United States v. Roberto Zamora , 661 F.3d 200 ( 2011 )


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  •      Case: 10-30092   Document: 00511638055   Page: 1   Date Filed: 10/19/2011
    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT  United States Court of Appeals
    Fifth Circuit
    FILED
    October 19, 2011
    No. 10-30092                    Lyle W. Cayce
    Clerk
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff-Appellee,
    v.
    ROBERTO ZAMORA AND FLETCHER FREEMAN, JR.,
    Defendants-Appellants.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Western District of Louisiana
    Before JONES, Chief Judge, and STEWART and SOUTHWICK, Circuit Judges.
    CARL E. STEWART, Circuit Judge:
    Roberto Zamora and Fletcher Freeman, Jr. appeal from their conviction
    related to drug trafficking. A jury found both Zamora and Freeman guilty of
    conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute cocaine, 21 U.S.C. § 846; found
    Zamora guilty of possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking
    crime, 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1); and found Freeman guilty of possession of cocaine
    with intent to distribute, 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). Zamora and Freeman separately
    raise a number of challenges to their convictions. We AFFIRM.
    Case: 10-30092   Document: 00511638055     Page: 2   Date Filed: 10/19/2011
    No. 10-30092
    I.
    A.      The Chapa-Duran Conspiracy
    From 2002 until 2006, the government alleges, the Chapa-Duran drug
    trafficking conspiracy was responsible for transporting drugs by car from Mexico
    into Houston, Texas, and, by means of a route through Louisiana, into
    Columbus, Georgia.       Francisco Chapa-Duran, a Mexican fugitive, led the
    conspiracy.
    In Mexico, Chapa-Duran and his associates would hide the drugs in
    vehicles used for trafficking operations. Participants in the conspiracy would
    receive several thousands of dollars to drive drugs into the United States, with
    the amount of money generally determined by the length of the trip and the
    duration of their service to the organization. When drugs were transported to
    Georgia, the means of delivery to local dealers varied, but when drugs were
    transported to Houston, the vehicle would normally be left in the Galleria Mall
    parking lot, where a local dealer would retrieve the drugs from the car.
    A distinguishing feature of the Chapa-Duran conspiracy was the way in
    which it used vehicles. In an attempt to prevent detection by law enforcement,
    members of the conspiracy would modify the dashboards and battery
    compartments of automobiles to outfit them for the storage of drugs. The
    vehicles of choice for the Chapa-Duran conspiracy were Volkswagen Beetles, the
    dashboards of which could be easily modified for drug storage, and Toyota
    Camrys, the battery compartments of which were similarly adaptable. Often,
    the conspiracy would register vehicles under the names of non-participants in
    the conspiracy so that these vehicles would not be traced back to Chapa-Duran.
    Many of the individuals involved in this conspiracy have pleaded guilty to
    drug trafficking crimes and have been sentenced to jail time for their role. The
    government alleges that both Fletcher Freeman, Jr., and Roberto Zamora were
    participants in the Chapa-Duran conspiracy.
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    B.      Fletcher Freeman, Jr.
    Freeman, who was employed in the trucking business, lived in Columbus,
    Georgia. The government alleges that couriers working for the Chapa-Duran
    conspiracy transported drugs to him and Bruce Stinson, a member of the
    conspiracy who had pleaded guilty to charges related to drug trafficking prior to
    the trial of Zamora and Freeman. During trial, a number of government
    witnesses, most of them participants in the Chapa-Duran conspiracy, testified
    that Freeman was the recipient of drugs brought by the Chapa-Duran conspiracy
    from Mexico. One witness, a member of the Chapa-Duran conspiracy, testified
    that he transported drugs to Freeman’s house and counted money there. Two
    other witnesses, also members of the Chapa-Duran conspiracy, testified to
    having turned drugs over to Freeman in exchange for money. Another witness
    who was not involved in the conspiracy testified that Freeman paid him to tow
    a vehicle containing drugs to Georgia.        The evidence presented by the
    government portrayed Freeman as a central figure in the Georgia branch of the
    Chapa-Duran conspiracy.
    C.      Roberto Zamora
    Roberto Zamora was arrested in Houston on April 4, 2006. That morning,
    at approximately 9:40 a.m., police began to monitor Zamora’s residence, 2118
    Fulton Street, after receiving a tip from a confidential informant that drugs
    might be located on the premises. The police determined the tip was reliable
