Granger v. Chrstn Hlth Mnstry ( 2003 )

United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
F I L E D
April 17, 2003
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
Charles R. Fulbruge III
Clerk
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
No. 02-30736
(Summary Calendar)
VALERIE GRANGER, DOCTOR
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
CHRISTIAN HEALTH MINISTRIES; BAPTIST COMMUNITY MINISTRIES;
MCFARLAND INSTITUTE; MANAGEMENT EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE; BYRON
HARRELL; EUGENE HUFFSTUTLER; JO LAXTON
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Louisiana
(01:-CV-2199)
Before JONES, STEWART, and DENNIS, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Dr. Valerie Granger (“Granger”) appeals the district court’s grant of summary judgment to
Christian Health Ministries (“Christian Health”) regarding her claim for race discrimination under
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited
circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et. seq.1 Christian Health,
Christian Health Ministries Foundation, Baptist Community Ministries, the McFarland Institute, the
Management Executive Committee, Byron Harrell, Reverend Eugene Huffstutler, and Jo Laxton
(collectively, the “Defendants”) also move to impose sanctions on Dr. Granger under Rule 38 of the
FEDERAL RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE. For the following reasons, we are persuaded that 1) the
district court’s grant of summary judgment was proper, 2) Dr. Granger’s appeal is frivolous, and 3)
sanctions against Dr. Granger are warranted.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On October 8, 1997, Dr. Granger began her employment with Christian Health, as Director
of the Congregational Wellness Program. On October 13, 2000, Dr. Granger was terminated based
on, amongst other things, her work history being replete with examples of poor judgment,
misrepresentations, and acts of direct insubordination. Dr. Granger was subsequently replaced by two
part-time employees, both of whom are Caucasian.
On November 8, 2000, Dr. Granger filed a charge of employment discrimination with the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission which issued a notice of right to sue. On June 11, 2001,
Dr. Granger filed a lawsuit in state court against the Defendants alleging employment discrimination
on the basis of race, defamation, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. Following removal
to federal court and various amendments by Dr. Granger to her complaint, the district court entered
an order dismissing Dr. Granger’s claims against all of the Defendants, except for her employment
1
Although Dr. Granger appealed the district court’s rulings with respect to all of her claims
against the Defendants, in her appellate brief, Dr. Granger only addresses the district court grant of
summary judgment to Christian Health regarding her Title VII claim. Thus, the remaining claims not
briefed are waived and will not be considered. See Trust Co. of Louisiana v. N.N.P. Inc., 104 F.3d
1478, 1485 (5th Cir. 1997).
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discrimination claims against Christian Health, Christian Health Ministries Foundation, and Baptist
Community Ministries. Dr. Granger voluntarily dismissed her claims against Christian Health
Ministries Foundation and Baptist Community Ministries. The district court subsequently granted
summary judgment to Christian Health on Dr. Granger’s Title VII claim.
DISCUSSION
We review a district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo. See Mowbray v. Cameron
County, Tex., 274 F.3d 269, 278 (5th Cir. 2001). Summary judgment is appropriate only when the
record indicat es “no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.” FED. R. CIV. P. 56.
I. Title VII claim
Under Title VII, the plaintiff bears the burden of proving a prima facie case of discrimination
by a preponderance of the evidence. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 801-03
(1973). To establish a prima facie case for disparate treatment, the plaintiff must prove that: 1) she
is a member of a protected class; 2) she was at all times qualified for the position at issue; 3) she
suffered an adverse employment action; and 4) others similarly situated were treated more favorably.
See Rutherford v. Harris County, TX, 197 F.3d 173, 184 (5th Cir. 1999). An employer seeking to
rebut a prima facie case of employment discrimination, need only "articulate" a legitimate non-
discriminatory reason for its actions. Id. If the employer carries its burden of production, the plaintiff
must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the employer's reasons are a mere pretext for
discrimination. Id.The district court found that Dr. Granger failed to establish the fourth prong of her prima facie
case for disparate treatment. We agree. Dr. Granger has not demonstrated that similarly situated
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white employees were treated more favorably. A review of the record reveals that Dr. Granger
conclusorily stated in her opposition to summary judgment before the district court that “no other
Anglo director or employee has been disciplined to the same degree as [herself.]” Dr. Granger does
not address this issue in her appellate brief and has offered no evidence to support her claim. As such,
we conclude that Dr. Granger has failed to establish a prima facie case of discrimination.
Moreover, Christian Health proffered legitimate reasons for terminating Dr. Granger. After
reviewing the record, we are persuaded that Christian Health terminated Dr. Granger because of her
problems with organization and time management, inability to communicate well with others, poor
judgment, failure to follow company policy and procedures, faulty work, failure to comply with
instructions for supervisory personnel, and acts of direct subordination. Dr. Granger has not put forth
any evidence demonstrating that the reasons articulated by Christian Health are pretexts for
discrimination. Thus, the district court’s grant of summary judgment was appropriate.
II. Motion for Sanctions
Rule 38 of the Federal Rules o f Appellate Procedure provides that “[i]f a court of appeals
determines that an appeal is frivolous, it may, after a separately filed motion or notice from the court
and reasonable opportunity to respond, award just damages and single or double costs to the
appellee.” An appeal is frivolous if it relies on legal points that are not arguable on the merits. See
Walker v. City of Bogalusa, 168 F.3d 237, 241 (5th Cir. 1999) (internal quotation marks omitted).
We are persuaded that Dr. Granger’s appeal is frivolous. As stated above, the record contains
abundant evidence demonstrating Christian Health’s non-discriminatory reasons for Dr. Granger’s
termination. Dr. Granger’s appellate brief is devoid of any discussion regarding whether similarly
situated individuals were treated favorably and whether Christian Health’s proffered reasons were
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pretexts for discrimination.2
Thus, sanctions are warranted to the extent that they seek to recover the costs for defending
this appeal. The costs and fees are to be borne by Dr. Granger. We direct Christian Health to file a
bill of costs together with an affidavit setting forth expenses and attorney’s fees reasonably incurred
by it in connection with this appeal.
CONCLUSION
Dr. Granger’s appeal is dismissed as frivolous; the Defendants’ motion for sanctions is
granted; Christian Health is directed to file verified bill of costs and attorney’s fees.
2
Dr. Granger’s brief makes no credible attempt to point to any evidence which could possibly
support her contention that the district court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of Christian
Health. The brief simply outlines the framework for granting summary judgment and analyzing
discrimination claims under McDonnell Douglas.
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