United States v. Brown ( 2002 )


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  •                      REVISED AUGUST 22, 2002
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
    _______________________
    No. 01-30771
    _______________________
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
    Plaintiff-Appellee,
    versus
    CECIL BROWN,
    Defendant-Appellant.
    _________________________________________________________________
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Eastern District of Louisiana, New Orleans Division
    _________________________________________________________________
    July 15, 2002
    Before KING, Chief Judge, JONES and DENNIS, Circuit Judges.
    EDITH H. JONES, Circuit Judge:
    Cecil Brown was convicted of extorting money for himself
    and former Governor Edwin Edwards from businesses seeking to obtain
    state contracts and licenses in Louisiana.   Brown argues on appeal
    that (1) he was entitled to an evidentiary hearing on his motion to
    suppress evidence obtained through electronic surveillance because
    the Government used a false or misleading affidavit to procure the
    initial wiretap order; and (2) the superseding indictment should
    have been dismissed because the Government, in violation of the
    Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause, engaged in a vindictive
    prosecution. Having reviewed the record, we hold that the district
    court did not err in denying Brown’s motion to suppress evidence or
    his motion to dismiss the indictment.              The judgment of conviction
    is AFFIRMED.
    I.     INTRODUCTION
    The jury found that, from 1992 to 1997, Cecil Brown acted
    as a “front man” for Governor Edwin Edwards in a scheme to extort
    money from companies that needed to obtain state approval to
    conduct business in Louisiana.             Brown would meet with businessmen
    and   offer    to   use   his    influence      with   the   governor     to     obtain
    favorable treatment for their business ventures.                     The illegal
    payoffs, which Brown and Edwards would split, typically were
    disguised as consulting fees paid to Brown’s company, Louisiana
    Consultants.
    The indictment focused on four commercial ventures: the
    Coushatta Indian Tribe’s request to operate a casino, a bid on a
    municipal waste contract, an unsuccessful attempt to bring a
    professional basketball team to New Orleans, and a plan for a
    privately funded and operated juvenile detention facility in Jena,
    Louisiana.      The Jena prison project involved a Texas company,
    Viewpoint      Development      Corporation,       whose     president     was    Fred
    Hofheinz,     the   former      mayor    of    Houston,    Texas.1       Viewpoint’s
    principal negotiator with Louisiana officials was Patrick Graham,
    1
    Hofheinz pled guilty in November 2000 to misprision of extortion and
    was a witness for the Government at Cecil Brown’s trial.
    2
    who began cooperating with the FBI after he was indicted on
    unrelated criminal charges in early 1996.
    The   jury   convicted   Cecil         Brown   on   seven   counts     of
    extortion, wire fraud, and interstate travel fraud, in violation of
    18 U.S.C. §§ 1962, 1951, 1343, and 2314.                   Brown was acquitted,
    though, on one count of racketeering and one count of interstate
    travel fraud.     He was sentenced to 51 months’ imprisonment, to be
    served consecutively to the 66-month sentence imposed in a related
    extortion case involving riverboat casino licenses.                     See United
    States v. Edwin Edwards, et al., No. CR-98-165-B-M2 (M.D. La.).
    Cecil Brown raises two issues on appeal.                  First, Brown
    contends that     the    Government’s       case    against     him   rests   on   an
    unlawfully obtained wiretap application.                   He contends that the
    Assistant United States Attorney who requested the initial wiretap
    order misled the district court as to (1) the trustworthiness of
    Patrick Graham, the Government’s cooperating witness, and (2) the
    content of consensually-taped conversations between Graham and
    Brown.   Brown thus asserts that the evidence obtained via the
    wiretap should have been suppressed and, at a minimum, he was
    entitled to an evidentiary hearing on his motion to suppress
    evidence.
    Second, Brown contends that the Government vindictively
    added the racketeering count and additional allegations of illegal
    conduct after the district court granted Brown’s motion to dismiss
    the original indictment because of a Speedy Trial Act violation.
    3
    Brown argues that the Government’s decision to increase the number
    and   severity   of   charges    denied     him     due    process    of    law    and,
    consequently, that the superseding indictment should have been
    dismissed.
    The   district     court    considered         Brown’s    arguments      and
    denied his motions to suppress the evidence obtained from the
    wiretap and to dismiss the superseding indictment.                         Finding no
    error, we affirm the judgment.
    II.     THE WIRETAP ORDER
    A.     The Franks Standard
    Cecil Brown contends that the FBI agent’s affidavit
    supporting the Government’s application for a wiretap order was
    insufficient to establish probable cause.                 According to Brown, the
    affidavit contained “a series of misrepresentations and material
    omissions”   designed    to     give   a    false    impression       of    both    the
    reliability of the Government’s confidential informant and the
    quantum of evidence the Government already had gathered.                          Brown
    argues that the district court erred in denying his request for an
    evidentiary hearing pursuant to Franks v. Delaware, 
    438 U.S. 154
    ,
    
