Anderson v. United States ( 2003 )


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  •                IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
    No. 02-60222
    Conference Calendar
    T. JAMES ANDERSON, JR.,
    Plaintiff-Appellant,
    versus
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Defendant-Appellee.
    --------------------
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Southern District of Mississippi
    USDC No. 3:02-CV-128-LN
    --------------------
    February 19, 2003
    Before WIENER, EMILIO M. GARZA, and CLEMENT, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:*
    T. James Anderson, Jr., filed in state court an action for
    declaratory judgment and injunctive relief against the United
    States of America, as the employer of United States District
    Court Judge William H. Barbour.    Anderson sought a declaration
    that Judge Barbour was not impartial in his disposition of a
    prior lawsuit by Anderson.
    *
    Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined
    that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent
    except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.
    R. 47.5.4.
    No. 02-60222
    -2-
    The United States filed a notice of removal to federal court
    pursuant to 
    28 U.S.C. §§ 1442
    , 1446.   The United States then
    filed a motion to dismiss the action, arguing that it was barred
    by the doctrine of res judicata because Anderson had raised the
    same allegations in a previous unsuccessful action against Judge
    Barbour in the district court.   The district court granted the
    motion to dismiss and imposed a $250 sanction against Anderson
    based on his failure to heed a warning that had been issued with
    respect to his prior frivolous lawsuit against Judge Barbour.
    Although this court applies less stringent standards to
    parties proceeding pro se than to parties represented by counsel
    and this court liberally construes the briefs of pro se
    litigants, pro se litigants must still brief the issues and
    reasonably comply with the requirements of FED. R. APP. P. 28.
    Grant v. Cuellar, 
    59 F.3d 523
    , 524 (5th Cir. 1995); Yohey v.
    Collins, 
    985 F.2d 222
    , 225 (5th Cir. 1993).    Issues not briefed
    are deemed abandoned.   Evans v. City of Marlin, Tex., 
    986 F.2d 104
    , 106 n.1 (5th Cir. 1993).
    Liberally construing Anderson’s brief, Anderson has
    adequately briefed the following main issues for appeal: (1) that
    the removal of the action to federal court was not appropriate
    and did not comport with due process; (2) that the disposition of
    the case did not comport with due process.    To the extent that
    Anderson intended to raise any issues other than those listed
    No. 02-60222
    -3-
    above, Anderson has waived those arguments by failing to
    adequately brief them on appeal.     See Yohey, 
    985 F.2d at 225
    .
    The procedure for removal is set forth by 
    28 U.S.C. § 1446
    .
    The United States complied with the requirements of § 1446, and
    it certified that it mailed a copy of the removal notice to
    Anderson.
    With respect to Anderson’s argument that removal was
    inappropriate, removal of Anderson’s pleading was not made based
    on the substance of his claims, but rather because the United
    States was named as the defendant.     See 
    28 U.S.C. § 1442
    (a).
    With respect to Anderson’s argument that the proceedings in
    the district court did not comport with due process, “[a] federal
    district court has both specific and inherent power to control
    its docket . . . .”   In re United Markets Int'l, Inc., 
    24 F.3d 650
    , 654 (5th Cir. 1994).     The rules are to be “construed and
    administered to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive
    determination of every action.”    FED. R. CIV. P. 1.   The district
    court did not deny Anderson due process.    The judgment of the
    district court is AFFIRMED.    All outstanding motions DENIED.