Woolridge v. Fischbach & Moore ( 2000 )

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
No. 00-10145
Summary Calendar
JOANNE JOHNSON WOOLRIDGE,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
V.
FISCHBACH & MOORE GROUP,
Defendant-Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
For the Northern District of Texas, Dallas Division
Civil Action No. 3:97-CV-1851-P
September 28, 2000
Before EMILIO M. GARZA, STEWART and PARKER, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Plaintiff-appellant, JoAnne Johnson Woolridge, (“Woolridge”)
appeals the district court’s grant of summary judgment on her
employment discrimination claim. We agree with the district
court’s finding that during the operative time period the
defendant-appellee, Fischbach & Moore Group, (“Fischbach”) was
not Woolridge’s employer. Therefore, we affirm the district
court’s opinion.
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the Court has determined
that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent
except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R.
47.5.4.
FACTUAL HISTORY AND PROCEEDINGS BELOW
Woolridge is an African-American female who was employed by
D.L. Electric as a master electrician and foreman. D.L. Electric
is a commercial electrical firm that subcontracted with Fischbach
to provide labor for a Dallas Area Rapid Transit project. D.L.
Electric hired workers for this job from Local 59 of the
International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers. Woolridge was a
member of Local 59. The terms of Woolridge’s employment were
governed by a contract called the “Inside Agreement.”
On August 28, 1996, Woolridge left her work site without
informing the appropriate supervisor of the status of the
employees she supervised. This act violated the Inside Agreement
and subjected Woolridge to termination. Fischbach notified D.L.
Electric of Woolridge’s leaving the work site without notifying
the proper supervisors, but D.L. Electric refused to discipline
her. Based on Woolridge’s unauthorized departure from the work
site and D.L. Electric’s refusal to discipline her, Fischbach
refused to use Woolridge on the remainder of the project. D.L.
Electric subsequently terminated Woolridge.
Woolridge sued Fischbach, alleging violations of title VII
of the Civil Rights Act and 42 U.S.C. § 1981, seeking injunction,
reinstatement, back pay and reimbursement. The district court
granted Fischbach’s motion for summary judgment based on, inter
alia, the fact that Fischbach was not Woolridge’s “employer” for
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purposes of title VII. Because we find that the district was
correct in ruling that Fischbach was not Woolridge’s employer for
purposes of title VII, we affirm.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
We review a district court’s grant of summary judgment de
novo, applying the same standard as the district courts. See
FED. R. CIV. P. 56. The moving party is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law when the record indicates no genuine issue as to
any material fact. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317,
322 (1986); Byers v. The Dallas Morning News, 209 F.3d 419, 424
(5th Cir. 2000).
We will consider the evidence in the light most favorable to
the non-movant, yet the non-movant may not rely on mere
allegations in the pleadings; rather, the non-movant must respond
to the motion for summary judgment by setting forth particular
facts indicating that there is a genuine issue for trial. See
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248-49 (1986).
Unsupported conclusory assertions presented in affidavits
opposing the motion for summary judgment are insufficient to
defeat a proper motion for summary judgment. See Lujan v.
National Wildlife Fed’n, 497 U.S. 871, 888 (1990). After the
non-movant has been given the opportunity to raise a genuine
factual issue, if no reasonable juror could find for the
non-movant, summary judgment will be granted. See Celotex Corp.,
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477 U.S. at 322; see also FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c).
DISCUSSION
I. “Employer” Liability Under title VII.
Title VII prohibits “employers” from adversely affecting a
person’s status as an employee based on race. See 42 U.S.C. §
2000e-2(a) (1994). A threshold requirement for liability to
attach to an entity under title VII is status as an employer.
The test used in the Fifth Circuit to determine whether a party
is an “employer” for purposes of title VII is a hybrid of
traditional tests1 articulated in Mares v. Marsh, 777 F.2d 1066
(5th Cir. 1985). The hybrid test
considers the “economic realities” of the work relationship
as an important factor in the calculus, but . . . focuses
more on “the extent of the employers right to control the
‘means and manner’ of the workers’ performance.
Mares, 777 F.2d at 1067 (quoting Spirides v. Reinhardt, 613 F.2d
826, 831 (D.C. Cir. 1979)); accord Nowlin v. Resolution Trust
Corp., 33 F.3d 498, 505 (5th Cir. 1994).
The district court analyzed Woolridge’s claims under the
framework of the hybrid test and found that no factual question
exists regarding Woolridge’s employment status with respect to
1
This test harmonizes the traditional common law test for
agency which turns on a question of control with the “economic
realities” test from the Fair Labor Standards Act under which a
person is an employee if they, “as a matter of economic reality,
are dependent upon the business to which they render service.”
Hickey v. Arkla Indust., Inc., 699 F.2d 748, 751 (5th Cir. 1983),
cited with approval in Mares, 777 F.2d at 1067.
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Fischbach, at the time in question. Woolridge offered
insufficient evidence to create a fact question that Fischbach is
her employer. Indeed, given proper analysis under the hybrid
test, a trier of fact could not even infer from the evidence
brought forth by Wooldridge, that Fischbach is her employer. We
agree with the district court’s analysis.
CONCLUSION
Fischbach was not an employer of Woolridge. Consequently,
any claim under title VII brought by Woolridge against Fischbach
is not supported by the wording of the statute.
AFFIRMED
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