    because the informant who provided the tip previously had provided the police
    with reliable information and certain aspects of the informant’s tip had been
    corroborated. As the informant had described, the police found a garage area on
    the south side of the residence with a black tarp covering the carport, and a gate
    in front of the house. Also as described, police found three cars outside when
    they arrived: a blue Volkswagen (“the Volkswagen”), a black Camaro, and a
    black pickup truck. While the police were observing the residence that morning,
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    a red Lincoln Navigator (“the Navigator”) arrived at 2118 Fulton Street. Police
    later learned that Roberto Zamora and his brother, Leobardo Zamora, were the
    driver and passenger of the Navigator. An officer testified during trial that he
    watched Leobardo enter the residence wearing one shirt and leave wearing
    another, and observed Roberto Zamora enter the Volkswagen and then exit it.
    Further testimony came from officers who witnessed Roberto Zamora parking
    the Volkswagen behind the black tarp covering the carport, as if Zamora wanted
    to conceal what was happening in the carport.
    After their brief stop at the residence, Roberto and Leobardo Zamora left
    2118 Fulton Street in the Navigator at 11:09 a.m. A couple minutes later,
    officers for the Houston Police Department stopped the Navigator for both a
    traffic violation and as part of their investigation of drug-related crimes at 2118
    Fulton Street. After conducting a search for warrants, officers learned that
    Leobardo had one warrant outstanding and Roberto had none. The police then
    called in a drug-sniffing dog. At approximately 11:45 a.m., the dog alerted to the
    Navigator, leading the police to search the car for drugs. Their search did not
    turn up any drugs. Following the search, officers continued to speak with
    Zamora. At 11:58 a.m., Zamora signed a form consenting to a search of 2118
    Fulton Street.
    Within the next thirty minutes, police drove to 2118 Fulton Street and
    found contraband: a package of cocaine weighing .7 grams, a money counter, a
    “perceived drug ledger,” packing materials commonly used for trafficking
    cocaine, marijuana, and a firearm. A drug-sniffing dog also alerted to the
    Volkswagen, leading the police to execute a search warrant for the car and find
    four kilograms of cocaine in the Volkswagen. Like the Volkswagens used by the
    Chapa-Duran conspiracy, the dashboard of the Volkswagen on the premises of
    2118 Fulton Street was modified for the convenient transportation of cocaine.
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    Additionally, police later learned that the Volkswagen at 2118 Fulton Street had
    previously been used by members of the Chapa-Duran conspiracy.
    Several hours after the police arrived at 2118 Fulton Street, Roberto
    Zamora told the police that he knew about the drugs in the Volkswagen but his
    brother did not. He also told the police that a gun was located in a bedroom in
    the 2118 Fulton Street residence underneath a bed. At that point, officers
    recited Miranda warnings to Zamora for the first time. Zamora promptly
    stopped speaking with them.
    D.      Suppression Hearing, Trial, and Sentencing
    On March 11, 2009, both Roberto Zamora and Freeman were charged in
    a superseding indictment with conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute
    cocaine and other controlled substances. Additionally, Zamora was charged with
    possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime, and Freeman
    was charged with possession with intent to distribute cocaine.1
    During pretrial proceedings, Roberto Zamora moved to suppress all
    evidence obtained from the officers’ search of the premises at 2118 Fulton Street.
    Initially, the district court suppressed the firearm found in Zamora’s residence
    on the grounds that Zamora had not been read his Miranda rights when he
    made the statement that led police to find the firearm. On the government’s
    motion for rehearing, however, the district court ruled that the gun was
    admissible because the government would have inevitably found the gun even
    in the absence of Zamora’s statement. The court again ruled that Zamora’s
    statement relating to the gun must be suppressed.
    The trial lasted four days.          Forty-one witnesses testified for the
    government, mostly law enforcement and members of the Chapa-Duran
    1
    The indictment also charged Leobardo Zamora, but his indictment is not the subject
    of this proceeding. Subsequent discussions of “Zamora” in this opinion will refer to Roberto
    Zamora.
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    organization. In addition to the evidence related to the traffic stop of Zamora,
    the deliveries of drugs to Freeman, and the general workings of the Chapa-
