Amer River Trans v. US Maritime Svc Inc ( 2007 )

United States Court of Appeals
REVISED September 5, 2007 Fifth Circuit
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
F I L E D
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT June 19, 2007
Charles R. Fulbruge III
No. 05-30878 Clerk
In Re: In the Matter of: AMERICAN RIVER TRANSPORTATION
COMPANY, as owner/operator of the Barge ART 529, seeking
exoneration from or limitation of liability
-------------------------
AMERICAN RIVER TRANSPORTATION COMPANY, as owner/operator
of the Barge ART 529
Petitioner - Appellee
v.
US MARITIME SERVICES, INC; ET AL
Defendants
LESTER ANTHONY ALLEMAND, individually and on behalf of his
deceased son, Jacques Allemand; EDNA H ALLEMAND,
individually and on behalf of her deceased son, Jacques
Allemand
Claimants - Appellants
___________________________________________________________
In Re: In the Matter of the Complaint of: AMERICAN RIVER
TRANSPORT COMPANY, as owner/operator of the Barge CONDO 2,
seeking exoneration from or limitation of liability
-------------------------
AMERICAN RIVER TRANSPORT COMPANY, as owner/operator
of the Barge CONDO2
Petitioner - Appellee
v.
US MARITIME SERVICES, INC; ET AL
Defendants
LESTER ANTHONY ALLEMAND, individually and on behalf of his
deceased son, Jacques Allemand; EDNA H ALLEMAND,
individually and on behalf of her deceased son, Jacques
Allemand
Claimants - Appellants
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Louisiana
Before HIGGINBOTHAM, WIENER, and PRADO, Circuit Judges.
Wiener, Circuit Judge:
In February 2003, Jacques Allemand (“Jacques”), a longshoreman
employed by Petitioner-Appellee American River Transportation Co.
(“ARTCO”), died when he jumped from the barge on which he was
employed into territorial waters in an attempt to save a co-worker
who had fallen from the barge. Following the deaths of Jacques and
his co-worker, ARTCO commenced Limitation of Liability Proceedings.
Claimants-Appellants Lester Anthony Allemand and Edna Allemand
(“the Allemands”), the divorced parents of Jacques, filed a claim
in the proceedings. The district court granted summary judgment
for ARTCO, dismissing the Allemands’ wrongful death action seeking
damages for loss of society. The court held that the Allemands
could not recover for loss of society, because they had not been
financially dependent on their son. As we agree with the district
court that non-dependent parents may not recover for loss of
2
society in maritime wrongful death actions, we affirm.
I. FACTS & PROCEEDINGS
A. Facts
For purposes of this appeal, the material facts are
uncontested. Jacques, the 24-year-old son of the Allemands, was a
work-release inmate performing barge-cleaner services on ARTCO’s
Barge ART 529 on the Mississippi River. Jacques had been
incarcerated for the five years immediately preceding his death.
He had not provided any financial support to his parents, either
before or after his incarceration.
Darnell Lane was also a work-release inmate performing barge-
cleaner services on Barge ART 529. On the day in question, Lane
was struck by water from a high-pressure hose on the barge, causing
him to hit his head (which rendered him unconscious) and fall into
the Mississippi River. Jacques jumped into the river in an attempt
to rescue Lane. Jacques struggled to keep his head above water,
but died when two moored ARTCO barges crashed into one another.
B. Prior Proceedings
In June 2003, ARTCO commenced two Limitation of Liability
Proceedings, later consolidated, in the Eastern District of
Louisiana, pursuant to 46 App. U.S.C. § 181 et seq. In September
2003, the Allemands answered the complaint and made a claim for
damages against ARTCO, both as Jacques’s survivors and for their
own loss of society caused by the wrongful death of their son. In
3
May 2005, ARTCO filed a motion for summary judgment against the
Allemands, contending that, as non-dependent parents of the
decedent, they could not recover damages for loss of society in a
maritime wrongful death action. In June 2005, the district court
orally granted ARCTCO’s motion. The district court explained its
reasoning:
Looking at the trends in the Fifth Circuit and based on
what I think the state of the law is now —— which
definitely should be appealed because it’s not clear ——
is that I can’t see the difference why a longshoreman’s
parents, as an example, don’t have to be dependent, but
everyone else who loses someone in state waters to an
accident has to be dependent to recover.