    98 S. Ct. 2674
    , 
    57 L. Ed. 2d 667
    (1978), and also in failing to
    suppress the evidence gathered through electronic surveillance.
    With respect to Franks hearings, we have held that a
    defendant is entitled to an evidentiary hearing on a motion to
    suppress evidence if he shows that (1) allegations in a supporting
    4
    affidavit were deliberate falsehoods or made with a reckless
    disregard for the truth, and (2) the remaining portion of the
    affidavit is not sufficient to support a finding of probable cause.
    United   States   v.   Dickey,   
    102 F.3d 157
    ,   161-62   (5th   Cir.
    1996)(citing 
    Franks, 438 U.S. at 171
    , 98 S.Ct. at 2684); see also
    United States v. Guerra-Marez, 
    928 F.2d 665
    , 671 (5th Cir. 1991).
    The second prong of the test, however, is often determinative:
    “Even if the defendant makes a showing of deliberate falsity or
    reckless disregard for the truth by law enforcement officers, he is
    not entitled to a hearing if, when material that is the subject of
    the alleged falsity or reckless disregard is set to one side, there
    remains sufficient content in the warrant affidavit to support a
    finding of probable cause.”       
    Dickey 102 F.3d at 161-62
    ; United
    States v. Privette, 
    947 F.2d 1259
    , 1261 (5th Cir. 1991).
    The district court concluded that Brown was not entitled
    to a Franks hearing and denied Brown’s motion to suppress evidence
    gathered through electronic surveillance.        The wiretap order at
    issue here led to three separate prosecutions, and the defendants
    in each case raised nearly identical motions to suppress. District
    Judge Frank Polozola set out at length his reasons for denying the
    motion in the riverboat license extortion case, in which Cecil
    Brown was a codefendant.     See United States v. Edwin Edwards, et
    al., 
    124 F. Supp. 2d 387
    , 393-400 (M.D. La. 2000).        Then, in a case
    involving criminal tax violations by an Edwards associate, District
    Judge Carl Barbier independently reviewed the record and adopted
    5
    Judge Polozola’s findings when denying Martin’s motion to suppress.
    See United States v. Andrew Martin, 
    169 F. Supp. 2d 558
    , 566-67 (E.D.
    La. 2001)(criminal tax violations).            And in this case, then-
    District Judge Edith Brown Clement reviewed the materials and
    adopted Judge Polozola’s findings as her own.
    This court reviews the denial of a Franks hearing de
    novo.    
    Dickey, 102 F.3d at 62
    .
    Brown’s allegations of false or misleading statements may
    be grouped under two headings.       First, he says that the Government
    relied heavily on a cooperating witness, Patrick Graham, whom the
    Government   knew   was    completely     untrustworthy.   Second,   Brown
    contends that the Government misrepresented what was actually said
    during consensually       recorded   conversations   between   Graham   and
    Brown.
    B.    Patrick Graham’s Reliability
    The Government’s application for a wiretap order was
    supported by the affidavit of FBI agent Freddy Cleveland.            Agent
    Cleveland stated that the facts and circumstances showing probable
    cause were developed through a “cooperating witness” (or “CW”), who
    was later identified as Patrick Graham.          In his affidavit, which
    was dated June 26, 1996, Agent Cleveland began his discussion with
    the following statement:
    The CW has provided information to Special Agents of the
    FBI since April 30, 1996. Since his cooperation with the
    FBI, he has never been known to provide false or
    misleading information.     The CW has made numerous
    consensual telephone and body recordings with CECIL
    6
    BROWN, which have verified portions of the information
    set forth in this affidavit. A review of the various
    records pertaining to the CW reveals that on March 20,
    1996, a District Court Grand Jury in Harris County, Texas
    indicted the CW for one (1) count of Money Laundering and
    one (1) count of Theft by Sting. This matter is pending
    and is scheduled for trial on July 29, 1996. The CW is
    also the target of a federal tax and corruption
    investigation in the Houston, Texas area, currently being
    handled by the FBI and the IRS in conjunction with the
    United States Attorney’s Office.
    In spite of the agent’s disclosure of the pending criminal charges
    and investigation, and the Government’s corroboration of much of
    what Graham had told them, Brown contends that the Government
    deliberately misled the district judge (Judge Donald Walter) as to
    Patrick Graham’s trustworthiness.
    Brown argues that the Government did not believe that
    Graham was even minimally trustworthy. Brown’s primary argument on
    this    point    is    based   on   a    statement    made   in   different    court
    proceedings by the same Assistant U.S. Attorney who had applied for
    the    wiretap    order.       In   a    bankruptcy   proceeding     in    Texas    in
    September 1996 -- which involved Patrick Graham’s brother’s wife --
    the AUSA told the court that “the Grahams” are not credible: “[T]he
    things that we’re not able to independently corroborate, we believe
    are lies.       And that’s the way it has to be when you deal with the
    Grahams.”       As Brown admits, the AUSA made this statement nearly
    three months after he had obtained the wiretap order.                     Even if we
    assume    that        the   later       statement    accurately     reflects       the
    Government’s view of Patrick Graham’s credibility as of June 1996,
    we do not believe that Agent Cleveland’s affidavit falsely implied
    7
    that Patrick Graham was trustworthy. As noted above, the affidavit
    recites the various charges brought against Graham (although Brown
    complains that the “sterile recitation” of pending charges did not
    adequately reveal the extent of Graham’s criminal nature).                   And
    immediately after stating that Graham had not been known to provide
    false or misleading information, Agent Cleveland emphasized that
    the    FBI   had    made    “numerous   consensual    telephone       and   body
    recordings”    that    corroborated     significant   aspects    of    Graham’s
    story.
    In sum, the affidavit provided to Judge Walter contains
    enough information with respect to Graham’s reliability for the
    judge to make a proper ruling on the question of probable cause.
    Brown has failed to show that the allegations in Agent Cleveland’s
    supporting affidavit were made “with a reckless disregard for the
    truth”   and    for   the    purpose    of   bolstering     Patrick    Graham’s
    credibility.       Brown thus does not meet the standard set forth in
    the first prong of the Franks test.
    Moreover, even if we assume arguendo that Patrick Graham
    could not be trusted, and we set to one side all the allegations
    that   are   not   independently    corroborated,     the    affidavit      still
    contains enough evidence to establish probable cause to believe
    that a crime was being committed.
    Patrick Graham’s narrative, reduced to its essentials,
    may be summarized as follows: In mid-1992, Graham and several of
    8
    his business partners began lobbying for the right to develop a
    juvenile detention center in Jena, Louisiana.              To secure political
    support for the project, Graham arranged a meeting with Cecil
    Brown, a friend of Governor Edwards.           After several false starts,
    Graham thought he had obtained financing for the Jena project.
    Graham asserted that Governor Edwards agreed to pressure Richard
    Stalder, the director of the Louisiana Department of Corrections,
    to enter into a “cooperative endeavor agreement” with Graham.                   In
    return, Graham agreed to pay Edwards and Brown $2.5 million.
    Graham claims that he made a $245,000 cash payment in 1994.                 Then,
    Graham and     Brown   (in    FBI   Agent   Cleveland’s     words)    signed    “a
    contract for services, dated December 1, 1994, to account for
    [$600,000 in cash] given to BROWN.          A copy of the contract has been
    provided to FBI agents by the CW.”          FBI agents also obtained a copy
    of the agreements between Graham and the Louisiana Department of
    Corrections.     The date when the state officials approved the
    project   corresponds    to    Graham’s     account   of    when    Edwards    was
    lobbying on his behalf.
    In late 1995, Graham and his partners agreed to sell
    their interest in the Jena prison project to a Houston attorney
    (Douglas Bech) for $4.8 million, including $1.3 million owed to
    unnamed   “creditors”.        Graham    asserts   that      the    $1.3   million
    represented the remainder of the money owed to Brown and Edwards.
    Graham expected that the sale would be finalized in the summer of
    9
    1996.   FBI agents obtained a copy of Viewpoint Development’s
    contract with Bech and confirmed the numbers Graham had given them.
    By early 1996, Graham had been indicted for two criminal
    offenses and was under investigation by the FBI.       Graham began
    cooperating with the FBI on April 30, 1996, and with Graham’s
    consent, the FBI began taping telephone and in-person conversations
    between Graham and Brown.
    During the May 8th conversation, Brown and Graham talked
    about the remaining money that Graham’s partners owed.    Graham and
    Brown tried to negotiate the exact amount.    Graham said, “Now what
    I have given you all so far totals up to by the time you figure the
    tax, you know, it was cash.    By the time you figure the tax, it’s
    like a million dollars.   So you offset.   That leaves a balance of
    1.5.”   Brown responded, “All right.”      A little later in that
    conversation, Brown said that unless he received $1.7 million
    during the closing, they would have “problems.” The parties failed
    to reach a definite agreement, but Brown suggested that Graham “put
    to paper everything that was paid to date.”
    From May 9 to May 13, 1996, FBI agents recorded (again
    with Graham’s consent) three telephone conversations, the essence
    of which was that Graham and Brown would meet in person to “go over
    the figures.”   On May 29, Graham and Brown met at a crawfish boil
    at Brown’s house.   At the FBI’s direction, Graham prepared a memo
    regarding the two payments -- $245,000 and $600,000 in cash --
    already made to Brown.      The FBI also recorded the conversation,
    10
    which included references to the memo.                      Brown suggested that he
    would talk to “our friend” (whom the Government believes was Edwin
    Edwards),    and     a    court-authorized           “pen    register”          revealed          a
    telephone call from Brown’s residence to Edwards’s residence on May
    30th.
    On     June    7,   FBI    agents       again    recorded          a    telephone
    conversation between Brown and Graham.                      Brown said that he had
    discussed the specific numbers with their “friend” the day after
    the crawfish boil.          Brown then demanded more money and suggested
    that the Department of Corrections might hold up the Jena project.
    Graham and Brown agreed to meet again.                         At this point, the
    Government prepared to request a wiretap for the telephones in
    Brown’s house and business.
    Having        reviewed     the     information         contained             in     the
    affidavit,    we    will    focus     on     the    allegations         that       are    either
    undisputed or corroborated.            It is undisputed that Graham and his
    partners were seeking state approval to proceed with the Jena
    prison project.           The memorandum that Graham prepared and Brown
    tacitly    approved       indicated    that        Graham    had   already          made        two
    payments    totaling       $845,000    to     Cecil    Brown       in    December             1994.
    (Graham and Brown later suggested that these cash payments were
    equivalent to more than $1 million before taxes.)                             Shortly after
    the $600,000 payment was made, state officials entered into a
    cooperative endeavor agreement with Graham and his partners.                                  More
    than a     year    later,    when     Venture       Development         was    selling          its
    11
    interest in the project, the purchase price included a $1.3 million
    payment for unnamed creditors.                 On the recorded conversations,
    Graham and Brown emphasized that they wanted to keep “Edwin” or
    “our friend” happy because he still had the ability to put the
    project on hold.       Graham and Brown also discussed the money that
    had been paid thus far and how much more was owed.                    Brown told
    Graham that he had to consult with “him,” and a pen register
    indicated   that   a    call   was   placed       from   Brown’s    residence   to
    Edwards’s residence the following day.              Brown then suggested that
    the Jena project would be in trouble if Graham and his partners
    could not pay more money.
    To be sure, there are many allegations in the affidavit
    that are not independently confirmed.              Graham told the FBI that he
    had met with Edwin Edwards several times personally, that Edwards
    had set the $2.5 million price, and that he saw Brown leave the
    $245,000 and $600,000 cash payments in Edwards’s office in the
    Governor’s Mansion.      These allegations are reported in FBI Agent
    Cleveland’s affidavit, but they are not corroborated.                 Even if we
    assume   that   Graham    cannot     be    believed,     and   we   exclude     all
    allegations that are not corroborated, the affidavit still contains
    sufficient information to establish probable cause to believe that
    a crime had been committed or was being committed.                  In our view,
    12
    the recorded conversations independently corroborate the salient
    aspects of Patrick Graham’s story.2
    C.   The Recorded Conversations
    In    a    similar    vein,   Brown     contends        that      FBI   Agent
    Cleveland’s interpretation of the taped conversations was made with
    reckless disregard for the truth.              Specifically, Brown argues that
    the Government assumed that Graham and Brown were referring to
    Edwin Edwards even when they did not call him by name.                              Brown
    contends that the Government used “very selective excerpts” from
    the recorded conversations to suggest that Edwards (and not Brown)
    was receiving most of the money.               Thus, in Brown’s view, if the
    Government had provided an accurate rendition of the recorded
    conversations      (that    is,    one    that    did   not       rely   on    Graham’s
    background    information),        a   district     judge     likely       would     have
    interpreted      the   recorded    conversations        as    a    discussion       of   a
    legitimate consulting arrangement instead of a scheme to extort
    money.   Brown’s argument is without merit.
    The best way to address this issue is to recount in
    greater detail the recorded conversations.               The first conversation
    takes place on May 8, 1996, as Patrick Graham and Cecil Brown are
    2
    Brown also asserts, with little elaboration, that the district court
    could not adequately assess Patrick Graham’s reliability because the Government
    failed to disclose “the many benefits” Graham would receive from his cooperation.
    The Government had agreed, for example, not to use any of the volunteered
    information against Graham and to inform the sentencing judges in the other cases
    about Graham’s assistance. Brown’s argument is without merit. Not only are
    these benefits unremarkable, but the consensually recorded conversations
    corroborated Graham’s story.
    13
    driving through Louisiana.    Brown says that he needs money and
    wants assurances that he will receive half of the agreed-upon price
    ($2.5 million plus another $1 million for a related deal) when
    Graham and his partners sell their interest in the Jena prison
    project. Graham tries to assure Brown that the deal will be closed
    soon.   Graham then emphasizes “one thing”:
    PG:   I want EDWIN to be comfortable, okay?      I can’t