    Duran organization, the government presented evidence that it argued
    connected Zamora to the Chapa-Duran conspiracy.               For example, the
    government introduced into evidence a notebook that, according to expert
    testimony, was consistent with use as a drug ledger and contained Zamora’s
    fingerprints. This ledger contained the name “Gordo,” a nickname that,
    according to witness testimony, was also used by a Houston-based customer of
    the Chapa-Duran organization. Further, the government showed that the
    Volkswagen found outside Zamora’s residence had been previously used for drug
    trafficking purposes by members of the Chapa-Duran organization. One witness
    for the defendants also testified.
    During the trial, Freeman’s lawyer cross-examined James Thomas, the
    officer who served as case agent for the investigation of the Chapa-Duran
    organization. Thomas mentioned that Freeman had “a criminal history” in the
    following exchange:
    Q: Is it a fact that other authorities in Georgia investigated Mr.
    Freeman and rejected charges on him?
    A: I don’t know. He’s got – he’s got a criminal history other than
    what he’s been arrested for here. That’s all I know.
    Q: He’s never been convicted of anything, correct?
    A: Not that I know of, no, sir.
    At the close of the government’s evidence, both Freeman and Zamora
    moved for a judgment of acquittal on the grounds of insufficiency of the evidence.
    Both motions were denied. The jury found the defendants guilty on all counts.
    Zamora received the mandatory minimum of 120 months on the conspiracy
    conviction and 60 months on the firearm conviction, running consecutively.
    Freeman received a sentence of 210 months for each convictions, running
    concurrently.
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    Their timely appeals followed.
    II.
    Zamora and Freeman raise a number of challenges to their convictions.
    We consider each in turn.
    A.
    Zamora argued in his brief that the district court erred by concluding
    that he was not entitled to consideration for a downward adjustment of his
    sentence under U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2. During oral argument, however, Zamora’s
    attorney conceded that the issue had become moot when the district court
    sentenced him to the mandatory minimum. Accordingly, we will not consider
    this contention. See United States v. Mankins, 
    135 F.3d 946
    , 950 (5th Cir.
    1998).
    B.
    Zamora also challenges the district court’s decision to admit evidence
    found at 2118 Fulton Street. He argues that the district court should not have
    admitted the evidence because it was the fruit of an unconstitutional traffic stop.
    We analyze a traffic stop’s constitutionality under a two-part framework.
    We first review “whether or not the officer’s decision to stop the vehicle was
    justified at its inception.” United States v. Pack, 
    612 F.3d 341
    , 350 (5th Cir.
    2010) (citation omitted), modified on other grounds on denial of reh’g, 
    622 F.3d 383
    . Traffic stops are justified at their inception when they are supported by “a
    reasonable and articulable suspicion that a person has committed a crime.”
    United States v. Jenson, 
    462 F.3d 399
    , 404 (5th Cir. 2006) (quoting United States
    v. Santiago, 
    310 F.3d 336
    , 340 (5th Cir. 2002)). Reasonable suspicion may be
    “based on information provided by a confidential informant, if the information
    possesses ‘an indicia of reliability.’” United States v. Roch, 
    5 F.3d 894
    , 898 (5th
    Cir. 1993) (citation omitted). We consider a number of factors when deciding
    whether a tip provides reasonable suspicion for an investigative stop, including:
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    the credibility and reliability of the informant, the specificity of the
    information contained in the tip or report, the extent to which the
    information in the tip or report can be verified by officers in the
    field, and whether the tip or report concerns active or recent
    activity, or has instead gone stale.
    United States v. Martinez, 
    486 F.3d 855
    , 861 (5th Cir. 2008) (quotation and
    citations omitted). If the stop was justified at its inception, our second step is to
    “determine whether or not the officer’s subsequent actions were reasonably
    related in scope to the circumstances that caused him to stop the vehicle in the
    first place.” 
    Pack, 612 F.3d at 350
    (citation omitted). When an officer makes a
    stop based on reasonable suspicion, the detention of a suspect may “last no
    longer than required to effect the purpose of the stop.” 
    Jenson, 462 F.3d at 404
    (citation omitted).
    The officers had two justifications for their initial stop of Zamora. First,
    the Navigator had a cancelled rear license plate and a missing front license