It’s clear that the law is that all nonlongshoremen who
are killed in state waters, in order for their survivors
to recover loss of society, they must be dependent
survivors. That’s a clear statement of the law. The
mental gymnastics I’m having trouble with is making the
leap as to why a longshoreman would be different.1
The district court indicated that an immediate appeal was
appropriate, closing the case for statistical purposes at that
time. The Allemands timely filed notices of appeal.
II. ANALYSIS
A. Jurisdiction and Standard of Review
We have jurisdiction over this interlocutory appeal pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(3).2 We review a district court's grant of
1
Although we agree with the district court’s conclusion,
it overstates the clarity of the state of the law for
nonlongshoremen, at least in this circuit.
2
Section 1292(a)(3) provides that “the courts of appeals
shall have jurisdiction of appeals from . . . [i]nterlocutory
4
summary judgment in an admiralty or maritime action de novo.3
Whether non-pecuniary damages are recoverable is a legal question
subject to de novo review.4
B. Evolution of the Maritime Wrongful Death Cause of Action
In 1886, the Supreme Court held in The Harrisburg that there
was no cause of action for wrongful death in maritime law.5 The
harshness of this holding was softened by the Supreme Court’s later
ruling in The Hamilton, in which the Court held that suits grounded
in state wrongful death causes of action could be brought in the
federal courts when the death occurred in a state’s territorial
waters.6 Although federal courts began “uniformly appl[ying] state
wrongful death statutes for deaths occurring in state territorial
waters,”7 The Harrisburg’s proscription against maritime wrongful
death actions survived.
In 1920, however, Congress “rejected wholesale the rule
decrees of such district courts or the judges thereof determining
the rights and liabilities of the parties to admiralty cases in
which appeals from final decrees are allowed.”
3
Holmes v. Atl. Sounding Co., Inc., 437 F.3d 441, 445
(5th Cir. 2006).
4
Moore v. M/V ANGELA, 353 F.3d 376, 383 (5th Cir. 2003).
5
119 U.S. 199 (1886).
6
207 U.S. 398, 407 (1907).
7
Miles v. Apex Marine Corp., 498 U.S. 19, 24 (1990).
5
against wrongful death”8 when it enacted the Jones Act and the
Death on the High Seas Act (“DOHSA”). The Jones Act created a
wrongful death cause of action, sounding in negligence, when a
seaman is killed during the course of his employment9; DOHSA
created a similar cause of action, sounding in either negligence or
unseaworthiness, when anyone is killed on the high seas (i.e.,
outside territorial waters), whether or not death occurs during the
course of employment.10 Both of these statutes limit recovery for
wrongful death to pecuniary damages.11
This series of events produced three anomalies: (1) “[I]n
territorial waters, general maritime law allowed a remedy for
unseaworthiness resulting in injury, but not for death”; (2)
“DOHSA allowed a remedy for death resulting from unseaworthiness on
the high seas, but general maritime law did not allow such recovery
for a similar death in territorial waters”; and (3) “in those
States whose statutes allowed a claim for wrongful death resulting
from unseaworthiness, recovery was available for the death of a
8
Id. at 23 (explaining evolution of maritime wrongful
death cause of action).
9
46 U.S.C. App. § 688.
10
46 U.S.C. App. §§ 761, 762.
11
46 U.S.C. App. § 762 (DOHSA explicitly limits damages
to pecuniary damages, unless death results from a commercial
aviation accident); Miles, 498 U.S. at 32 (explaining that,
despite absence of explicit limit on form of damages in the Jones
Act, “[t]here is no recovery for loss of society in a Jones Act
wrongful death action”).
6
longshoreman due to unseaworthiness, but not for the death of a
Jones Act seaman.”12 In Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., the
Supreme Court remedied these anomalies by overruling The Harrisburg
and recognizing the existence of a general maritime wrongful death
action.13 The Court reasoned that “[w]here death is caused by the
breach of a duty imposed by federal maritime law, Congress has
established [through the passage of the Jones Act and DOHSA] a
policy favoring recovery in the absence of a legislative direction
to except a particular class of cases.”14
Although Moragne recognized a general maritime wrongful death
cause of action, it did not define the contours of such a claim.