    afford anything to go wrong on this deal.       All
    right?   So, we’ve got to get him, whatever that
    portion is covered first. . . . I’m not gonna drag
    you out more than 90 days on yours. Okay?
    CB:   Yeah.
    PG:   I just don’t . . . ah, you know, you never have
    told me what the . . . the . . . the sharing ratio
    is.
    CB:   He doesn’t get any. I get it all. I want half
    right away.
    PG:   Okay. Hey, say whatever you want to . . . .
    CB:   Uh huh.
    PG:   . . . but I mean [don’t?] be cavalier about this
    CECIL.
    CB:   Okay.
    PG:   But if . . .
    CB:   Nothing’s gonna go wrong with this deal. I just
    want half of my money right away to cover some
    obligations I have.
    PG:   I understand. I understand.
    CB:   Okay.
    PG:   And I need to get your obligations. I need to be
    assured. . . .
    CB:   And then I want. . . .
    PG:   . . . that your obligations are covered.
    CB:   Right.
    PG:   That’s what I want.
    CB:   And then I want a little bit. . . . I want a little
    bit of my other half. . .
    PG:   I understand.
    CB:   . . . also at closing. And I’m not talking about
    much there.
    Before proceeding further, we should emphasize that (as Brown
    correctly points out) Agent Cleveland’s affidavit omitted Brown’s
    14
    statement that Edwards “doesn’t get any” of the money.                It would
    have been preferable, of course, to bring this fact to Judge
    Walter’s attention.        However, we agree with Judge Polozola’s
    conclusion that Brown’s denial of Edwin Edwards’s “‘take’ of the
    proceeds of this transaction in one particular excerpt does not
    negate the additional information in the record regarding potential
    criminal payoffs.”       
    Edwards, 124 F. Supp. 2d at 400
    .        In fact, the
    context of this excerpt suggests that Brown’s denial cannot be
    taken at face value: After stating that he gets “all” the money,
    Brown immediately says that all of the first payment will go to
    cover “obligations.”       Graham, who had just said he wanted to be
    sure that     Edwin   Edwards   got   his   portion,   then   rephrased    his
    concern: “I need to be assured . . . that your obligations are
    covered.” The more plausible reading of this particular passage is
    that Edwards would be receiving -- through Cecil Brown -- most, if
    not   all,    of   the   initial   payment     of   $1.7   million.       This
    interpretation is made even stronger by remarks made later in that
    same conversation.
    Brown and Graham then make their first attempt to clarify
    how much money was owed.        Brown tells Graham that eventually they
    need to “put a pencil to paper.”            Patrick Graham’s position was
    that the total money owed was $3.5 million; that he had already
    paid the equivalent of $1 million to $1.2 million in cash; that
    $1.7 million would be paid to Brown when the deal in Texas went
    through; and that Graham’s partners in Texas wanted him to re-
    15
    negotiate the remaining money owed.               Brown’s primary concern,
    however, was getting the $1.7 million as soon as possible.
    PG:   I know you’re always broke and I need to know your
    . . . your share . . . but what I need to know is
    what is it that we have to come [up] with to
    satisfy our friend to make sure that . . . the
    worst that can happen CECIL, is a project go bad
    even after you get funded and everybody gets . . .
    we can’t be cavalier and say . . .
    CB:   Unh-unh. Unh-unh.
    PG:   This is great. He’s out of office. There’s . . .
    there’s no risk anymore. I’m telling you. . . .
    CB:   If . . . if I don’t get 1.7 at closing . . . if . .
    . if my company, LOUISIANA CONSULTANTS, doesn’t get
    1.7 at closing. . .
    PG:   Um hum.
    CB:   . . . ah
    PG:   Then we’ve got a problem.
    CB:   We’ve got problems, okay.
    There can be little doubt that “our friend” in this context means
    Edwin Edwards. Not only was Edwards the sole topic of conversation
    up   that   point,   but   the   reference   to    being   “out   of   office”
    reinforces the point: Edwards’s term as governor had ended in
    January 1996, four months before this conversation. Patrick Graham
    repeated this point moments later: “I know he’s out of office now
    [. . .], but we don’t want anything to go wrong.”
    In addition to the unmistakable references to Edwards,
    this passage is also important because it confirms that the $1.7
    million would be paid to Louisiana Consultants.             As noted above,
    Cecil Brown was doing business as Louisiana Consultants, so that
    any payment to the company was essentially a payment to Brown
    personally.
    16
    The conversation then returns to Brown’s need for money
    at closing.    Brown says, “if I were you,”
    CB:   I would be prepared at closing to pay me 1.7, and .
    . . and I . . . and I need a few dollars. I need a
    . . .
    PG:   Okay.   So what you’re saying is, the 1.7 is not
    gonna satisfy you. We need something over that to
    get you happy.
    CB:   Please.
    Graham warns Brown not to take any of the $1.7 million payment for
    his own use.   According to Graham, the other partners in Viewpoint
    Development needed to be reassured that the payment at closing
    would not go directly to Brown.       In the end, Graham agrees to
    deliver some money in addition to the $1.7 million at closing on
    one condition:
    PG:   [. . .] as long as we can make the agreement CECIL
    that you’re not gonna take from his ah, and create
    a problem for this thing. I will . . . I will go
    back and tell my partners that, okay, we need to
    come up with half of it to cover ah, all our
    obligations so that ah, ah . . . let me tell you.
    He’s got the ultimate hammer. CECIL, he’s got the
    ultimate hammer. All he’s got to do is make phone
    calls and stop the legislature . . .
    CB:   Huh. Huh.
    PG:   . . . from funding this thing, and that’s Texas all
    over.   That’s the problems I had in Texas.     You
    don’t need it and I don’t need it. I mean, you’ll
    have everybody investigating everything. (Pause)
    CB:   I need 1.7 at closing for LOUISIANA CONSULTANTS.
    And can you let me have ah . . .
    PG:   What?
    CB:   A couple of hundred thousand?
    PG:   Okay.
    It is clear that the $1.7 million is earmarked for someone other
    than Cecil Brown and that this unnamed person has the power to
    squelch the Jena prison project by pressuring state legislators.
    17
    Just   a   few   seconds   later,   Brown   confirms   his
    understanding of the new arrangement.
    CB:   The 1.7 I believe, we . . . we do that at closing.
    That’s cut and dry. Am I correct?
    PG:   Okay. And . . . and that you can’t touch. That’s
    not yours. That goes to obligations. We’ve got to
    come up with another hundred thousand to . . . to
    make . . . that you can keep to take care of what
    you get.
    CB:   [. . .] Hell yeah. I can do that.
    Patrick Graham again warns Brown not to keep the $1.7 million.
    Graham then says that his partners are afraid that Brown will keep
    some of the money.      But, Graham tells Brown, “you and I know
    different.   Ah, ah, you know, we talked about it before.    I think
    the bastard rapes and pillages you, but that’s, you know, that’s
    your relationship.    I don’t get into it.”
    Brown became rather angry at this point.      Raising his
    voice, he says
    CB:   [. . .] At closing make sure that I have ah, 1.7
    paid to LOUISIANA CONSULTANTS plus a hundred
    thousand dollars to get me out of a crack.
    PG:   Okay.
    CB:   And then after that every 30 days ah, it . . . it
    don’t have to be a hundred thousand dollars every
    30 days. I just want to make sure that I get my
    money.
    PG:   Please assure me CECIL that you’re not gonna step
    on that and keep it. It just concerns the shit out
    of me.
    CB:   Don’t let it. I know what I’m doing. You think I
    would . . . I would take a chance at queering this
    deal where it is now?    How long have we waited?
    How long have we worked?
    PG:   Now CECIL, I’m telling you. I’m . . . I’m telling
    you. I just want him happy. Okay? I want your
    assurance that you’ll do what it takes to get him
    happy. Okay?
    18
    After a short pause, Graham asked Brown if he had briefed “him” on
    the status of the project.      Brown replies that “he” knows about the
    details, and Graham immediately changes the subject and asks if
    “he” had fun in Colorado.        The two men then talk briefly about
    Governor and Mrs. Edwards’s recent ski trip to Colorado.
    Graham then returned to the topic of how much money had
    already been paid.       Graham reminded Brown that he had already
    delivered “two large bundles of . . . of green money.”          The “before
    tax   equivalent”   of   the   cash   payments,   Graham    explained,   was
    anywhere from $1 million to $1.2 million, “depending on how you do
    your tax math.”     When the $1.7 million due at closing was factored
    in, that left a balance of $600,000 to $800,000.           Brown and Graham
    quibbled for a while over how much had been paid and how to
    calculate the balance.     Graham demanded, “Give me credit for what
    I’ve already paid.”       Brown said he wanted to know the exact
    balance: “That’s the number I need to know.”
    CB:   Because I want to know what I’m getting.
    PG:   I understand, because that remains with you. I am
    appreciative of that and I’m sensitive to it.
    CB:   And if you need some of that . . .
    PG:   I want you . . .
    CB:   . . . some of that that’s coming to me, that’s
    fine, because you got me here in the first place.
    PG:   No. No.
    CB:   But do not flirt with that other motherf***er. Do
    not.
    Brown reiterated that he needed to know “the second number” (i.e.,
    the $600,000 to $800,000 balance) soon, and that he did not want to
    negotiate that number downward.
    19
    Graham    then   told   Brown     to    “let   me   know   how     your
    discussions    go    tomorrow.”     It   is   not    obvious    who    Brown    was
    scheduled to meet with, but Graham warned Brown, “Don’t piss him
    off.”     Brown called Graham back on May 9th to say that he “had a
    discussion with him . . . . [and] got some directions what I need
    to do. . . .    I’m directin’ to get ah all of my money.”                The two
    men agreed to sit down and talk more about the balance owed.
    At a May 29th crawfish boil, Graham wrote on a sheet of
    notebook paper what he and his partners were proposing.                   Graham
    calculated that they had already paid in cash the equivalent of
    $1.2 million.       Graham wrote that they would pay the “1.7 due at
    closing, plus $100,000.”       Because a side deal had fallen through,
    Graham and his partners were not willing to pay the full $3.5
    million they had previously agreed upon.               Brown was not pleased
    with this offer, but Graham insisted that he “sit down with the man
    and go over it and I want you to come back and tell me, PAT, that’s
    okay, or no, we gotta negotiate some more.”
    About a week later, Graham called Brown and said, “I know
    you didn’t have time to uh, uh, to discuss anything with our friend
    about those numbers.”        Brown said that he had spoken to him “the
    very next day” after the crawfish boil.             (As noted above, a court-
    ordered pen register indicated that a call had been placed from
    Brown’s residence to Edwards’s residence the evening after the
    party.)     Brown accused Graham of “trying to pay me a hundred
    thousand when I feel you owe me a million.”
    20
    Graham said that he understood that Brown was not happy
    about receiving only $100,000, but he emphasized,
    PG:   I just want uh, uh, certain parties, we need our
    friend to be happy on the front side, that’s all,
    um, my goal is. I could make you happy.
    CB:   I’m sure he’s happy.
    PG:   Okay.
    CB:   You know he ought to be.
    PG:   I understand. (Laughter)
    CB:   I’m not happy.
    Brown said that he had “ask[ed] him to do something about it.”
    CB:   Have you not gotten a call yet?
    PG:   No.
    CB:   Okay, you will.
    PG:   Alright, is he gonna call me?
    CB:   No, uh, probably Stalder [the secretary of the
    Louisiana Department of Corrections].
    There is no indication whether Graham received a telephone call,
    but the import of this threat is clear: The Louisiana Department of
    Corrections could delay the Jena prison project; and if Graham and
    his partners wanted their sale to proceed as planned, they should
    consider increasing the money paid directly to Brown.
    In   their   final   conversation   before   the   Government’s
    decision to seek a wiretap order, Brown and Graham again failed to
    reach an agreement.      Graham says, “We’re gonna make him happy.
    Okay?”   Brown counters that “He, ah my lawyer says I’m stupid” for
    trusting Graham and his partners.        Graham became angry:
    PG:   I wish you’d throw right back at that son of a
    bitch that he’s gone to the bank hundreds of
    thousands of [. . .] dollars on me.
    CB:   I’m worried about Cecil.    I ain’t worried about
    him.
    PG:   Okay.
    21
    CB:    Oh, he’s gone to the bank a million times[. . . .]
    But that don’t help me.
    Graham tries to assure Brown that they can work something out to
    get him more money up front.      But in the end, Graham returns to his
    main theme:
    PG:    [A]ll I want is I don’t want it to blow up and all
    I want to do is keep him happy because you and I we
    can get him happy, then you and I can make some
    money in the long run. Okay?
    CB:    Have you, ah, ah, my lawyer has met with ah I’m
    surprised you didn’t get a call yet. But maybe you
    will or maybe he tried and maybe they talked again.
    Graham ended this conversation, as he often did, by telling Brown
    not to worry and to trust him.
    Having reviewed these recorded conversations, we conclude
    that the Government reasonably believed that the $1.7 million paid
    by Viewpoint Development was going to Edwin Edwards and that
    Edwards (at Brown’s request) was willing to use his influence to
    increase the share paid directly to Brown.        In other words, when
    FBI Agent Cleveland deduced that “our friend” and “him” referred to
    Edwin Edwards, those allegations were not made with reckless
    disregard for the truth.     We agree with the three district judges
    who have considered this issue before and hold that the allegations
    in   the    affidavit,   which   accurately   summarized   the   recorded
    conversations, support a finding of probable cause.          Therefore,
    Cecil Brown was not entitled to a Franks hearing on his motion to
    suppress the evidence.
    III.   VINDICTIVE PROSECUTION
    22
    The second issue on appeal is whether the district court
    erred in not dismissing the superseding indictment on the grounds
    that the Government was engaged in a vindictive prosecution in
    violation of the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause.      As noted
    above, Brown contends that the Government vindictively added a
    racketeering count and an additional allegation of illegal conduct
    after the district court granted Brown’s motion to dismiss the
    original indictment because of a Speedy Trial Act violation.
    Addressing this issue requires a more detailed review of
    the procedural history of the case.      A grand jury for the Middle
    District of Louisiana returned the original indictment against
    Cecil Brown in November 1999.         A year later, for reasons not
    germane to this appeal, the Fifth Circuit reassigned the case to
    the Eastern District of Louisiana.      The district court, with the
    approval of both parties, continued the trial until February 2001
    in order to allow defense counsel additional time for preparation.
    In December 2000, Cecil Brown moved to dismiss the
    original indictment, citing violations of the Speedy Trial Act.
    The district court conducted a conference by telephone on December
    20, 2000.     According to Brown’s attorney, the Assistant U.S.
    Attorney threatened that if Brown prevailed on the Speedy Trial Act
    motion, the government would seek a new indictment.
    In January 2001, the district court granted Brown’s
    motion to dismiss the original indictment. United States v. Brown,
    