    plate. Evident traffic violations such as these clearly provide the police with
    reasonable suspicion to stop the vehicle.       
    Pack, 612 F.3d at 350
    (citation
    omitted).   Second, reasonable suspicion of drug trafficking arose from the
    informant’s tip and the officers’ monitoring of 2118 Fulton Street, combined with
    their reasonable belief that the Zamoras lived at the property located at 2118
    Fulton Street. Here, the tip that drugs might be located at 2118 Fulton Street
    provided the officers with reasonable suspicion justifying the stop of the car
    because the tip had several “indicia of reliability.” The officers had previously
    known the confidential informant to be reliable. See 
    Gonzalez, 190 F.3d at 672
    -
    73. Officers had also corroborated several aspects of the informant’s tip through
    their observation of the residence. See United States v. Tijerina, 272 F. App’x
    378, 380 (5th Cir. 2008) (per curiam). The tip had been received on the morning
    when the police began their investigation and so was not stale. See Gonzalez,
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    10-30092 190 F.3d at 673
    . Additionally, the officers had good reason to connect Roberto
    and Leobardo Zamora to the 2118 Fulton Street residence. Both men had driven
    in the Navigator to 2118 Fulton Street, and Roberto had unlocked the gate.
    They had also both engaged in suspicious behavior while outside the residence
    at 2118 Fulton Street, including an apparent attempt to hide their conduct from
    public view. For these reasons, the combination of this tip and the monitoring
    of 2118 Fulton Street provided reasonable suspicion of drug trafficking activities
    carried on by the occupants of the Navigator.                Thus, the police had two
    independent justifications for their stop: their reasonable suspicion of traffic
    violations and their reasonable suspicion of drug trafficking.
    The next step is to consider whether the actions taken by the police
    subsequent to the initial detention were reasonably related in scope to the
    original detention. After the police interrogated both Zamora brothers about
    their license plate violations and performed a computer check on their license
    plates, the traffic violation no longer provided a sufficient rationale for detaining
    Roberto Zamora.        
    Jenson, 462 F.3d at 404
    .          Nevertheless, the reasonable
    suspicion for the drug-related offense remained, justifying the officers’ decision
    to call for drug-sniffing dogs. See United States v. Williams, 
    69 F.3d 27
    , 28 (5th
    Cir. 1995). Once the drug-sniffing dog alerted to the scent of narcotics, the police
    had probable cause that drugs were in the Navigator and therefore were
    authorized to search the vehicle. See United States v. Garcia, 
    319 F.3d 726
    , 730
    (5th Cir. 2003). The search of the Navigator did not turn up drugs. Even so, the
    short detention of Zamora for the purpose of continued questioning between
    11:45 a.m., the approximate time the drug-sniffing dogs concluded their search,
    and 11:58 a.m., the time Zamora signed the consent form,2 was not
    2
    Because Zamora does not contend that his consent was involuntary, we do not address
    this issue. See United States v. Valdiosera, 
    932 F.2d 1093
    , 1099 (5th Cir. 1991) (stating that
    “any issue not raised or argued in the appellant’s brief are considered waived and will not be
    entertained on appeal”).
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    unreasonable. The original purpose of the officers’ stop was to interrogate
    Roberto and Leobardo Zamora about drug trafficking that seemed to be
    occurring at 2118 Fulton Street, not in the Navigator. Therefore, despite the
    absence of drugs in the Navigator, the short period of additional questioning was
    reasonably related to the purpose of the officers’ detention.
    Because the officers’ conduct was not unreasonable, the officers did not
    violate Zamora’s Fourth Amendment rights and the challenged evidence was not
    the fruit of a constitutional violation. The district court did not err when it
    admitted the evidence found at 2118 Fulton Street.
    C.
    Zamora next challenges the district court’s failure to provide the venue
    instruction that he requested. Zamora asked that the district court instruct the
    jury that the government needs to prove venue in the Western District of
    Louisiana, where the trial was held. Zamora contends that the district court’s
    failure to do so requires acquittal.
    We review a district court’s refusal to provide a jury instruction requested
    by the defendant for abuse of discretion. United States v. Wright, 
    634 F.3d 770
    ,
    775 (5th Cir. 2011). “We will reverse the district court’s decision only if the
    requested instruction (1) was a substantially correct statement of the law; (2)