Then, in Sea-Land Services Inc. v. Gaudet,15 the Court addressed a
claim that had been asserted by the widow of a longshoreman who
died as a result of injuries sustained in territorial waters. The
Supreme Court held that the maritime wrongful death cause of action
allowed “the decedent's dependents [to] recover damages for their
loss of support, services, and society, as well as funeral
expenses.”16 In so holding, the Court recognized that allowing a
claim for loss of society damages deviated from DOHSA’s limitation
12
Miles, 498 U.S. at 26.
13
398 U.S. 375, 378, 392-94 (1970).
14
Id. at 393.
15
414 U.S. 573 (1974).
16
Id. at 584.
7
of recovery to pecuniary damages, but it nevertheless determined
that such a result was “compelled if [the Court was] to shape the
remedy to comport with the humanitarian policy of the maritime law
to show ‘special solicitude’ for those who are injured within its
jurisdiction.”17 Thus, the Gaudet Court recognized that
“effectuating longstanding maritime policies trumped uniformity
with DOHSA.”18
Four years after it decided Gaudet, the Court began to reverse
course when it decided Mobil Oil Corp. v. Higginbotham,19 another
case addressing the limits of the Moragne wrongful death cause of
action. In Higginbotham, the Court gave priority to the goal of
achieving uniformity between general maritime law and the Jones Act
and DOHSA over the humanitarian goal of maritime law.
Acknowledging that Gaudet had been broadly written without express
reliance on the fact that the death occurred in territorial waters,
the Court nevertheless concluded that Gaudet applied only to deaths
that occurred on territorial waters.20 Thus, as Higginbotham
involved a death that occurred on the high seas, DOHSA and its
express limitation on damages, rather than Gaudet, determined the
17
Id. at 586-88.
18
In re: Air Crash at Belle Harbor, New York on November
12, 2001, No. MDL 1448 (RWS), 2006 WL 1288298, at *18 (S.D.N.Y.
May 9, 2006).
19
436 U.S. 618 (1978).
20
Id. at 622-23.
8
damages available in the Moragne action. Accordingly, the Court
held that the decedent’s survivor could not recover damages for
loss of society.21
The Court was again called on to interpret the scope of
damages recoverable in a maritime wrongful death action in Miles v.
Apex Marine Corp.22 In Miles, the mother of a seaman who had died
in territorial waters brought a wrongful death action, alleging
negligence under the Jones Act and unseaworthiness under general
maritime law. The plaintiff sought, inter alia, damages for loss
of society. The jury found that the ship owner had been negligent
but that the ship was seaworthy. It also found that the decedent’s
mother was not dependent on the decedent, so that she was not
entitled to damages for loss of society.23
On appeal to this court, the panel concluded as a matter of
law that the ship had been unseaworthy, reviving the maritime
wrongful death claim. The panel therefore addressed whether the
decedent’s non-dependent mother was entitled to recover for loss of
society. Relying on an earlier Fifth Circuit opinion, we held in
Miles that the mother was not entitled to such damages because she
21
Id. at 623-24.
22
498 U.S. 19 (1990).
23
Id. at 21-22. The jury had been instructed that if it
found that the plaintiff was not financially dependent on her
son, she could not recover damages for loss of society. Id. at
22.
9
had not been financially dependent on her son.24
The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment that the plaintiff in
Miles was not entitled to recover for loss of society, but did so
on different grounds. After again reviewing the teleology of the
wrongful death cause of action, the Court held that loss of society
damages are not recoverable in a general maritime action for the
wrongful death of a Jones Act seaman.25 Noting that there is no
right of recovery whatsoever for loss of society in a Jones Act
action, the Court reasoned that “[i]t would be inconsistent with
[the Court’s] place in the constitutional scheme were [it] to
sanction more expansive remedies in a judicially created cause of
action in which liability is without fault than Congress has
allowed in cases of death resulting from negligence.”26
Accordingly, held the Court, there is no recovery for loss of
society in a general maritime action for the wrongful death of a
Jones Act seaman.