    2001 WL 13337
    (E.D. La.).     As he had indicated before, the AUSA
    23
    quickly obtained a new indictment that included allegations of
    extortion involving the Coushatta Indian Tribe as well as a new
    count    for    violation     of     the   Racketeer   Influenced   and   Corrupt
    Organizations Act (RICO) and a notice of forfeiture under RICO.
    Shortly before the case went to trial in March 2001,
    Cecil Brown moved to dismiss the superseding indictment on the
    grounds that the Government’s decision to bring additional charges
    amounted to prosecutorial vindictiveness in violation of Brown’s
    rights guaranteed by the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.
    See Blackledge v. Perry, 
    417 U.S. 21
    , 25-27, 
    94 S. Ct. 2098
    , 2101-
    02, 
    40 L. Ed. 2d 628
    (1974).                 The district court denied Brown’s
    motion to dismiss the superseding indictment.
    We    review    the     district   court’s    factual      findings
    concerning prosecutorial vindictiveness for clear error and its
    legal determinations de novo.               United States v. Johnson, 
    91 F.3d 695
    , 698 (5th Cir. 1996).
    “If    the     defendant       challenges    as   vindictive     a
    prosecutorial decision to increase the number or severity of
    charges following a successful appeal, the court must examine the
    prosecutor’s actions in the context of the entire proceedings.”
    United States v. Krezdorn, 
    718 F.2d 1360
    , 1364 (5th Cir. 1983) (en
    banc).    And, as Judge DeMoss succinctly put it, “if there is any
    indication that the prosecutor had a legitimate reason . . . for
    increasing the charges, then no presumption of vindictiveness is
    24
    created.”    United States v. Aggarwal, 
    17 F.3d 737
    , 744 (5th Cir.
    1994)(citing 
    Krezdorn, 718 F.2d at 1364
    ).
    The context of the entire proceedings includes the timing
    of the prosecutor’s decision.     
    Johnson, 91 F.3d at 698
    .       While the
    general standard articulated in Krezdorn makes no distinction
    between pre-trial and post-trial decisions, the Supreme Court has
    observed that “a change in the charging decision made after an
    initial trial is completed is much more likely to be improperly
    motivated than is a pretrial decision.”       United States v. Goodwin,
    
