FTC v. National Business Consultants ( 2012 )


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  •      Case: 12-30026     Document: 00511935224         Page: 1     Date Filed: 07/26/2012
    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT  United States Court of Appeals
    Fifth Circuit
    FILED
    July 26, 2012
    No. 12-30026                          Lyle W. Cayce
    Summary Calendar                             Clerk
    FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION
    Plaintiff-Appellee
    v.
    ROBERT NAMER
    Defendant-Appellant
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Eastern District of Louisiana
    CV No. 89-1740
    Before HIGGINBOTHAM, DAVIS and ELROD, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:*
    Robert Namer appeals the judgment of the district court approving the
    renewal of the United State’s judgment liens created in this matter under the
    provisions of the Federal Debt Collection Procedures Act, 
    28 U.S.C. § 3201
    (c)(2)(B). Namer argues that the money judgment dated November 8, 1991
    became invalid and unenforceable ten years later on November 8, 2001, as it was
    *
    Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not
    be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.
    R. 47.5.4.
    Case: 12-30026      Document: 00511935224     Page: 2    Date Filed: 07/26/2012
    No. 12-30026
    never revived within ten years after it was rendered as required by Louisiana
    Civil Code Article 3501. This argument is without merit.
    Although Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 69(a)(1) provides that the federal
    government's enforcement by writ of execution "must accord with the procedures
    of the state where the court is located," that Rule goes on to provide that
    notwithstanding this directive, "a federal statute governs to the extent it
    applies." Fed R. Civ. P. 69(a)(1). The Federal Debt Collection Procedures Act of
    1990 ("FDCPA") is such a statute.         The FDCPA        provides that, with the
    exception of conflicting federal law, it "provides the exclusive civil procedures for
    the United States to . . . recover a judgment on a debt." 
    28 U.S.C. § 3001
    . The
    judgment liens at issue in this case are “debts” within the meaning of the
    FDCPA. Federal Trade Commission v. National Business Consultants, Inc., 
    376 F.3d 317
     (5th Cir. 2004) (an earlier proceeding in this case). The FDCPA further
    Provides that it "shall preempt State law to the extent such law is inconsistent."
    
    28 U.S.C. § 3003
    (d).
    The Louisiana state law Namer relies on, Louisiana Civil Code Article
    3501, clearly conflicts with the provisions of the FDCPA.        It provides that a
    money judgment “is prescribed by the lapse of ten years from its signing”
    although any party having an interest in the judgment may have it revived
    before it prescribes, as provided in Article 2031 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
    
    Id.
     In contrast, the FDCPA provides for the duration of liens as follows:
    (c) Duration of lien; renewal.
    (1) Except as provided in paragraph (2), a lien created under
    subsection (a) is effective, unless satisfied, for a period of 20 years.
    2
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    No. 12-30026
    (2) Such lien may be renewed for one additional period of 20 years
    upon filing a notice of renewal in the same manner as the judgment
    is filed and shall relate back to the date the judgment is filed if–
    (A) the notice of renewal is filed before the expiration of the
    20-year period to prevent the expiration of the lien; and
    (B) the court approves the renewal of such lien under this
    paragraph.
    
    28 U.S.C. § 3201
     (emphasis added). Louisiana Civil Code Article 3501, which
    would preclude enforcement of the judgment after ten years from the entry of
    that judgment unless timely revived, is such an inconsistent state law and is,
    therefore, preempted.     The FDCPA allows twenty years for renewal of
    judgments. See 
    28 U.S.C. § 3201
    .
    Further, because the purpose of the FDCPA "is to create a
    comprehensive statutory framework for the collection of debts owed
    to the United States government [and to] improve the efficiency and
    speed in collecting those debts," H.R. Rep. No. 101-736, at 32 (1990),
    a state law limiting such collection is inconsistent with the purpose
    of the act and is, therefore, preempted.
    United States v. Gianelli, 
    543 F.3d 1178
    , 1183 (9th Cir. 2008) (dealing with
    California law precluding enforcement of a judgment when 10 years has passed
    since the judgment was entered). We agree with Gianelli on the following point
    as well.
    Although not binding upon us, the reasoning of United States v.
    Pierce, 
    231 B.R. 890
    , 893 (E.D.N.C. 1998) supports our conclusion.
    In Pierce, the district court rejected the argument that where the
    government proceeded to enforce a judgment under the FDCPA,
    Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 69(a)(1) incorporated a state law
    limitation prohibiting enforcement after ten years. 
    Id.
     That court
    reasoned that, in light of the legislative history underlying the
    3
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    No. 12-30026
    FDCPA and the language of the statute itself, binding the federal
    government to state law limitations on enforcement "would
    completely thwart the FDCPA's stated purpose of the creation of
    uniform federal procedures for the collection of debts to the federal
    government." 
    Id.
    Accordingly, the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.
    4
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 12-30026

Filed Date: 7/26/2012

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 4/17/2021