United States v. Mier ( 2001 )


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  •                  IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
    No. 00-20530
    Summary Calendar
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff-Appellee,
    versus
    RAFAEL P. MIER, also known as Ralph,
    Defendant-Appellant.
    ______________________________________________
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Southern District of Texas
    USDC No. H-98-CR-57-4
    ______________________________________________
    March 21, 2001
    Before POLITZ, DAVIS, AND BENAVIDES, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:*
    Rafael P. Mier appeals the sentence received following his guilty-plea
    conviction for conspiracy to possess with the intent to distribute and aiding and
    abetting the possession with the intent to distribute marihuana, in violation of 21
    U.S.C. §§ 841 and 846. He maintains, for the first time on appeal, that the district
    court erred in determining the amount of marihuana for sentencing purposes and
    *
    Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should
    not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in
    5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
    asserts that, following Jones v. United States1 and Apprendi v. New Jersey,2 the
    court was required to submit that question to a jury to be proved beyond a
    reasonable doubt. The contention lacks merit. The sentence Mier received is below
    the applicable statutory maximum, thus rendering Apprendi inapplicable.3
    Mier next contends that the district court erred in overruling his objection to
    the Guidelines § 3B1.1(c) two-level enhancement imposed for his leadership role in
    the offense. The determination that Mier played a leadership role because he used
    his wife, son, and girlfriend to assist in his drug distribution is supported by the
    record, is not clearly erroneous, and is sufficient to justify the enhancement under §
    3B1.1(c).4
    Mier further contends that the district court erred in failing to depart
    downward sua sponte from the applicable guidelines range because his criminal
    history score overrepresented his criminal past. We lack jurisdiction to consider this
    challenge.5
    1
    
    526 U.S. 227
    (1999).
    2
    
    53 U.S. 466
    (2000).
    3
    21 U.S.C. §§ 841(b)(1)(C) and 846; United States v. Doggett, 
    230 F.3d 160
    (5th
    Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 
    2001 WL 38408
    (U.S. Feb. 20, 2001)(No. 00-7819); United
    States v. Keith, 
    230 F.3d 784
    (5th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 
    2001 WL 70558
    (U.S. Feb.
    20, 2001)(No. 00-8077).
    4
    U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1, comment. (n.1); see also United States v. Powell, 
    124 F.3d 655
    (5th Cir. 1997).
    5
    United States v. Yanez-Huerta, 
    207 F.3d 746
    (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 
    121 S. Ct. 432
    (2000).
    2
    Mier additionally submits, for the first time on appeal, that the district court
    erred in imposing a $10,000 fine because he does not have the ability to pay. Mier
    offers no proof that he is unable to pay a fine or that he will become unable to do so
    in the future.6 The PSR made no recommendation relative to a fine and the district
    court was not required to make any specific findings regarding Mier’s ability to
    pay.7 The fine imposed is considerably below the guidelines range and is payable in
    installments. In assessing a fine, the district court did not depart from the PSR and
    the imposition thereof was not plainly erroneous. 8
    Mier has failed to demonstrate any error in the sentence or sentencing
    procedure and, accordingly, the sentence is AFFIRMED.
    6
    See § 5E1.2(a).
    7
    United States v. Landerman, 
    167 F.3d 895
    (5th Cir. 1999).
    8
    
    Id. at 899-900;
    see United States v. Hodges, 
    110 F.3d 250
    (5th Cir. 1997).
    3