    was not substantially covered in the charge as a whole, and (3) concerned an
    important point in the trial such that the failure to instruct the jury on the issue
    seriously impaired the defendant’s ability to present a given defense.” 
    Id. (quotation marks
    and citation omitted). The “failure to instruct on venue is
    reversible error when trial testimony puts venue in issue and the defendant
    requests the instruction . . . .” United States v. White, 
    611 F.2d 531
    , 536 (5th Cir.
    1980) (citation omitted). Venue is not put “in issue” when the government
    presents adequate evidence of venue, and the defendant fails to contradict the
    government’s evidence. United States v. Caldwell, 
    16 F.3d 623
    , 625 (5th Cir.
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    1994). If venue is not put at issue, the district court’s failure to instruct on
    venue is, at worst, harmless error. 
    Id. We reject
    Zamora’s argument.        The government is permitted to try
    defendants accused of conspiracy in any district where an overt act in the
    conspiracy took place. 
    Id. at 624.
    Here, the government presented evidence
    showing that overt acts in the Chapa-Duran conspiracy occurred in the Western
    District of Louisiana. While Zamora argued during trial that he was not part of
    the Chapa-Duran conspiracy, Zamora never contradicted the government’s
    contention that overt acts of the Chapa-Duran conspiracy occurred in the
    Western District of Louisiana. Without any evidence to the contrary, there was
    no dispute as to whether the Western District of Louisiana was an appropriate
    venue to try alleged members of the Chapa-Duran conspiracy. Therefore, venue
    was not put “in issue.” See 
    id. at 624.
    For this reason, the district court did not
    commit reversible error when it denied Zamora’s proposed venue instruction.
    D.
    Zamora also contends that the district court erred by denying his motion
    for judgment of acquittal. Zamora argues that the evidence presented by the
    government demonstrated neither that he was part of the Chapa-Duran
    conspiracy nor that he used a gun in furtherance of a drug trafficking offense.
    We review a district court’s denial of a motion for judgment of acquittal de
    novo. United States v. Xu, 
    599 F.3d 452
    , 453 (5th Cir. 2010). The analysis
    focuses on “whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the
    prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of
    the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Jackson v. Virginia, 
    443 U.S. 307
    , 319
    (1979). This requires the defendant to make a “high showing.” United States v.
    Fernandez, 
    559 F.3d 303
    , 315 (5th Cir. 2009). It is not the province of the
    appellate court to “evaluate the weight of the evidence or the credibility of the
    witnesses.” United States v. Solis, 
    299 F.3d 420
    , 445 (5th Cir. 2002) (citation
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    omitted).   Accordingly, “‘[j]urors are free to choose among reasonable
    constructions of the evidence’ in order to arrive at a verdict.” United States v.
    Thomas, 
    627 F.3d 146
    , 151 (5th Cir. 2010) (citation omitted).
    1.
    We first consider Zamora’s motion for a judgment of acquittal on the
    charge of conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute cocaine. To show that
    a defendant was part of a conspiracy to distribute cocaine, the government must
    prove “(1) an agreement between two or more persons to violate the narcotics
    laws, (2) the defendant’s knowledge of the agreement, and (3) the defendant’s
    voluntary participation in the conspiracy.” United States v. Booker, 
    334 F.3d 406
    , 409 (5th Cir. 2003) (citation omitted). A jury may “infer the existence of an
    agreement [to a conspiracy] from . . . testimony and the other circumstantial
    evidence.” United States v. Garcia, 
    567 F.3d 721
    , 732 (5th Cir. 2009). “An
    express agreement is not required; a tacit, mutual agreement with common
    purpose, design, and understanding will suffice.” United States v. Lewis, 
    476 F.3d 369
    , 383 (5th Cir. 2007) (quotation marks and citation omitted). If all that
    is proven, however, is a “defendant’s mere presence at the crime scene or close
    association with conspirators, jurors would not be entitled to infer participation
    in the conspiracy.” United States v. Diaz, 
    637 F.3d 592
    , 602 (5th Cir. 2011)
    (quotation marks and citation omitted).
    It is not seriously contested that Francisco Chapa-Duran operated a
    conspiracy to traffic drugs, or that many of the witnesses at trial were part of
    that conspiracy. Zamora contends, however, that he did not know of the Chapa-
    Duran conspiracy or voluntarily participate in it. Viewed in the light most
    favorable to the jury’s verdict, the evidence that Zamora knew of and
