United States v. Frederico Gonzalez , 377 F. App'x 371 ( 2010 )


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  •      Case: 09-10756     Document: 00511101611          Page: 1    Date Filed: 05/05/2010
    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT  United States Court of Appeals
    Fifth Circuit
    FILED
    May 5, 2010
    No. 09-10756
    Summary Calendar                         Lyle W. Cayce
    Clerk
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff-Appellee
    v.
    FREDERICO GONZALEZ, also known as Viejon,
    Defendant-Appellant
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Northern District of Texas
    USDC No. 3:03-CR-329-13
    Before BENAVIDES, PRADO and SOUTHWICK, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:*
    Frederico Gonzalez appeals the sentence of life imprisonment imposed at
    resentencing for his conviction for conspiracy to distribute and possess with the
    intent to distribute cocaine, cocaine base, marijuana, and MDMA and conspiracy
    to transport and attempt to transport monetary instruments from inside the
    United States to outside the United States. This court previously vacated
    Gonzalez’s sentence and ordered resentencing in light of United States v. Booker,
    
    543 U.S. 200
    (2005).
    *
    Pursuant to 5TH CIR . R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not
    be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR .
    R. 47.5.4.
    Case: 09-10756   Document: 00511101611 Page: 2        Date Filed: 05/05/2010
    No. 09-10756
    Gonzalez argues that the district court erred in applying a sentence
    enhancement for possession of a dangerous weapon pursuant to U.S.S.G.
    § 2D1.1(b)(1). He argues that the district court did not find beyond a reasonable
    doubt that he possessed a firearm and the court looked to pre-Booker standards
    in making its determination.
    Because Gonzalez was resentenced after the decision in Booker, there was
    no error in the district court’s finding sentencing factors by a preponderance of
    the evidence. See United States v. Stevens, 
    487 F.3d 232
    , 246 (5th Cir. 2007);
    United States v. Fambro, 
    526 F.3d 836
    , 851 & n.96 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 
    129 S. Ct. 625
    (2008). Additionally, the district court did not look to improper
    standards. Based on the type of firearms found at Gonzalez’s residence, the drug
    paraphernalia also found at the residence, and the testimony that Gonzalez
    trafficked drugs from this same residence, the district court’s determination that
    Gonzalez possessed a firearm in connection with his drug-trafficking offense is
    plausible in light of the record as a whole and is not clearly erroneous. See
    United States v. Caldwell, 
    448 F.3d 287
    , 290 (5th Cir. 2006); United States v.
    Mitchell, 
    31 F.3d 271
    , 277 (5th Cir. 1994).
    Gonzalez also contends the district court’s determination of drug quantity
    under U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1 is erroneous because the record supports a finding that
    he was responsible for only 145 kilograms of cocaine rather than at least 150
    kilograms. The district court should approximate the amount of drugs involved
    in an offense when the amount seized does not reflect the scale of the offense.
    See § 2D1.1, comment. (n.12). In making this approximation, the district court
    may consider any evidence which has “sufficient indicia of reliability.” U.S.S.G
    § 6A1.3, comment.; United States v. Manthei, 
    913 F.2d 1130
    , 1138 (5th Cir.
    1990).   The district court properly approximated the amount of drugs
    attributable to Gonzalez from the Presentence Report and the testimony of
    Special Agent Aziz, both of which are sufficiently reliable. Although the exact
    numbers from Special Agent Aziz’s testimony totaled 145 kilograms, his
    2
    Case: 09-10756    Document: 00511101611 Page: 3         Date Filed: 05/05/2010
    No. 09-10756
    testimony indicated that Gonzalez was responsible for a greater amount. Special
    Agent Aziz explained that individuals were observed making several drug
    deliveries to Gonzalez’s residence.      Though the exact quantities of these
    deliveries were not determined by his testimony, the district court’s
    determination that the additional amount was more than five kilograms of
    cocaine was plausible in light of the record as a whole and therefore not clearly
    erroneous. See United States v. Betancourt, 
    422 F.3d 240
    , 246 (5th Cir. 2005).
    Gonzalez argues that his total offense level was miscalculated by the
    district court because the court applied enhancements under U.S.S.G. § 2S1.1
    based on his money laundering conviction.          The record does not support
    Gonzalez’s argument.        Though the court initially improperly stated that
    Gonzalez’s offense level was enhanced under § 2S1.1, the record reflects that the
    court was corrected and properly calculated Gonzalez’s total offense level at 44.
    Moreover, the Supplement to the Presentence Report also properly calculates
    Gonzalez’s offense level.
    Gonzalez contends that his within-guidelines sentence is substantively
    unreasonable. He argues that his codefendants received sentences of 30 years
    or less. Because Gonzalez does not show that his codefendants were similarly
    situated, he fails to establish that his sentence is unreasonable due to a disparity
    between his sentence and his codefendants’ sentences. See United States v.
    Candia, 
    454 F.3d 468
    , 476 (5th Cir. 2006). Additionally, the district court
    considered Gonzalez’s arguments and determined that the factors of 18 U.S.C.
    § 3553(a) did not warrant a sentence outside the guidelines range. There is no
    indication that the district court abused its discretion in weighing the § 3553(a)
    factors or that Gonzalez’s sentence is substantively unreasonable. See Gall v.
    United States, 
    552 U.S. 38
    , 51 (2007); United States v. Campos-Maldonado, 
    531 F.3d 337
    , 338 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 
    129 S. Ct. 328
    (2008).
    Accordingly, the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.
    3