C. The Allemands’ Claim
Under the present state of the law, (1) Miles and the Jones
Act recognize that a seaman’s survivors have a cause of action for
24
Miles v. Melrose, 882 F.2d 976, 985-87 (5th Cir. 1989),
aff’d sub nom. on different grounds Miles v. Apex Marine Corp.,
498 U.S. 19 (1990).
25
Miles, 498 U.S. at 36. The Court also held that there
is a general maritime cause of action for the wrongful death of a
seaman, and that there is no survival claim for the lost income
of a deceased Jones Act seaman. Id.
26
Id. at 32-33.
10
wrongful death, whether the death occurred in territorial waters or
on the high seas, limited, however, to pecuniary damages (and thus
no damages for loss of society), regardless whether that cause of
action is brought under the Jones Act, under DOHSA, or under
general maritime law, and (2) Higginbotham and DOHSA recognize that
the survivors of any person who dies on the high seas have a cause
of action for wrongful death, also limited to pecuniary damages,
whether that cause of action is brought under the Jones Act, DOHSA,
or general maritime law. It is less than pellucid, though, what
force, if any, Gaudet has in the wake of Miles.27 We need not reach
this issue, however, because the parties and the district court
have framed the question here more narrowly, asking only whether
the non-dependent survivors of a deceased longshoreman or
27
The Supreme Court has observed that Gaudet is no longer
applicable on its facts, because of amendments to the Longshore
and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act. Miles, 498 U.S. at 30 n.1.
Thus, Gaudet has “been condemned to a kind of legal limbo:
limited to its facts, inapplicable on its facts, yet not
overruled.” Tucker v. Fearn, 333 F.3d 1216, 1223 (11th Cir.
2003) (quoting Miller v. Amer. President Lines, Ltd., 989 F.2d
1450, 1459 (6th Cir. 1993)). There is reason to doubt the
continued applicability of Gaudet. One of the goals of maritime
law is to provide special solicitude to seamen; it would be
inconsistent with this goal for the survivors of nonseamen to
have a greater right to recovery than the survivors of seamen.
See Wahlstrom v. Kawasaki Heavy Indus., Ltd., 4 F.3d 1084, 1092
(2d Cir. 1993) (noting that “it would be anomalous to expand the
class of beneficiaries of nonseamen who may recover for loss of
society in the aftermath of the Supreme Court's denial of any
such recovery to the beneficiaries of seamen.”); cf. Tucker, 333
F.3d at 1223 n.10 (“There is a strong argument . . . that the
pertinent threshold question is whether any survivors of
nonseamen are entitled to recover loss of society damages and not
whether non-dependent survivors of nonseamen may recover loss of
society damages.”).
11
harborworker may recover for loss of society when the death occurs
in state waters.28 We conclude that they may not.
First, this result is consistent with our precedent. Prior to
the Supreme Court’s ruling in Miles that no survivor of a seaman ——
whether dependent or not —— can recover damages for loss of society
in a Moragne wrongful death action, we twice addressed whether non-
dependent survivors of seamen may recover for loss of society in a
maritime wrongful death action. In Sistrunk v. Circle Bar Drilling
Co.,29 parents of deceased seamen filed a maritime wrongful death
action seeking damages for loss of society. The district court
entered judgment in favor of the parents, and the drilling company
appealed.30
On appeal, we concluded that the parents were not entitled to
damages for loss of society.31 In so holding, we observed that
neither of the goals of maritime law —— providing special
28
The Allemands also argue that non-dependent parents may
bring a survival action under general maritime law. The district
court’s ruling, however, only pertained to the Allemands’ claim
for loss of society and support, not their claim for survival,
and judgment was not entered with respect to the survival claim.
Rather, the remaining claims were statistically closed and
frozen, pending resolution of this appeal. Accordingly, that
portion of the appeal is not properly before us, as there is no
judgment to review.
29
770 F.2d 455 (5th Cir. 1985).
30
Id. at 456.
31
The court noted, and we agree, that the Gaudet court’s
use of “the word ‘dependents’ in discussing the right to recover
for loss of society, while lending support to our holding, is not
dispositive.” Id. at 460 n.4.