    participated in the Chapa-Duran conspiracy to distribute cocaine was sufficient
    to convict Zamora.
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    The government presented two items of evidence that, when considered
    together, permit a rational trier of fact to infer that Zamora knew of and
    participated in the Chapa-Duran conspiracy. First, the Volkswagen used by
    Zamora had previously been titled to two members of the Chapa-Duran drug
    trafficking organization.   Like the Volkswagen used by the Chapa-Duran
    organization, Zamora’s Volkswagen was modified in a way that facilitated the
    transportation of illegal drugs. Further, evidence showed that it was common
    for the members of the Chapa-Duran organization to transfer cars used for drug
    trafficking among themselves. When officers observed it on April 4, 2006, the
    Volkswagen contained cocaine and was parked outside of the house Zamora lived
    in.   Zamora told police that he knew about the cocaine contained in the
    Volkswagen. Thus, the jury heard evidence that Zamora’s Volkswagen had
    previously belonged to members of the Chapa-Duran organization, was outfitted
    in the same way as the Volkswagen used by the Chapa-Duran organization, and
    was used for the purpose as the Chapa-Duran Volkswagen. This type of “concert
    of action can indicate agreement and voluntary participation” in a conspiracy.
    See United States v. Lopez, 
    979 F.2d 1024
    , 1029 (5th Cir. 1992).
    Second, the drug ledger found by police also allowed a rational juror to
    infer that Zamora knew of and participated in the Chapa-Duran conspiracy.
    According to expert testimony, the notebook found by police in Zamora’s
    residence contained Roberto Zamora’s fingerprints and indicia of being used to
    record illicit drug transactions. This ledger also contained the name “Gordo.”
    Trial testimony established that a man named Gordo was among the persons in
    Houston who purchased drugs from the Chapa-Duran organization.              The
    presence of a known customer of the Chapa-Duran conspiracy in a drug ledger
    containing Roberto Zamora’s fingerprints supports the inference that Roberto
    Zamora was involved in drug trafficking with the Chapa-Duran organization.
    See United States v. Jones, 347 F. App’x 129, 136 (5th Cir. 2009).
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    While both of these items of evidence are circumstantial, they are, when
    taken together, strong enough that the jury was permitted to infer that Zamora
    knew of the Chapa-Duran conspiracy and participated in it. The district court
    did not err when it denied Zamora’s motion for a judgment of acquittal for
    conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute cocaine.
    2.
    Zamora further contends that the evidence did not establish that the
    firearm found in his residence was possessed in furtherance of a drug trafficking
    crime. This offense is committed when “during and in relation to any . . . drug
    trafficking crime . . . for which the person may be prosecuted in a court of the
    United States, uses or carries a firearm, or who, in furtherance of any such
    crime, possesses a firearm . . . “ 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A). We have looked to
    several factors in determining whether a gun was used in furtherance of a drug
    trafficking offense: “the type of drug activity that is being conducted,
    accessibility of the firearm, the type of the weapon, whether the weapon is
    stolen, the status of the possession (legitimate or illegal), whether the gun is
    loaded, proximity to drugs or drug profits, and the time and circumstances under
    which the gun is found.” United States v. Ceballos-Torres, 
    218 F.3d 409
    , 414-15
    (5th Cir. 2000).
    Viewed in the light most favorable to the jury’s verdict, the evidence also
    supports the conclusion that Zamora possessed a weapon in furtherance of a
    drug trafficking crime. First, the gun was found in Zamora’s residence at 2118
    Fulton Street, which supports the jury’s conclusion that Zamora “possessed” the
    firearm. Second, the jury could conclude that the combination of the four
    kilograms of drugs found in the Volkswagen outside the residence and the drug-
    related paraphernalia found inside the residence showed that drug trafficking
    was occurring at 2118 Fulton Street. Cf. United States v. Rose, 
    587 F.3d 695
    ,
    702 (5th Cir. 2009) (holding that large amount of cocaine packaged in individual
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    baggies was one basis for affirming conviction for possession of a firearm in
    furtherance of a drug trafficking offense). Third, several facts of this case
    support the conclusion that Zamora possessed the gun “in furtherance” of drug
    trafficking.   The gun was loaded, see 
    id. at 703;
    it was easily accessible
