Goldblatt v. A & W Industries Inc ( 2001 )


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  •                 IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
    _____________________
    No. 01-10650
    Summary Calendar
    _____________________
    In The Matter Of: KENNETH ALLEN GOLDBLATT,
    Debtor.
    KENNETH ALLEN GOLDBLATT,
    Appellant,
    versus
    A & W INDUSTRIES INC.,
    Appellee.
    __________________________________________________________________
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Northern District of Texas
    USDC No. 4:01-CV-0256-A
    _________________________________________________________________
    October 18, 2001
    Before JOLLY, HIGGINBOTHAM, and PARKER, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:1
    This appeal contests the district court’s order that dismissed
    an appeal from the bankruptcy court.        The district court dismissed
    the   appeal   because   Kenneth   Allen    Goldblatt,   the   debtor   and
    appellant, failed to file his brief within the twenty day period
    required by Northern District of Texas Bankruptcy Rule 8009.1(a).
    We find no abuse of discretion and affirm.
    1
    Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the Court has determined that
    this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except
    under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
    I
    The    relevant   facts   are    these:    In    June   2000,   Goldblatt
    designated a piece of commercial property in Grapevine, Texas as
    his business homestead. On June 29, Goldblatt filed for Chapter 11
    protection in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Northern
    District of Texas.     During the ensuing bankruptcy proceedings, A &
    W Industries, Inc., the tenant in possession of the premises in
    question, filed a motion for a determination of its status as a
    creditor.    On February 28, 2001, the Bankruptcy Court issued a
    final    order   finding   that      the   property   does    not    meet   the
    requirements for a business homestead under Texas law.
    On March 7, 2001, Goldblatt’s bankruptcy attorney filed a
    timely notice of appeal from the order in the bankruptcy court.
    The next day, because of his deteriorating health, Goldblatt’s
    bankruptcy attorney forwarded his files for the appeal to the
    instant attorney.       On April 2, two weeks after the March 19
    deadline for filing a designation of records and a statement of
    issues on appeal under Bankruptcy Rule 8006, Goldblatt’s substitute
    counsel moved to extend the deadline.2          A & W opposed the motion.
    The district court found that Goldblatt’s counsel had not shown
    that the delay in filing was the result of excusable neglect and
    2
    Evidently, Goldblatt’s counsel erroneously filed the motion
    in the bankruptcy court on April 2, and it did not reach the
    district court clerk until April 9. Goldblatt also asserts in his
    brief that his counsel filed a designation of the record along with
    his motion to extend the deadline. A review of the record in this
    case indicates that no such filing was docketed in the district
    court or transmitted to this Court on appeal.
    denied Goldblatt’s motion to extend the deadline for filing his
    designation and statement of issues.    After this ruling, Goldblatt
    failed to file an appellate brief (or any other documents) within
    the period set by Local Bankruptcy Rule 8009.1.3       The district
    court dismissed Goldblatt’s appeal sua sponte.       The court also
    noted Goldblatt’s failure to satisfy the procedural requirements
    for appeal set out in Bankruptcy Rule 8006.
    II
    Bankruptcy Rule 8001(a) provides that the “[f]ailure of an
    appellant to take any step other then the timely notice of appeal
    does not affect the validity of the appeal, but is ground only for
    such action as the district court . . . deems appropriate, which
    may include dismissal of the appeal.”      Because the deadline for
    filing an appellate brief under Rule 8009 is not jurisdictional,
    the failure to satisfy the deadline does not require an automatic
    dismissal. See In re Tampa Chain Co., Inc., 
    835 F.2d 54
    , 55 (2d
    Cir. 1987).
    While we have said that dismissal is a “penalty of last
    resort” to be employed sparingly, we have also made clear that a
    district court’s dismissal of an appeal will be affirmed unless the
    district court abused its discretion.    Matter of Braniff Airways,
    Inc., 
    774 F.2d 1303
    , 1305 (5th Cir. 1985); Matter of CPDC, Inc.,
    3
    Under Local Rule 8009.1(a) the appellant’s opening brief must
    be filed within twenty days after entry of the appeal on the
    docket.   Although Goldblatt filed his notice of appeal in the
    bankruptcy court on March 7, 2001, his appeal was not docketed in
    the district court until March 28, 2001.