12
solicitude to seamen and achieving uniformity in maritime law ——
would be achieved by allowing the Sistrunk parents to recover.
First, the goal of
providing special solicitude to seamen . . . would not be
furthered in any meaningful way by allowing the parents
in this case to recover for loss of society. . . . To the
extent that the purpose of admiralty's special solicitude
to the survivors of seamen is to provide for their
financial support, the special solicitude aim of
admiralty has no relevance in this case. The parents in
this case were not dependent on their sons.32
The Sistrunk panel continued:
[T]he parents could not recover if the seamen's deaths
occurred on the high seas or were the result of
negligence but not of unseaworthiness. Admiralty cannot
provide the parents solicitude at a voyage's outset when
their right to recover for loss of society is dependent
on the fortuity that the deaths occur in territorial
waters and are caused by unseaworthiness.33
For the same reason, we concluded that the goal of achieving
uniformity in the law would not be furthered by allowing the
Sistrunk parents to recover. “[T]he parents have not explained why
this court should extend to them special solicitude when, but for
the happenstance that the seamen were killed in territorial waters
and by unseaworthiness, Congress would have denied them recovery
under DOHSA and the Jones Act.”34 Accordingly, we held that “in a
general maritime wrongful death action under Moragne, non-dependent
parents may not recover for loss of society where their deceased
32
Id. at 460 (emphasis added).
33
Id.
34
Id.
13
children were killed in territorial waters and are survived by
spouse and/or child.”35
Sistrunk could arguably be limited to situations involving
recovery attempts by non-dependent parents when there is also a
surviving spouse or child. Not so in Miles v. Melrose, however, in
which we confronted the issue “whether non-dependents may recover
for loss of society when there is no surviving spouse or child, [an
issue] . . . of first impression for this circuit.”36 We answered
that query in the negative, concluding that the aims of maritime
law would not be served by allowing recovery under such
circumstances. We explained that, like the non-dependent parents
in Sistrunk, the parents in Miles could not recover damages for
loss of society under either DOHSA or the Jones Act; the fact that
the Miles decedent had not been survived by a spouse or child did
not alter the result.37 As we had in Sistrunk, we concluded in
Miles that the goal of achieving uniformity in maritime law was
best served by denying recovery. With respect to the goal of
providing solicitude to seamen, we concluded that “[s]ince the
parents here were also not dependent on their son and since they
too could not recover these damages under the Jones Act or DOHSA,
we do not contravene maritime law's aim of providing special
35
Id. at 460-61.
36
882 F.2d 976, 987 (5th Cir. 1989), aff’d sub nom. on
different grounds Miles v. Apex Marine Corp., 498 U.S. 19 (1990).
37
Id. at 987-88.
14
solicitude to seamen by denying them recovery for loss of
society.”38 Although the Supreme Court affirmed Miles on other
grounds, its holding that there is no maritime cause of action for
loss of society for the survivors of seamen —— whether dependent or
not —— did not conflict with our reasoning.
Both Miles and Sistrunk, of course, involved seamen and are
therefore distinguishable from this case. The holdings in neither
Miles or Sistrunk, however, rested on the fact that the decedents
were seamen. Instead, we noted in both cases that the surviving
parents would not have a cause of action under either the Jones Act
or DOHSA; and DOHSA, of course, applies to both seamen and
nonseamen. If anything, the arguments in favor of denial of
recovery advanced in Sistrunk and Miles are even stronger here, as
“it would be anomalous to expand the class of beneficiaries of
nonseamen who may recover for loss of society in the aftermath of
the Supreme Court's denial of any such recovery to the
beneficiaries of seamen.”39
In addition, the circuit courts that have considered the
instant issue have “almost unanimously” agreed with our approach in
Miles and Sistrunk.40 Citing Miles and Sistrunk, the Second, Sixth,
and Eleventh Circuits have held that a non-dependent parent of one
38
Id. at 988.
39
Wahlstrom v. Kawasaki Heavy Indus., Ltd., 4 F.3d 1084,
1092 (2d Cir. 1993).
40
Id. at 1091-92 (collecting cases).