    underneath a bed, cf. id; and it was a handgun, a type of gun commonly used in
    drug trafficking, see 
    id. at 702.
    Further, a rational juror could conclude that the
    gun was located near the location of activity related to drug trafficking: while
    most of the drugs found were in the Volkswagen, a number of the accoutrements
    of the drug trade–including the drug ledger and measuring materials–were
    located near the gun.
    For all these reasons, a rational juror could have concluded that the gun
    found at 2118 Fulton Street was used in furtherance of drug trafficking. The
    district court’s denial of Zamora’s motion for a judgment of acquittal on his
    conviction for possessing a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking offense
    was not erroneous.
    E.
    Freeman argues that the district court erroneously denied his motion for
    a mistrial. Freeman maintains that a witness’s testimony that Freeman had “a
    criminal history” was so prejudicial that it requires a mistrial.
    We review a denial of a motion for mistrial for abuse of discretion. United
    States v. Mitchell, 
    484 F.3d 762
    , 775 (5th Cir. 2007). If a defendant moves for a
    mistrial on the grounds that the jury heard prejudicial testimony, “a new trial
    is required only if there is a significant possibility that the prejudicial evidence
    had a substantial impact upon the jury verdict, viewed in light of the entire
    record.” United States v. Paul, 
    142 F.3d 836
    , 844 (5th Cir. 1998) (citation
    omitted). If the “evidence is so prejudicial that the jury will unlikely be able to
    erase it from their minds, then a mistrial should be ordered.” United States v.
    Escamilla, 
    666 F.2d 126
    , 128 (5th Cir. 1982) (citations omitted). To determine
    15
    Case: 10-30092        Document: 00511638055         Page: 16     Date Filed: 10/19/2011
    No. 10-30092
    whether prejudicial testimony should prompt a mistrial, we have focused on the
    characteristics of the prejudicial evidence, see 
    Paul, 143 F.3d at 844
    , and the
    strength of the other evidence in the case, see United States v. Limones, 
    8 F.3d 1004
    , 1007 (5th Cir. 1993); United States v. Millsaps, 
    157 F.3d 989
    , 993 (5th Cir.
    1998).
    Our review of the record demonstrates that the district court did not err
    when it denied Freeman’s motion for a mistrial.                   First, the inadmissible
    testimony was isolated, only vaguely related to the alleged crime, and its
    prejudicial impact was limited by subsequent events.3                    The inadmissible
    testimony was only vaguely related to the charges brought by the government
    in that it did not establish any specific conduct by Freeman. Instead, it only
    established that Freeman had “a criminal history.” The testimony was isolated
    because the jury never heard anything of this criminal history after the witness
    mentioned it.      
    Paul, 142 F.3d at 844
    .          In a four-day trial with forty-two
    witnesses, the challenged testimony consists of only one sentence. Finally,
    events subsequent to the inadmissible testimony limited its prejudicial impact.
    After the witness testified that Freeman had “a criminal history,” he noted that
    Freeman had not been convicted of any crimes. The district court also instructed
    the jury that Freeman was on trial only for the conduct alleged in the
    indictment. See 
    id. (noting a
    similar instruction from the trial judge in affirming
    the district court).4
    3
    We assume for the sake of deciding that Freeman is correct that the testimony was
    inadmissible. As Freeman notes, “[e]vidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible
    to prove the character of a person in order to show action in conformity therewith.” Fed. R.
    Evid. 404(b). The government argues, however, that the statement was invited by the
    questioning of Zamora’s counsel, and therefore was not inadmissible. We need not decide this
    issue to resolve the question before us.
    4
    Freeman did not request and the district court did not provide a curative instruction.
    The district court seemed to believe that the benefits of doing so in this case would be
    outweighed by the tendency of such an instruction to call attention to the inadmissible
    evidence.
    16
    Case: 10-30092    Document: 00511638055     Page: 17    Date Filed: 10/19/2011
    No. 10-30092
    Second, the other evidence presented by the government was very strong.
    The government presented many witnesses who testified that Freeman was a
    major player in the Chapa-Duran drug trafficking organization, including
    several individuals who testified that they delivered drugs directly to Freeman.
    The overwhelming amount of testimony provided the jury with more than
    enough information to tie Freeman to the Chapa-Duran organization. See
    
