Norman Sinclair v. Petco Animal Supplies Stores , 581 F. App'x 369 ( 2014 )


Menu:
  •      Case: 14-30091      Document: 00512754804         Page: 1    Date Filed: 09/03/2014
    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
    No. 14-30091
    Summary Calendar
    United States Court of Appeals
    Fifth Circuit
    FILED
    September 3, 2014
    NORMAL SINCLAIR,
    Lyle W. Cayce
    Clerk
    Plaintiff-Appellant
    v.
    PETCO ANIMAL SUPPLIES STORES, INC.,
    Defendant-Appellee
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Eastern District of Louisiana
    USDC No. 2:13-CV-6179
    Before JOLLY, JONES, and HIGGINSON, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:*
    Plaintiff-Appellant     Normal Sinclair         (“Sinclair”) sued         Defendant-
    Appellant Petco Animal Supplies Stores, Inc. (“Petco”) in state court, alleging
    that Petco’s negligence in failing to maintain a safe premises caused Sinclair
    to injure himself when he slipped and fell on merchandise near the checkout
    counter in one of Petco’s stores. Petco removed the action to federal court. Petco
    filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
    Sinclair subsequently filed a motion to amend his complaint, which the district
    * Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not
    be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH
    CIR. R. 47.5.4.
    Case: 14-30091    Document: 00512754804     Page: 2   Date Filed: 09/03/2014
    No. 14-30091
    court granted. The district court then granted Petco’s motion to dismiss.
    Sinclair timely appealed.
    “We review de novo a district court order granting a Rule 12(b)(6) motion
    to dismiss for failure to state a claim and may affirm on any basis supported
    by the record.” Asadi v. G.E. Energy (USA), L.L.C., 
    720 F.3d 620
    , 622 (5th Cir.
    2013). We accept “all well-pleaded facts as true, viewing them in the light most
    favorable to the plaintiff.” In re Katrina Canal Breaches Litig., 
    495 F.3d 191
    ,
    205 (5th Cir. 2007) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). To survive
    dismissal, the plaintiff must plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that
    is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 
    550 U.S. 544
    , 570 (2007).
    “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that
    allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable
    for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 
    556 U.S. 662
    , 678 (2009). “A
    complaint must fail if it offers only naked assertions devoid of further factual
    enhancement.” Doe v. Robertson, 
    751 F.3d 383
    , 387 (2014) (internal quotation
    marks and citation omitted).
    Sinclair argues first that the district court erred in dismissing his
    complaint for failure to state a claim. Under Louisiana law, “[a] merchant owes
    a duty to persons who use his premises to exercise reasonable care to keep his
    aisles, passageways, and floors in a reasonably safe condition.” La. Rev. Stat.
    Ann. § 9:2800.6(A). In a premises-liability action, the plaintiff has the burden
    of proving, “in addition to all other elements of his cause of action,” the
    following: “(1) [t]he condition presented an unreasonable risk of harm to the
    claimant and that risk of harm was reasonably foreseeable”; “(2) [t]he
    merchant either created or had actual or constructive notice of the condition
    which caused the damage, prior to the occurrence”; and “(3) [t]he merchant
    failed to exercise reasonable care.” 
    Id. at (B).
    “‘Constructive notice’ means the
    [plaintiff] has proven that the condition existed for such a period of time that
    2
    Case: 14-30091        Document: 00512754804           Page: 3     Date Filed: 09/03/2014
    No. 14-30091
    it would have been discovered if the merchant had exercised reasonable care.”
    
    Id. at (C)(1).
    “Under Louisiana law, constructive notice requires a showing that
    the dangerous condition existed for ‘some time period’ prior to the fall.” Cates
    v. Dillard Dept. Stores, Inc., 
    624 F.3d 695
    , 697 (5th Cir. 2010) (citing White v.
    Wal–Mart Stores, Inc., 
    699 So. 2d 1081
    , 1084 (La. 1997)).
    Sinclair alleges that Petco’s “negligent acts and/or omissions,” including
    its failure “to maintain its premises in a safe and hazard free condition,” were
    the “sole and proximate cause of the injuries and damages” he sustained.
    Sinclair alleges further that Petco “knew or should have known of the
    hazardous condition of its aisles, passageways and checkout counter path”
    and that the merchandise on which he allegedly tripped “presented an
    unreasonable risk of harm to customers.” 1 These allegations offer no more than
    “labels and conclusions,” “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of
    action,” and “naked assertions devoid of further factual enhancement”; they
    are thus insufficient to state a claim that is plausible on its face. See 
    Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678
    (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Accordingly, the
    district court did not err in dismissing Sinclair’s complaint for failure to state
    a claim. 2
    Sinclair argues second that the district court abused its discretion in
    denying him leave to amend his complaint a second time after the district court
    1  Our review of the district court’s dismissal pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) is limited to the
    allegations in the pleadings (here, Sinclair’s complaint and amended complaint). See Lone
    Star Fund V (U.S.), L.P. v. Barclays Bank PLC, 
    594 F.3d 383
    , 387 (5th Cir. 2010); United
    States v. Cont’l Common, Inc., 
    553 F.3d 869
    , 872 n.2 (5th Cir. 2008) (citing Morin v. Caire, 
    77 F.3d 116
    , 120 (5th Cir. 1996)).
    2 Sinclair’s complaint alleges further that “the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur applies in
    this matter.” The district court concluded that Sinclair failed to state a claim for relief under
    the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. On appeal, Sinclair fails to raise any argument with regard
    to res ipsa loquitur; accordingly, that argument is waived. See Hannah v. United States, 
    523 F.3d 597
    , 600 n.1 (5th Cir. 2008); Miller v. Nationwide Life Ins. Co., 
    391 F.3d 698
    , 701 n.1
    (5th Cir. 2004).
    3
    Case: 14-30091     Document: 00512754804     Page: 4   Date Filed: 09/03/2014
    No. 14-30091
    ruled on the motion to dismiss. “Decisions concerning motions to amend are
    entrusted to the sound discretion of the district court.” Jones v. Robinson
    Property Grp., L.P., 
    427 F.3d 987
    , 994 (5th Cir. 2005) (internal quotation marks
    and citation omitted). The district court may consider multiple factors,
    “including undue delay, bad faith or dilatory motive on the part of the movant,
    repeated failures to cure deficiencies by amendments previously allowed,
    undue prejudice to the opposing party by virtue of allowance of the
    amendment, and futility of the amendment.” 
    Id. The district
    court granted
    Sinclair leave to amend his complaint once, and Sinclair was unable to cure
    the deficiencies in his original complaint. Sinclair has failed to demonstrate, in
    the district court and on appeal, how another amendment would cure the
    deficiencies in his complaint. Accordingly, the district court did not abuse its
    discretion in denying Sinclair leave to amend his complaint a second time. See
    Goldstein v. MCI WorldCom, 
    340 F.3d 238
    , 254-55 (5th Cir. 2003) (finding no
    abuse of discretion where plaintiff had one opportunity to amend, could not
    correct deficiencies in complaint, and could not show how another amendment
    would correct deficiencies); Jamieson By and Through Jamieson v. Shaw, 
    772 F.2d 1205
    , 1208 (5th Cir. 1985) (explaining that “[a]mong the acceptable
    justifications for denying leave to amend are . . . repeated failure to cure
    deficiencies by prior amendment . . . and the futility of the amendment.”).
    We AFFIRM the district court’s judgment. We further DENY Appellee’s
    opposed motion to strike portions of Appellant’s brief.
    4