15
who dies in territorial waters on a pleasure craft (non-seafarers)
may not recover for loss of society in a maritime wrongful death
action.41 Although these cases did not involve longshoremen, their
reasoning does not turn on the fact that the decedents were
nonseafarers.42 Instead, the reasoning in each case turned on
whether allowing recovery would further the twin goals of maritime
law.
Appellants urge us to ignore this case law and instead adopt
the Ninth Circuit’s holding in Sutton v. Earles.43 In Sutton, non-
dependent parents of several individuals who died on a pleasure
craft sued for loss of society damages under general maritime law.44
The Ninth Circuit first concluded that Gaudet authorized recovery
of damages for loss of society by the survivors of nonseamen and
41
Tucker v. Fearn, 333 F.3d 1216, 1218, 1222 (11th Cir.
2003) (“declin[ing] to fashion a rule that would permit
[nonseamen’s] survivors a more liberal recovery [than seamen’s
survivors] under general maritime law.”); Wahlstrom, 4 F.3d at
1085, 1092 (holding that non-dependent parents of minor who died
while on pleasure craft in territorial waters could not recover
for loss of society in a maritime wrongful death cause of
action); Anderson v. Whittaker Corp., 894 F.2d 804, 811-12 (6th
Cir. 1990) (noting that it agreed with Miles’s reasoning and
holding that non-dependent parents of a decedent could not
recover for loss of society in a general maritime wrongful death
cause of action).
42
“By ‘nonseafarers,’ we mean persons who are neither
seamen covered by the Jones Act, . . . nor longshore workers
covered by the Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act . .
. .” Yamaha Motor Corp. v. Calhoun, 516 U.S. 199, 205 n.2 (1996)
(citations omitted).
43
26 F.3d 903, 914-15 (9th Cir. 1994).
44
Id. at 906, 914.
16
that neither the Jones Act nor DOHSA applied to limit the damages
to pecuniary damages. It further noted that both the Jones Act and
DOHSA allow recovery by parents when there is no surviving spouse
or child. The court then responded to the argument that such
damages should not be available to non-dependent parents:
We do not consider ourselves free to give such weight [as
the Second Circuit does in Wahlstrom] to the interest of
uniformity, in light of Gaudet’s explicit acknowledgement
that it was creating a non-uniform category of damages in
territorial waters, and the acknowledgements of non-
uniformity in Higginbotham. The fact that the death of
a seaman in territorial waters leads to recovery only of
pecuniary damages is dictated by statute, and that
statute does not limit recoveries for the deaths of non-
seamen.
. . . .
We decline, therefore, to limit Gaudet by drawing an
unnecessary distinction between dependent and non-
dependent parent plaintiffs in Moragne actions for
determining the availability of loss-of-society damages.
. . . Any lack of uniformity that is evidenced by our
ruling inheres in the decision of the Supreme Court in
Gaudet and in the actions of Congress in enacting DOHSA
and the Jones Act. We are in no position to disregard or
modify either of those authorities, even if we were of
such a mind. We therefore affirm the district court's
award of loss-of-society damages without regard to
dependency.45
Although we agree with Sutton that the dependent/non-dependent
distinction is not explicitly required by the relevant statutes or
Supreme Court precedent, we are not persuaded by Sutton’s
reasoning. Sutton does not acknowledge the potentially limited
force of Gaudet after being confined to its facts. Neither does
45
Id. at 917 (internal citations and footnote omitted).
17
Sutton address the Supreme Court’s more restrictive approach to
maritime wrongful death causes of actions since Gaudet.46 We
decline to adopt Sutton’s holding. Instead, as we concluded in
Miles and Sistrunk, and as the Second, Sixth, and Eleventh Circuits
have agreed, we conclude that allowing recovery here would (1)
impede uniformity by going against the substantial majority of the
federal court decisions on this issue, and (2) create an anomaly by
“expand[ing] the class of beneficiaries of nonseamen who may
recover for loss of society in the aftermath of the Supreme Court's
denial of any such recovery to the beneficiaries of seamen.”47
Citing Moragne and Gaudet, the Allemands contend that
“certainly it better becomes the humane and liberal character of
proceedings in admiralty to give than withhold the remedy, when not
required to withhold it by established and inflexible rules.”48 In
the maritime cases following Gaudet, however, the Supreme Court has
placed greater importance on conforming general maritime law with
the statutes than on the “humanitarian policy” of maritime law.