    457 U.S. 368
    , 381-82, 
    102 S. Ct. 2485
    , 2492-93, 
    73 L. Ed. 2d 74
    (1982).   Many of our cases, including Krezdorn, have involved new
    indictments following a successful appeal by defendants.              The
    reason is apparent: By the time a case has been tried, the
    Government has discovered and assessed all the relevant information
    and has reached a decision about the extent to which the defendant
    should be prosecuted.    A pre-trial change in the indictment (e.g.,
    following the rejection of a plea agreement) is less likely to be
    deemed vindictive: “In the course of preparing a case for trial,
    the prosecutor may uncover additional information that suggests a
    basis for further prosecution or he simply may come to realize that
    information possessed by the State has a broader significance.”
    
    Goodwin, 457 U.S. at 381-82
    , 102 S.Ct. at 2492-93.
    Krezdorn   suggests   that   we   employ   a   burden-shifting
    framework   for   evaluating   prosecutorial    vindictiveness     claims.
    “Absent a presumption of vindictiveness . . . , the defendant must
    25
    prove that the prosecutor’s conduct was actually vindictive.”
    
    Johnson, 91 F.3d at 698
    .
    Applying these principles, the district court found no
    indication that the prosecutor was acting vindictively.
    First, as the district court pointed out, one should not
    read too much into the fact that 13 months passed between the time
    of the original indictment and the time when the RICO charge and
    Coushatta    allegations   were   added.   The   court   found   that   the
    Government originally indicted Cecil Brown to avoid potential
    problems with the statute of limitations and that the Government
    allowed the case to lie dormant until it had first tried the
    related cases involving Governor Edwards and Insurance Commissioner
    Jim Brown.    When viewed in the light of these facts, “the apparent
    dilatoriness in the change of the original charge evaporates.” The
    fact that the indictment could have been amended earlier to include
    a RICO count and allegations of fraud involving the Coushatta
    Indian Tribe’s casino deal is not probative.
    Second, the district court found that the Government had
    already decided to seek a new indictment before Brown moved to
    dismiss on Speedy Trial Act grounds.       The AUSA filed a statement
    explaining why he thought there was a potential defect in the
    travel fraud counts in the original indictment.            Moreover, the
    Government wanted to seek a forfeiture and to bring in evidence of
    the Coushatta Tribe casino deal.      The Government believed that the
    RICO count would address these problems, and the district court
    26
    accepted this explanation as true. The prosecutor’s explanation is
    further supported by the fact that the Government had filed a
    motion to admit (under Fed. R. Evid. 404(b)) evidence of the
    allegations involving the Coushatta Tribe before Brown filed his
    motion to dismiss for Speedy Trial Act violations.
    Third, the district court reasoned that Brown’s assertion
    of his rights under the Speedy Trial Act was not consequential
    enough to provoke a vindictive response.                  The district court
    informed the parties that, if she found a violation of the Speedy
    Trial Act, she would dismiss the indictment without prejudice
    because of the unusual circumstances of the case. As the dismissal
    was without prejudice, and the prosecutors could not have been
    inconvenienced by Brown’s motion (which was pending for less than
    a month), the district court thought it “extremely unlikely that
    the prosecutor would feel the need to ‘punish a pesky defendant for
    exercising his legal rights’” (citing 
    Goodwin, 457 U.S. at 384
    , 102
    S.Ct. at 2494).
    Finally, the district court rejected Brown’s argument
    that   the    AUSA’s    statements     during      the   telephone    conference
    constitute direct proof of actual vindictiveness.                    During this
    conference, the AUSA indicated that he would seek additional
    charges if the motion to dismiss the original indictment were
    granted.      And,     of   course,   when   the    original   indictment    was
    dismissed, the Government carried through on its promise. However,
    in her order denying the motion to dismiss, the district court
    27
    emphasized that she was on the line during the discussions and that
    “the Court did not perceive the prosecutor’s statements as a
    threat.”   The district court found that “the prosecutor was merely
    giving Brown fair warning that, if forced to reindict, he would
    cure perceived deficiencies in the original indictment that he
    might not have been allowed to correct had trial proceeded as
    scheduled.”
    Brown has failed to show why the district court’s factual
    findings in this matter are clearly erroneous.            Brown insists that
    the AUSA explicitly tied his decision to seek a harsher indictment
    to Brown’s assertion of his rights under the Speedy Trial Act.
    Also,   Brown   argues    that   the   AUSA   knew   about   the   Coushatta
    transactions as early as July 1996, and there was no reason for not
    including them in the indictment.             Even if we accept Brown’s
    assertion on this point, it is not disputed that the Government had
    planned to introduce the Coushatta allegations at trial and that
    the Government had filed a Rule 404(b) motion before Brown filed
    his motion to dismiss.
    In sum, the district court did not err in concluding that
    no   presumption   of    vindictiveness     arises   in   this   case.   The
    Government’s decision to add the new charges and allegations was
    motivated a non-vindictive purpose, namely, to strengthen the
    Government’s case.
    IV.   CONCLUSION
    28
    For the foregoing reasons, the judgment is AFFIRMED.
    29
    KING, Chief Judge, specially concurring:
    With one small exception, I concur fully in Judge Jones’s
    excellent opinion for the panel.               The exception relates to whether
    the     Government        effectively       misrepresented          Patrick    Graham’s
    credibility to the district judge when the agent said, in his
    affidavit, that “[s]ince his cooperation with the FBI, he has never
    been known to provide false or misleading information.”                       The agent
    provided information (about pending indictments and a pending
    federal tax and corruption investigation of Graham) to the district
    judge       that      would    put    the   judge   on   notice      that    Graham   was
    potentially untrustworthy.              Nevertheless, on the basis of Brown’s
    offer of proof, the district judge may not have been fully advised
    (as he should have been) of what may have been the Government’s
    well-founded conviction that Graham was, in fact, untrustworthy.
    But, as Judge Jones has clearly established, even if we assume
    arguendo that the Government was not truthful or sufficiently
    forthcoming on the matter of Graham’s lack of trustworthiness and
    we    set    aside     all    the    allegations    that   are      not   independently
    corroborated, the affidavit still contains enough evidence to
    establish          probable   cause    to   believe      that   a    crime    was   being
    committed.
    30
    DENNIS, Circuit Judge, concurring in the judgment and in Parts I,
    III, and IV of the court’s opinion, and specially concurring in
    Part II:
    In my judgment, Brown satisfied the first prong of the Franks
    v. Delaware3 test by showing that information was omitted from the
    warrant affidavit with intentional or reckless disregard for the
    truth.    I concur in the judgment of the court, however.        When the
    material that was intentionally or recklessly omitted is added, and
    Patrick Graham’s uncorroborated statements are set aside, there
    remains    sufficient   content   in   the   reconstructed   affidavit   to
    support a finding of probable cause for belief that Brown had
    committed, was committing, or was about to commit violations of the
    Hobbs Act.     Consequently, Brown was not entitled to a Franks
    hearing.
    In Franks, the Supreme Court held “that, where the defendant
    makes a substantial preliminary showing that a false statement
    knowingly and intentionally, or with reckless disregard for the
    truth, was included by the affiant in the warrant affidavit, and if
    the allegedly false statement is necessary to the finding of
    3
    
