Meeson v. Bd Regents TX So ( 2003 )

United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
F I L E D
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT October 20, 2003
Charles R. Fulbruge III
Clerk
No. 03-20361
Summary Calendar
MAITREE MIKE MEESON,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
BOARD OF REGENTS OF TEXAS SOUTHERN UNIVERSITY; WILLIARD L.
JACKSON, JR., in his official capacity; and PRISCILLA SLADE, in
her official capacity,
Defendants-Appellees.
--------------------
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Texas
USDC No. 4:00-CV-1427
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Before BARKSDALE, EMILIO M. GARZA, and DENNIS, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Plaintiff Matiree Michael Meeson is a naturalized United
States citizen who was born in Thailand and is of Thai ethnicity.
He was terminated in March, 1999 from the Texas Southern University
Law School (“TSU”), where he had been employed as director of
computers. Meeson alleges that he was replaced by Lonnie Prothro,
an African American. Meeson also alleges that this termination and
replacement occurred due to his Thai race/nationality, in violation
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined
that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent
except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.
R. 47.5.4.
No. 03-20361
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of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. §§2000e et seq.. Meeson further alleges
that comments made by the interim dean of TSU, Andrea Johhson,
after Meeson was released indicate direct evidence of an intent to
discriminate against “Third World” people. On April 27, 2000,
Meeson brought suit in district court in the Southern District of
Texas, alleging that his termination occurred in violation of Title
VII. The defendants moved for summary judgment and, the district
court granted defendants’ motion. Meeson brings this appeal.
We review the district court’s grant of summary judgment
de novo, employing the same criteria used in that court. Rogers v.
International Marine Terminals, 87 F.3d 755, 758 (5th Cir. 1996).
Summary judgment should be granted where the record indicates no
genuine issue of material fact, and that the moving party is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Id. In considering the
motion we must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the
non-moving party. Matsushita Elec. Indus Co. v. Zenith Radio
Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587-88 (1986). But “the nonmoving party must
set forth specific facts showing the existence of a ‘genuine’ issue
concerning every essential component of its case.” Morris v. Covan
World Wide Moving, Inc., 144 F.3d 377, 380 (5th Cir. 1998).
Title VII makes it unlawful for an employer “to fail or refuse
to hire or discharge an individual . . . because of such
individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.” 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-1(a)(1). A plaintiff may establish a prima facie
case of race/national origin discrimination with either direct or
No. 03-20361
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circumstantial evidence. Under Title VII, direct evidence includes
any statement or written document showing a discriminatory motive
on its face. Portis v. First national Bank of New Albany, MS, 34
F.3d 325, 328-29 (5th Cir. 1994). Direct evidence is evidence
which, if believed, proves the fact of intentional discrimination
without inference or presumption. See id.Plaintiffs may also establish a prima facie case of
race/national origin discrimination through the use of
circumstantial evidence. See Beyers v. Dallas Morning News, Inc.,
209 F.3d 419, 426 (5th Cir. 2000). Absent direct evidence,
plaintiff bears the initial burden of establishing a prima facie
case of discrimination. See Rios v. Rossotti, 252 F.3d 375, 378
(5th Cir. 2001) (internal citations omitted). A prima facie case
of discrimination based on race/national origin requires a showing
that the employee (1) suffered an adverse employment action, such
as loss of a position; (2) was qualified for the position; (3) was
within the protected class; and (4) the person selected for the
position was not within the protected class. See id.The district court correctly found that interim dean Johnson’s
statements comparing TSU to a third world country did not
constitute direct evidence of an intention to discriminate against
people of “third world” origin. This statement, as the district
court explained, instead referred to interim dean Johnson’s desire
to improve TSU’s efficiency.
No. 03-20361
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Plaintiff can still survive defendants’ motion for summary
judgement through providing circumstantial evidence as explained
above. The district court found that plaintiff did not establish
the prima facie case of discrimination necessary to defeat
defendants’ summary judgment motion through circumstantial
evidence. We agree. Defendants present credible evidence that
Meeson’s job was eliminated due to a planned university wide
reorganization. Protho applied for another, different, position
that was created by the reorganization. Plaintiff did not apply for
the job that Protho eventually took. Months later, as a result of
the TSU reorganization falling through, Protho ended up with job
responsibilities similar to those that plaintiff held when he was
director of computers. Based on all of the evidence presented in
the record, viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, a
reasonable jury could not find that plaintiff was “replaced” by
Protho in this circumstance. Accordingly, defendants’ summary
judgment motion should be granted.
Based on the foregoing, the district court’s judgment is
AFFIRMED.