As the Third Circuit noted
46
Appellants also cite Thompson v. Offshore Co., 440 F.
Supp. 752, 765 (S.D. Tex. 1977), a district court case decided
prior to Sistrunk and Miles.
47
Wahlstrom, 4 F.3d at 1092.
48
Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375, 387
(1970) (quoting The Sea Gull, 21 Fed. Cas. p. 909 (No. 12,578)
(C.C. Md. 1865)); see also Gaudet, 414 U.S. at 588 (“[O]ur
decision is compelled if we are to shape the remedy to comport
with the humanitarian policy of the maritime law to show ‘special
solicitude’ for those who are injured within its jurisdiction.”).
18
[o]ne trend that cannot be ignored is that the Court
seems to be cutting back on plaintiffs' rights in
maritime actions. Throughout the 1950s and 1960s, the
Supreme Court expanded the rights of plaintiffs by
generally allowing plaintiffs the benefit of whichever
rule, state or federal, was more favorable to recovery.
Moragne —— or perhaps Gaudet —— represented the apex of
the Court's policy of expanding plaintiffs' rights in
admiralty actions. Higginbotham, Tallentire, and Miles,
in contrast, show a tendency on the part of the Court
during the last two decades to reverse its policy of
favoring seamen plaintiffs.49
The Allemands further urge that the dependent/non-dependent
line is an inappropriate distinction to be drawn when the damages
at issue are not intended to compensate for a financial loss.
Specifically, they assert that “[i]f [loss of society] benefits are
not economically based, there is no legitimate reason . . . for
tying recovery for their loss to the irrelevant fact that the
deceased loved one did not also aid in the support —— a completely
different loss which some family members might also sustain —— of
his beloved parents.” Although this argument is not without some
appeal, we have previously rejected it. We stated in Miles that
[s]ince loss of society is not a financial loss,
restricting its recovery to dependents may seem
unwarranted. However, tort law has never recognized a
principle of awarding redress to all who are injured by
an event, however wide the ripple. Strict liability,
such as that for unseaworthiness, is based in part on the
assumption that the defendant is best able to bear and
distribute the cost of the risk of injury. But there are
limits to a defendant's power to shift losses to the
public. The larger and more amorphous the potential
class of plaintiffs, the more difficult it is to estimate
and insure against the risk in advance, weakening the
49
Calhoun v. Yamaha Motor Corp., 40 F.3d 622, 636 (3d
Cir.), aff’d 516 U.S. 199 (1996).
19
justification for imposing liability. The number of
plaintiffs who could allege a loss of love and affection
as a result of the death of a dearly beloved seaman ——
aunts and uncles, nieces and nephews, even friends and
lovers —— necessitates that we draw a line between those
who may recover for loss of society and those who may
not. The line suggested by the Supreme Court in Moragne
and Gaudet, and by our own court in Sistrunk, the line
between dependents and non-dependents, appears to be the
most rational, efficient and fair. It creates a finite,
determinable class of beneficiaries. It allows recovery
for those with whom the creation of the wrongful death
action was concerned: a seaman's dependents.50
We stand by this reasoning, and we agree with that of the Second
Circuit in Wahlstrom to the effect that, whatever the merits of the
Allemands’ argument, “[c]ountervailing concerns nonetheless
outweigh the force of this contention.”51
III. CONCLUSION
When we consider this case in the overall framework
established by our prior holdings, those of the Second, Sixth, and
Eleventh Circuits, and the more restrictive approach applied by the
Supreme Court to non-pecuniary damages in Moragne wrongful death
actions since Gaudet, we conclude that non-dependent parents of a
longshoreman who died in territorial waters are not entitled to
recover damages for loss of society. For the reasons set forth
above, the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED. As for the
Allemands’ appeal of the district court’s “dismissal” of their
survival claim, that appeal is DISMISSED, as the issue was not
50
882 F.2d at 988-89 (citations and quotation marks
omitted).
51
Wahlstrom, 4 F.3d at 1092.
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presented to or decided by the district court.
21