    438 U.S. 154
    (1978).
    -31-
    probable cause, the Fourth Amendment requires that a hearing be
    held at the defendant's request.”4          In summarizing its opinion, the
    Court repeated its holding with “some embellishment”:
    There is, of course, a presumption of validity with
    respect to the affidavit supporting the search warrant.
    To   mandate   an    evidentiary      hearing,      the   challenger’s
    attack must be more than conclusory and must be supported
    by more than a mere desire to cross-examine.                   There must
    be allegations of deliberate falsehood or of reckless
    disregard for the truth, and those allegations must be
    accompanied by an offer of proof.             They should point out
    specifically the portion of the warrant affidavit that is
    claimed to be false; and they should be accompanied by a
    statement of supporting reasons.             Affidavits or sworn or
    otherwise reliable statements of witnesses should be
    furnished, or their absence satisfactorily explained.
    Allegations     of    negligence      or     innocent     mistake    are
    insufficient.         The   deliberate       falsity      or    reckless
    disregard whose impeachment is permitted today is only
    that   of    the     affiant,   not     of    any    nongovernmental
    informant.     Finally, if these requirements are met, and
    if, when material that is the subject of the alleged
    falsity or reckless disregard is set to one side, there
    4
    
    Id. at 155–56.
    -32-
    remains sufficient content in the warrant affidavit to
    support a finding of probable cause, no hearing is
    required. On the other hand, if the remaining content is
    insufficient, the defendant is entitled, under the Fourth
    and Fourteenth Amendments, to his hearing.             Whether he
    will prevail at that hearing is, of course, another
    issue.5
    In   this   circuit,    “[o]missions       or   misrepresentations   can
    constitute improper government behavior.”6 “By reporting less than
    the total    story,   an    affiant   can    manipulate   the   inferences   a
    magistrate will draw.       To allow a magistrate to be misled in such
    a manner could denude the probable cause requirement of all real
    meaning.”7     We therefore apply Franks to instances of omission.8
    To warrant a Franks hearing, the exclusion of the information must
    reflect intentional or reckless misconduct by the affiant, and the
    omitted facts must be material.9             “Clear proof of deliberate or
    5
    
    Id. at 171–72.
         6
    United States v. Tomblin, 
    46 F.3d 1369
    , 1377 (5th Cir. 1995)
    (citing United States v. Stanert, 
    762 F.2d 775
    , 781 (9th Cir.
    1985)).
    7
    
    Stanert, 762 F.2d at 781
    .
    8
    United States v. Bankston, 
    182 F.3d 296
    , 305 (5th Cir. 1999),
    rev’d in part on other grounds, Cleveland v. United States, 
    531 U.S. 12
    (2000).
    9
    See 
    Tomblin, 46 F.3d at 1377
    .
    -33-
    reckless omission is not required. . . .                 At this stage, all that
    is required is that the defendant make a substantial showing that
    the affiant intentionally or recklessly omitted facts required to
    prevent technically true statements in the affidavit from being
    misleading.”10
    Furthermore, we have agreed with and adopted the holding of
    several other circuits “that a deliberate or reckless misstatement
    or omission by a governmental official who is not the affiant may
    nevertheless form the basis of a Franks claim.”11                     Indeed, the
    Supreme Court noted in Franks that “police [can]not insulate one
    officer’s deliberate misstatements merely by relaying it through an
    officer-affiant personally ignorant of its falsity.”12 Accordingly,
    a   defendant     is   entitled    to   a   Franks       hearing   upon   making   a
    substantial      preliminary      showing    that    a    governmental    official
    deliberately or recklessly caused facts that preclude a finding of
    10
    
    Stanert, 762 F.2d at 781
    .        See 
    Franks, 438 U.S. at 171
    .
    11
    Hart v. O’Brien, 
    127 F.3d 424
    , 448 (5th Cir. 1997) (citing
    United States v. Wapnick, 
    60 F.3d 948
    , 956 (2d Cir. 1995); United
    States v. DeLeon, 
    979 F.2d 761
    , 764 (9th Cir. 1992) (“A deliberate
    or reckless omission by a government official who is not the
    affiant can be the basis for a Franks suppression.      The Fourth
    Amendment places restrictions and qualifications on the actions of
    the government generally, not merely on affiants.”); United States
    v. Calisto, 
    838 F.2d 711
    , 714 (3d Cir. 1988); United States v.
    Pritchard, 
    745 F.2d 1112
    , 1118 (7th Cir. 1984)), abrogated on other
    grounds by Kalina v. Fletcher, 
    522 U.S. 118
    (1997).
    12
    
