Dean v. Meth Hosp of Dallas ( 1999 )

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
___________________________
No. 98-11498
___________________________
MARY DEAN,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
VERSUS
METHODIST HOSPITALS OF DALLAS, INC.,
doing business as Methodist Hospital
Defendant-Appellee.
___________________________________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Texas
(3:97-CV-2431-P)
___________________________________________________
November 17, 1999
Before DAVIS, EMILIO M. GARZA, and DENNIS, Circuit Judges.
Per Curiam:*
Mary Dean challenges the district court’s entry of summary
judgment on her wrongful discharge action, brought under the Family
Medical Leave Act(“FMLA”), 29 U.S.C. § 2601. For the reasons that
follow, we affirm the judgment of the district court.
From 1979 until 1995, Dean worked as a respiratory therapist
for Methodist Hospital. In 1992, Dean became clinically depressed
and sought treatment for depression and post-traumatic stress
disorder. In 1995, Jo Ann Arias, a Methodist Hospital Human
Resources employee, told Dean that she could take medical leave
under the FMLA. The FMLA entitles any eligible employee who
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the Court has determined that
this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except
under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
suffers from “a serious health condition that makes the employee
unable to perform the functions of [his/her] position” to take a
maximum of twelve work weeks leave during any twelve-month period.
29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1). On April 18, 1995, Dean left her
employment at Methodist and began FMLA leave.
In May 1995, Dean’s doctor, Inna Kogan, informed Arias that
Dean no longer had a serious medical condition and could return to
work. Dean did not return to work, however. She alleges in her
affidavit that her doctor, in fact, advised her not to do so. Dean
also explains that when Arias confronted her with Dr. Kogan’s
statement, she became depressed and suffered a relapse. Dean also
states in her affidavit that Dr. Kogan called Arias to inform her
of Dean’s poor health status.
Both parties agree that shortly after this incident, Dean
wrote a letter to Arias, requesting that the hospital grant her
extended leave until July 1, 1995, and that the hospital treat the
extended leave period as personal, rather than FMLA, leave. Dean
states in her affidavit that she attempted to return to the work at
the hospital on July 10, nine days after her scheduled personal
leave period had expired. Dean explains that her supervisor
informed her that she could not return to work at the hospital
until she had spoken with Arias. Dean finally spoke with Arias on
July 24, 1995, at which time Arias informed Dean that Methodist did
not have any positions available for her.
The following month, Dean filed for unemployment benefits with
the Texas Employment Commission. On January 17, 1986, Methodist
sent Dean a letter indicating that the hospital’s maximum six-month
2
personal leave period had expired on December 15, 1995, and that
Dean needed to contact the hospital’s human resources department if
she planned to apply for any open positions. Dean failed to
respond and Methodist subsequently terminated her employment,
retroactive to December 15, 1995.
On August 27, 1997, Dean filed this lawsuit, alleging that
Methodist had interfered with her employment rights under the FMLA.
Methodist moved for summary judgment, arguing that: (1) Dean was no
longer entitled to FMLA leave after May 17, 1995, when Dr. Kogan
informed Methodist that Dean no longer had a serious medical
condition; (2) Dean was not entitled to FMLA leave after June 15,
because she had requested that the hospital grant her extended
personal leave, rather than FMLA leave; and (3) Dean did not seek
to return to work until July 24, 1995, thus exceeding the FMLA’s
twelve-week leave period.
The district court granted Methodist’s motion for summary
judgment. The court found that Dean failed to establish a genuine
issue of fact as to whether she was entitled to leave after May 17,
1995. The court further held as a matter of law that an employee’s
FMLA leave period expires as soon as the employee ceases to suffer
from a serious medical condition. Accordingly, the court concluded
that once Dr. Kogan had determined that Dean no longer suffered
from a disabling depression, she was no longer entitled to FMLA
leave.
3
II
We review de novo the district court’s grant of summary
judgment, viewing questions of fact in the light most favorable to
the party opposing the motion. Horton v. City of Houston, 179 F.3d
188, 191 (5th Cir. 1999). Summary judgment is proper only if “the
pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions
on file, together with affidavits, if any, show that there is no
genuine issue of material fact and that the moving party is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c);
see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-24, 106 S. Ct.
2548 (1986).
Dean argues that the district court erred in concluding that
the summary judgment record did not reflect a genuine factual
dispute as to whether she was entitled to FMLA leave after May 17,
1995. Dean concedes that she was able to return to work on May
17, but argues that she suffered a relapse as a result of her
confrontation with Arias. Dean also argues that Methodist was
aware of her relapse, as evidenced by the hospital’s willingness to
grant her extended, albeit personal, leave.
Dean has failed to present any evidence that would create a
genuine issue of fact as to her relapse. A dispute about a
material fact is genuine only where “the evidence is such that a
reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non-moving party.”
Shackleford v. Deloitte & Touche, LLP, __ F.3d __, 1999 WL 728105,
*3 (5th Cir. Oct. 4, 1999). On appeal, Dean offers nothing to
4
support her relapse theory other than conclusory statements in her
affidavit, where she states that her confrontation with Arias
“triggered additional depression and anxiety for me because Ms.
Arias was accusing me of being dishonest.” These assertions cannot
by themselves create a genuine issue of material fact. “A summary
assertion made in an affidavit is simply not enough evidence to
raise a genuine issue of material fact.” Melton v. Teachers
Insurance & Annuity Assoc. of America, 114 F.3d 557, 559 (5th Cir.
1997); see also Lechuga v. Southern Pacific Transp. Co., 949 F.2d
790, 798 (5th Cir. 1992)(“Conclusory statements in an affidavit do
not provide facts that will counter summary judgment evidence, and
testimony based on conjecture alone is insufficient to raise an
issue to defeat summary judgment.”). This is particularly true in
light of Dr. Kogan’s uncontroverted and unambiguous statement to
Arias that Dean was “able to return to work.” Dean’s affidavit,
therefore, does not create a genuine issue of material fact as to
whether Dean suffered a relapse. See Murray v. Red Kap Indus.,
Inc., 124 F.3d 695, 698 (5th Cir. 1997)(holding that plaintiff’s
statement that she was unable to return to work was insufficient to
create genuine issue of fact where doctor had previously released
her to return to work.)
The FMLA permits eligible employees to take a maximum of
twelve workweeks of leave during any 12-month period. 29 U.S.C. §
2612(a)(1); 29 C.F.R. § 825.200 (FMLA leave entitlement sets a 12-
month limit). Employees are eligible for FMLA leave only so long
as they (1) suffer from a serious health condition and (2) are
unable to perform the functions of their position. 29 U.S.C. §
5
2612(a)(1)(D); see Stoops v. One Call Communications, Inc., 141
F.3d 309, 314 (7th Cir. 1998)(holding that where employer has
obtained physician’s certificate stating that employee is not
entitled to FMLA leave, the employer does not violate FMLA by
relying on that certificate). Because the summary judgment
evidence indicates that after May 17, 1995, Dean was able to
perform the functions of her position she was not entitled to FMLA
leave after that date. Accordingly, the judgment of the district
court is affirmed.
AFFIRMED.
6