    Millsaps, 157 F.3d at 993
    .
    When we consider all these facts together, we do not find a substantial
    likelihood that a fleeting reference to “a criminal history” had a substantial
    impact on the jury’s verdict. The district court did not err when it denied
    Freeman’s motion for a judgment of acquittal.
    III.
    Because we find no reversible error in the rulings of the district court, we
    AFFIRM the district court’s judgments and the defendants’ sentences.
    17
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 10-30092

Citation Numbers: 661 F.3d 200, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 21146, 2011 WL 4953992

Judges: Jones, Stewart, Southwick

Filed Date: 10/19/2011

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 11/5/2024

Authorities (25)

United States v. Williams , 69 F.3d 27 ( 1995 )

Jackson v. Virginia , 99 S. Ct. 2781 ( 1979 )

United States v. Diaz , 637 F.3d 592 ( 2011 )

United States v. Jenson , 462 F.3d 399 ( 2006 )

United States v. Garcia , 567 F.3d 721 ( 2009 )

United States v. Charles Robert White , 611 F.2d 531 ( 1980 )

united-states-v-jose-cleotide-solis-also-known-as-little-cocho-ecliserio , 299 F.3d 420 ( 2002 )

United States v. Gavin Allan Paul Patrick Carlos Britton , 142 F.3d 836 ( 1998 )

United States v. Wright , 634 F.3d 770 ( 2011 )

United States v. George Escamilla , 666 F.2d 126 ( 1982 )

United States v. Mankins , 135 F.3d 946 ( 1998 )

United States v. Santos Limones and Juan Antonio Fuentes , 8 F.3d 1004 ( 1993 )

United States v. Booker , 334 F.3d 406 ( 2003 )

United States v. Roch , 5 F.3d 894 ( 1993 )

United States v. Keyon Lakeith Mitchell Duford Lee Mitchell , 484 F.3d 762 ( 2007 )

United States v. Millsaps , 157 F.3d 989 ( 1998 )

United States v. Rugerio Valdiosera-Godinez and Alejandro ... , 932 F.2d 1093 ( 1991 )

United States v. Xu , 599 F.3d 452 ( 2010 )

United States v. Lewis , 476 F.3d 369 ( 2007 )

United States v. Rose , 587 F.3d 695 ( 2009 )

View All Authorities »