    Franks, 438 U.S. at 164
    n.6.
    -34-
    probable cause to be omitted from a warrant affidavit, even if the
    governmental official at fault is not the affiant.
    In    challenging      the    presumption      of    validity   afforded   the
    affidavit supporting the wiretap order, Brown alleged, in his
    motion to suppress, that the affidavit of FBI Special Agent Freddy
    N. Cleveland was “materially misleading.”                   In particular, Brown
    contended that the government intentionally misled Judge Walter as
    to the trustworthiness of its cooperating witness, Patrick Graham,
    and   misrepresented         the    content    of    the   consensually     recorded
    conversations between Graham and Brown.                     In support of those
    allegations, Brown submitted to the district court an offer of
    proof      consisting   of    ten    volumes    of    exhibits.       The   exhibits
    included: (1) a transcript of testimony given by former Assistant
    United States Attorney (“AUSA”) Steven J. Irwin before a federal
    bankruptcy court in Houston, Texas, on September 16, 1996;13 (2)
    transcripts of deposition testimony given by Irwin and James B.
    Letten in November 2000;14 (3) various news articles recounting
    13
    Irwin appeared before the bankruptcy court in support of the
    government’s ex parte motion to stay proceedings in a case that
    involved Michael Graham’s wife. Michael Graham, who reached a deal
    with the government at the same time as his brother Patrick, was
    scheduled to testify in that case. In requesting the stay, the
    government apparently argued that the bankruptcy proceedings (and
    Michael Graham’s testimony therein) could jeopardize its undercover
    operations in Louisiana.
    14
    Letten, who was the First Assistant United States Attorney
    at the time of his deposition, is currently the Acting United
    States Attorney for the Eastern District of Louisiana. Letten and
    Irwin were deposed on different dates in November 2000 by a
    -35-
    Graham’s criminal history; and (4) the full transcripts of the
    consensually recorded conversations.
    In his June 26, 1996 affidavit, Cleveland indicated that his
    cooperating witness was credible: “[Patrick Graham] has provided
    information to Special Agents of the FBI since April 30, 1996.
    Since his cooperation with the FBI, he has never been known to
    provide false or misleading information.”15    Brown’s offer of proof
    demonstrates, however, that the government knew, as early as April
    1996, that Graham was thoroughly dishonest and had a reputation in
    Texas for engaging in fraudulent and deceptive practices.        The
    offer of proof also indicates that the affidavit purposefully
    understated the seriousness of the criminal matters that were
    pending against Graham in Texas and the magnitude of Graham’s
    incentive to provide false information about Brown and Edwin
    Edwards in order to curry favor with federal prosecutors in both
    Louisiana and Texas.      Thus, Cleveland’s affidavit reported “less
    defendant in a federal criminal case entitled United States v.
    James Anthum Collins and Yank Barry, No. 98-18 (S.D. Tex.). The
    defendants in that case were the former Executive Director of the
    Texas Department of Criminal Justice (Collins) and the president of
    VitaPro Foods, Inc. (Barry).      VitaPro sold a high-protein soy
    product that was used as a meat substitute in penal institutions.
    The government alleged that Barry paid Collins at least $20,000 to
    gain approval for a five-year multimillion-dollar contract with the
    Department of Criminal Justice.      Patrick Graham, who solicited
    business for VitaPro in Louisiana, informed the federal government
    that the Texas VitaPro deal was a bribe scheme and served as the
    government’s key witness at trial.
    15
    Def.’s Mot. Suppress Ex. 5-B, Cleveland Aff. ¶ 15.
    -36-
    than the total story” to Judge Walter.16       By omitting information
    concerning Graham’s character and vouching for his trustworthiness,
    the government created a false impression of Graham’s reliability,
    which likely misled the issuing judge.
    In his November 2000 deposition, Irwin, the AUSA who applied
    for the wiretap order, was asked whether he was aware, in April
    1996, that Patrick and Michael Graham were swindlers and “con men”
    who lacked credibility.      Irwin responded, “We knew what we were
    buying when we bought into them.”17      He explained that the Grahams
    initially approached him through their attorney Charles Blau.18
    After preliminary discussions with Blau, Irwin ran a Lexis/Nexis
    search and “reams and reams and reams of material came out about
    Patrick Graham and Michael Graham and the various schemes that they
    were involved in.”19    The search certainly would have uncovered the
    widely reported details of Patrick Graham’s January 1996 arrest for
    accepting a $150,000 down payment on a $750,000 total fee for
    arranging the escape of a convicted wife-murderer from a maximum-
    16
    United States v. Stanert, 
    762 F.2d 775
    , 781 (9th Cir. 1985).
    17
    Def.’s Mot. Suppress Ex. 27 at 42.
    18
    Blau approached Irwin at a gambling corruption seminar held
    at the Grand Hotel in Gulfport, Mississippi, on April 19–20, 1996.
    Irwin was a panelist at the seminar.
    19
    Def.’s Mot. Suppress Ex. 27 at 14.
    -37-
    security prison in Texas.20   Irwin concluded, from the “reams of
    material” available to the government, that if the Grahams said,
    “‘It’s raining outside,’ somebody better go outside and come back
    wet.”21
    As his deposition makes clear, Irwin reached this conclusion
    on the Grahams’ trustworthiness prior to April 30, 1996, the date
    that Patrick Graham began cooperating with the government. Irwin’s
    September 1996 testimony before the bankruptcy court is fully
    consistent with this early-held opinion of Graham’s bad character:
    “I’m not defending the Grahams as good people; they’re not. . . .
    They’re as bad as they come. . . . [T]he things that we’re not able
    to independently corroborate, we believe are lies.    And that’s the
    way it has to be when you deal with the Grahams.”22   In sum, Irwin’s
    20
    Newspaper articles reporting the January 4, 1996 arrest were
    available in the Lexis/Nexis database shortly thereafter.       See,
    e.g., Christy Hoppe, Prison Developer Accused of Seeking Money to
    Help Dallas Killer Escape, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Jan. 6, 1996, at 1A,
    available at LEXIS, News, Dallas Morning News File (load date: Jan.
    8, 1996). Although Irwin confirmed in his deposition that he knew
    about the foiled jailbreak plan in April 1996, the wiretap
    application did not provide Judge Walter with the details of this
    disturbing crime. Rather, the government advised only that Graham
    had been indicted by the Grand Jury in Harris County, Texas, for
    one count of money laundering and one count of theft by sting.
    21
    Def.’s Mot. Suppress Ex. 27 at 47. Shortly after the Grahams
    began cooperating with federal authorities in Louisiana, AUSAs for
    the Southern District of Texas warned Irwin to “[b]e careful,
    because you’re reaching into a bad box of snakes.” 
    Id. at 41.
         22
    Def.’s Mot. Suppress Ex. 2, 9/16/96 Hr’g Tr. at 30. Although
    the bankruptcy-court testimony was given nearly three months after
    the issuance of the wiretap order, Irwin’s November 2000 deposition
    establishes that the testimony concerning the Grahams’ credibility
    -38-
    testimony at his deposition and in the bankruptcy-court establishes
    that, beginning shortly after his first knowledge of Patrick
    Graham, Irwin and other federal officials continuously viewed
    Graham as an unreliable person whose information was worthless in
    the absence of independent corroboration.
    Soon after becoming an informant, Graham proved that the
    government’s distrust of him was justified.         In his deposition,
    Letten characterized the government’s deal with the Grahams, which
    was never reduced to writing, as an “informal cooperation agreement
    with use/derivative use immunity” covering only offenses committed
    in   Louisiana.23    The    Grahams,     however,   wanted     multistate
    transactional immunity, and, even though they did not receive it,
    they represented to others that they had.24         In a May 23, 1996
    letter to Charles Blau, AUSA Peter G. Strasser complained that the
    Grahams   had   recently   told   attorney   Dan    Cogdell,    who   was
    representing Patrick Graham in the Texas jailbreak prosecution,
    was not based on fresh information but reflected, instead,
    conclusions that Irwin reached during his April 1996 background
    research on the Grahams.
    23
    Def.’s Mot. Suppress Ex. 28 at 85. Use immunity—also termed
    use/derivative-use immunity—is “[i]mmunity from the use of the
    compelled testimony (or any information derived from that
    testimony) in a future prosecution against the witness.” BLACK’S LAW
    DICTIONARY 754 (7th ed. 1999).
    24
    Transactional immunity is “[i]mmunity from prosecution for
    any event or transaction described in the compelled testimony.
    This is the broadest form of immunity.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 754
    (7th ed. 1999).
    -39-
    that they had “‘immunity for (their) actions in Louisiana and
    Texas,’” a representation that was, in Strasser’s words, “simply
    wrong.”25   Thus, less than one month after Patrick Graham began
    cooperating, he was already misrepresenting his “deal” in an effort
    to broaden the scope of the immunity conferred on him by the
    government.26
    By virtue of his role in the investigation, Cleveland must
    have known that Graham had provided false or misleading information
    about his cooperation/immunity agreement; in fact, Strasser sent
    Cleveland a copy of his letter to Blau.   Yet, in his June 26, 1996
    affidavit, Cleveland declared that Patrick Graham “has never been
    known to provide false or misleading information” since he began
    cooperating with the government.   Because Cleveland may have meant
    that Graham had not been known to provide false or misleading
    information to the government (Cleveland stated, in the preceding
    sentence, that Graham “ha[d] provided information to Special Agents
    of the FBI since April 30, 1996"), that declaration may not qualify
    25
    AUSA Strasser was Irwin’s immediate supervisor and had
    participated in the initial meetings with Blau and the Grahams.
    The letter appears in Brown’s offer of proof as an exhibit to the
    November 2000 deposition of James B. Letten.     See Def.’s Mot.
    Suppress Ex. 29, Def.’s Ex. 106.
    26
    In his November 2000 deposition, Irwin acknowledged the
    government’s initial concern that the Grahams would later
    mischaracterize the deal: “[D]id I think the Grahams for one minute
    would come back , try to—to say the deal was something other than
    what it was? Absolutely.” Def.’s Mot. Suppress Ex. 27 at 43.
    -40-
    as    a        deliberate      falsehood,      but     it    is   certainly    misleading.
    Cleveland knew that Graham was unreliable and that his mendacious
    conduct continued even after April 30.                       In assuring the magistrate
    that Graham had been truthful with the government for a two-month
    period, Cleveland suppressed that knowledge and created the false
    impression that Graham was, in fact, reliable.
    As Brown’s counsel argues, if the government had disclosed its
    knowledge concerning the dishonesty and bad character of Graham,
    the district court may have refused to sign the wiretap order or
    “requir[ed]            the    applicant   to    furnish       additional      testimony   or
    documentary evidence in support of the application.”27                           After all,
    “it is the magistrate who must determine independently whether
    there is probable cause . . . .”28                     “He may question the affiant,
    or    summon          other    persons    to    give        testimony   at     the   warrant
    proceeding.”29           Much of the information contained in the affidavit,
    particularly            the    allegations      concerning        the   genesis      of   the
    extortion scheme, was based on the uncorroborated statements of
    Graham. If the issuing judge gave credence to those statements, he
    did   so         in   reliance    on   the     false    impression      that    Graham    was
    reliable.             Thus, to prevent the affidavit from being misleading,
    Cleveland should have advised the issuing judge that Patrick Graham
    27
    18 U.S.C. § 2518(2).
    28
    Franks v. Delaware, 
    438 U.S. 154
    , 165 (1978).
    29
    