    
    221 F.3d 693
    , 698 (5th Cir. 2000). In reviewing the district
    court’s decision, we must consider “the prejudicial effect of the
    delay on the appellees and the bona fides of the appellant” to
    ensure that the client is not “unduly punished for his attorney’s
    mistakes.” CPDC, 
    221 F.3d at 698
     (citations and internal quotation
    marks omitted).   But, as the Seventh Circuit observed in Matter of
    Scheri, 
    51 F.3d 71
    , 75 (7th Cir. 1995):
    We . . . must remember that the district
    court, not the appellate court, is in the best
    position to assess the nature of the delay,
    the motivations of the parties and their
    attorneys, and the impact of the delay on the
    court's calendar. Consequently, our review of
    a district court's broad discretion to deal
    with litigation delay, even through the
    drastic sanction of dismissal, is deferential.
    III
    With these principles in mind, we conclude that the district
    court acted within its discretion.          We have fully considered
    Goldblatt’s   contention   that   his   substitute   counsel’s   various
    procedural failures are excusable because counsel’s office received
    the file while he was away at a trial in Starr County, Texas.        In
    his motion to extend the Rule 8006 deadline, Goldblatt’s counsel
    asserted that he was in trial from March 9 until March 16, 2001,
    and did not return to his office until March 19, 2001.      The motion
    does not provide an account of counsel’s activities between March
    16 and the resumption of the Starr County trial on April 2, the
    date he moved to extend the time for filing his designation and his
    statement of issues. Goldblatt thus offers no explanation for
    counsel’s failure to file a motion for extension immediately after
    he returned to his office on March 19.
    In     determining   whether     an    omission     was   the   product   of
    excusable neglect, courts should consider “the danger of prejudice
    to the [appellee], the length of the delay and its potential impact
    on judicial proceedings, the reason for the delay, including
    whether it was within the reasonable control of the movant, and
    whether the movant acted in good faith.”             Pioneer Inv. Serv. Co. v.
    Brunswick Assocs. Ltd. Partnership, 
    507 U.S. 380
    , 395 (1993).
    Counsel’s travel schedule or absence from office is generally not
    sufficient to support a finding of excusable neglect.                 See Airline
    Professionals Ass'n v. ABX Air, Inc., 
    109 F.Supp.2d 831
    , 834 (S.D.
    Oh. 2000) (“[C]ourts still demand that an attorney show more than
    a busy practice or absence from the office to merit an extension of
    the   time    in   which   to   file   a    notice   of   appeal.”)   (citations
    omitted).
    This principle has particular force where, as here, counsel
    fails to request an extension before the applicable deadline passes
    and fails to file an appellate brief.4           In view of the delay caused
    by Goldblatt’s failure to file a statement of issues, a designation
    of the record on appeal, or an appellate brief notifying A & W of
    4
    This situation is therefore distinguishable from CPDC, 
    221 F.3d at 698-700
    , in which we reversed a district court’s dismissal
    of a bankruptcy appeal under Rule 8001. In CPDC, the appellant
    filed a designation of record excerpts but failed to file a
    statement of issues. See 
    id. at 695
    . We noted that “[a]lthough
    the statement of issues was not timely filed, Appellants did file
    their appellate brief timely and prior to the district court’s
    dismissal of the appeal.” 
    Id. at 700
    .
    the issues on appeal, the district court could properly conclude
    that dismissal was warranted in this case.5
    Accordingly, we hold that the district court did not abuse its
    discretion in dismissing the appeal, and its judgment is therefore
    AFFIRMED.
    5
    See In Re Serra Builders, Inc., 
    970 F.2d 1309
    , 1311 (4th Cir.
    1992) (affirming dismissal of a bankruptcy appeal because the
    appellant filed its designation of the record on appeal fifteen
    days late and did not request an extension until after the deadline
    had passed; noting that the only explanation offered was that the
    appellant’s attorney was out of the country); Nielsen v. Price, 
    17 F.3d 1276
    , 1277 (10th Cir. 1994) (affirming dismissal of appeal
    from bankruptcy court judgment because, without explanation, the
    plaintiffs failed to designate the record on appeal, file a
    statement of the issues, or file an appellate brief); see also
    Matter of M.A. Baheth Const. Co., Inc., 
    118 F.3d 1082
    , 1083-84
    (5th Cir. 1997) (affirming district court’s dismissal of an appeal
    under FED. R. APP. P. 6 for failure to file a designation of records
    and issues on appeal).