.1991).        To
    demonstrate a violation of each claim involves proof of distinctive
    facts—to prove a claim for improper assessment, a taxpayer must
    demonstrate why no taxes are owed, but to prove a claim for
    improper collection practices, the taxpayer must demonstrate that
    the IRS did not follow the prescribed methods of acquiring assets.
    Moreover, it is possible to have an improper collection practices
    claim without a corresponding improper assessment claim, and vice
    versa.     It is also possible, as this case illustrates, that a
    taxpayer    could   have   a   colorable   claim    for   both   an   improper
    assessment of taxes as well as improper collection practices.              The
    fact that these separate claims can develop with respect to the
    same taxpayer does not affect the separate and distinctive nature
    of each claim.
    B
    The government argues that if we find that Mrs. Shaw is not
    barred procedurally from asserting her § 7433 claim, the district
    court erred in concluding that the conduct of the IRS agent was
    actionable under § 7433. Section 7433—by its specific words—allows
    a taxpayer to sue the government only if, "in connection with any
    collection of Federal Tax with respect to a taxpayer, any officer
    or employee of the [IRS] recklessly or intentionally disregards any
    provision of this title, or any regulation promulgated under this
    title...."    
    26 U.S.C. § 7433
    (a) (1989).      The plain language of the
    statute is well supported by the statute's legislative history.
    Although in its early form the statute granted taxpayers the right
    5
    to   sue   "for   damages   in    connection     with   the    determination       or
    collection of any Federal tax," H.R.CONF.REP. NO. 100-1104, 100th
    Cong., 2d Sess. 228 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4515,
    5288 (emphasis added), Congress later deleted that portion of the
    statute that referred to determination of taxes. As the Conference
    Agreement states, § 7433 "is limited to reckless or intentional
    disregard in connection with the collection of taxes.                   An action
    under this provision may not be based on alleged reckless or
    intentional disregard in connection with the determination of tax."
    H.R.CONF.REP. NO.     100-1104,     100th    Cong.,     2d    Sess.   229   (1988),
    reprinted    in    1988   U.S.C.C.A.N.      4515,   5289      (emphasis     added).
    Therefore, based upon the plain language of the statute, which is
    clearly supported by the statute's legislative history, a taxpayer
    cannot seek damages under § 7433 for an improper assessment of
    taxes.     See also Miller v. United States, 
    763 F.Supp. at 1543
    (noting    the    difference     between    an   assessment     activity     and   a
    collection activity).       In this case, although the IRS improperly
    assessed tax liability against Mrs. Shaw, it did not engage in
    improper collection procedures.4            Thus, Mrs. Shaw cannot collect
    damages under § 7433.
    4
    In her brief, Mrs. Shaw complained of collection activities
    of an IRS agent that occurred in October 1988. Section 7433 was
    enacted as part of the Technical & Miscellaneous Revenue Act of
    1988 ("TAMRA"), Pub.L. No. 100-647, 
    102 Stat. 3342
     (November 10,
    1988), and it applies only "to actions by officers or employees
    of the Internal Revenue Service after the date of the enactment
    of this Act." See Pub.L. No. 100-647 § 6241(d) (emphasis added).
    Thus, only conduct that occurred after the enactment date of
    TAMRA, November 10, 1988, can serve as a basis for civil damages.
    Because those collection activities occurred in October 1988,
    that conduct cannot form the basis of a § 7433 claim.
    6
    III
    For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court
    is
    AFFIRMED.
    7
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 93-08405

Filed Date: 5/9/1994

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 12/21/2014