    Id. at 166.
    -41-
    was untrustworthy and that the government did not believe his
    uncorroborated statements.       The omission of this information from
    the affidavit reflects intentional misconduct or, at the very
    least, a “reckless disregard for the truth.”30
    Brown also alleges that Cleveland misrepresented the content
    of the consensually recorded conversations. There is a substantial
    showing to this effect with respect to one important segment of the
    May 8, 1996 conversation between Graham and Brown. In paragraph 30
    of   the     affidavit,   Cleveland   recites    the   following   from   that
    conversation:
    GRAHAM:      . . . Ah, I want EDWIN to be comfortable,
    okay?   I can’t afford anything to go wrong
    with this deal. All right? So we’ve got to
    get him, whatever that portion is covered
    first. . .
    BROWN:       Yeah.31
    This recitation, a product of the government’s calculated editing,
    presents the excerpt as an acknowledgment by Brown that Edwin
    Edwards would receive a portion of the payment that Brown was
    seeking from Graham and his partners.           In the actual conversation,
    however, Brown conveyed a much different message.           As indicated by
    the ellipsis mark, Cleveland omitted the statement and question
    immediately preceding Brown’s affirmative response:
    30
    
    Id. at 155.
          31
    Def.’s Mot. Suppress Ex. 5-B, Cleveland Aff. ¶ 30.
    -42-
    GRAHAM:        . . . Ah, I want EDWIN to be comfortable,
    okay? I can’t afford anything to go wrong on
    this deal. All right? So we’ve got to get
    him, whatever that portion is covered first.
    All I want to do is drag you out and I’m not
    gonna drag you out more than 90 days on yours.
    Okay?
    BROWN:         Yeah.32
    Thus, it appears more likely that Brown was responding to the
    latter question pertaining to a delay in his payment rather than
    Graham’s first question regarding his (Graham’s) desire to make
    “EDWIN” comfortable.          More importantly, Cleveland did not inform
    Judge Walter as to the very next words spoken by Brown, which
    contain a flat denial that any money was going to Edwards:
    GRAHAM:        I just don’t . . . ah, you know, you never
    have told me what the . . . the . . . the
    sharing ratio is.
    BROWN:         He doesn’t get any.        I get it all.    I want
    half right away.33
    During the remainder of their conversation that day, Graham
    made several other attempts to secure Brown’s acknowledgment that
    Edwards would be receiving a share of the extortion proceeds.             In
    my opinion, Brown’s subsequent inconsistent and ambiguous responses
    failed to provide an adequate basis for reaching such a conclusion
    as a matter of probable cause, as opposed to a mere suspicion.
    Although        analyzing     the   recorded   conversations   to   determine
    32
    Def.’s Mot. Suppress Ex. 7, 5/8/96 Tr. at 3.
    33
    
    Id. -43- Edwards’s
    probable role is ultimately unnecessary to a disposition
    of Brown’s appeal, I conclude that the Cleveland affidavit omitted
    the facts of Brown’s flat denial of the existence of an Edwards
    portion and Graham’s other unsuccessful efforts with reckless
    disregard for the truth and for the omissions’ tendency to mislead
    the magistrate.       By burying this information and offering, in
    corroboration of Graham’s story, an excerpt that was misleadingly
    edited and taken out of context, the government tried to make the
    probable cause determination appear uncomplicated.          The government
    should have afforded Judge Walter the opportunity to interpret and
    weigh Brown’s denial and his ambiguous statements within the
    context of the entire conversation rather than misrepresenting a
    single excerpt in order to compel the court to decide in its favor.
    For the foregoing reasons, I conclude that Brown satisfied the
    first prong of the Franks test by making a substantial preliminary
    showing that the government intentionally or recklessly omitted
    facts from the warrant affidavit, causing the information actually
    reported to be misleading.
    Turning     to   the   second   prong   of   Franks,   Brown   is   not
    constitutionally entitled to a hearing unless he shows that the
    omissions are material.34      “Identifying intentional omissions and
    misstatements is not enough . . . .”35            Our inquiry, then, is
    34
    United States v. Meling, 
    47 F.3d 1546
    , 1554 (9th Cir. 1995).
    35
    
    Id. -44- whether
    the reconstructed affidavit establishes probable cause to
    believe that Brown had committed or was committing a crime.36            We
    reconstruct the Cleveland affidavit by supplying the omissions and
    setting      aside   all   of   Graham’s     allegations   that   are   not
    independently corroborated.37          Because there remains sufficient
    content in the corrected affidavit to support a finding of probable
    cause, the district court’s judgment must be affirmed.
    The Hobbs Act makes it a crime for anyone to obstruct, or
    attempt to obstruct, commerce by extortion.38 “The term ‘extortion’
    means the obtaining of [(or attempting to obtain)] property from
    another, with his consent, induced by wrongful use of actual or
    threatened force, violence, or fear . . . .”39              “Extortion by
    wrongful use of fear includes fear of economic harm.”40                 The
    excerpts      from   and   summaries    of   the   consensually   recorded
    36
    United States v. Bankston, 
    182 F.3d 296
    , 305–06 (5th Cir.
    1999), rev’d in part on other grounds, Cleveland v. United States,
    
    531 U.S. 12
    (2000). See also United States v. Stanert, 
    762 F.2d 775
    , 782 (9th Cir. 1985) (“Standing alone, [a defendant’s]
    substantial preliminary showing that the affidavit contained
    reckless or deliberate falsities and omissions is insufficient to
    warrant a Franks hearing. A defendant challenging an affidavit
    must also show that the affidavit purged of those falsities and
    supplemented by the omissions would not be sufficient to support a
    finding of probable cause.”).
    37
    See 
    Bankston, 182 F.3d at 305
    ; 
    Stanert, 762 F.2d at 782
    .
    38
    See 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a).
    39
    
    Id. § 1951(b)(2).
         40
    United States v. Tomblin, 
    46 F.3d 1369
    , 1384 (5th Cir. 1995).
    -45-
    conversations that would appear in the corrected affidavit provide
    independent corroboration for the following aspects of Graham’s
    story: (1) Cecil Brown was attempting to obtain property (money)
    from Graham and his associates with their consent;41 (2) Brown
    threatened Graham and his associates with economic loss; and (3)
    Graham’s group took the threats seriously, and it was reasonable
    for them to do so, because of Brown’s close relationship with Edwin
    Edwards.      For example, in a June 7, 1996 conversation, which is
    recounted in the affidavit, Brown warned Graham that he should be
    receiving a call from the Secretary of the Louisiana Department of
    Corrections.      I agree with Judge Jones that “the import of this
    threat is clear: The Louisiana Department of Corrections could
    delay the Jena prison project; and if Graham and his partners
    wanted their sale to proceed as planned, they should consider
    increasing the money paid directly to Brown.”42       Moreover, the
    reconstructed affidavit, taken as a whole, would supply reasonable
    grounds for believing that Graham and his group feared that Brown
    would make good on his threats to delay the project if he did not
    41
    Graham was a Texas citizen representing a Texas corporation,
    Viewpoint Development Corporation, that had an interest in a
    private prison project in Louisiana; thus, the “effect on
    interstate commerce” element of the Hobbs Act was undoubtedly
    satisfied. See United States v. Villafranca, 
    260 F.3d 374
    , 377
    (5th Cir. 2001) (stating that “the Hobbs Act’s required effect on
    interstate commerce is identical with the requirements of federal
    jurisdiction under the Commerce Clause”).
    42
    Op. at 21–22.
    -46-
    receive a satisfactory amount of money.                    Put differently, the
    content remaining in the affidavit would establish probable cause
    to believe that Brown had committed, was committing, or was about
    to commit a Hobbs Act violation.               Because a valid wiretap order
    could issue on the basis of the reconstructed affidavit, “no
    hearing is required” under Franks.43
    In conclusion, Brown’s offer of proof convinces me that the
    government knew Patrick Graham was untrustworthy at the time it
    applied     for    the   wiretap   order.    It    is    also   evident   that   the
    government        carefully   crafted      its     application,      omitting    its
    assessment of Graham’s credibility as well as key facts concerning
    his misdeeds, in an effort to prevent Judge Walter from reaching a
    similar      view     on   the     issue    of     Graham’s        trustworthiness.
    Furthermore,        through   intentional         or    reckless    omission,    the
    Cleveland affidavit misrepresented the corroborative strength of at
    least one excerpt from the recorded conversations.                    Such conduct
    falls short of the ethical standards that the government should
    observe when it seeks authorization to intrude so profoundly on the
    privacy of its citizens.           But these findings are of no benefit to
    Brown under the Franks standard because he failed to show that the
    reconstructed affidavit is not sufficient to support a finding of
    probable     cause.        Perhaps    identifying         false    statements    and
    deliberate or reckless omissions by an affiant that tend to mislead
    43
    Franks v. Delaware, 
    438 U.S. 154
    , 172 (1978).
    -47-
    an issuing judge should be enough to entitle a criminal defendant
    to an evidentiary hearing on a motion to suppress, but the Supreme
    Court has determined otherwise.   Under the rigid test established
    in Franks, the district court properly denied Brown’s request.
    -48-