Manieri v. Layirrison ( 1999 )

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
_____________________
No. 98-31236
_____________________
WAYNE MANIERI,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
JAMES E. LAYIRRISON; ET AL,
Defendants,
KENNY GIACONE; MICHAEL DEAN; TANGIPAHOA PARISH
SHERIFF’S OFFICE; J. EDWARD LAYIRRISON, Sheriff;
TANGIPAHOA PARISH COUNCIL PRESIDENT GOVERNMENT, also
known as Parish of Tangipahoa; and GLENN CACIOPPO,
Defendants-Appellees.
_________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Louisiana
(98-CV-501-D)
_________________________________________________________________
October 27, 1999
Before KING, Chief Judge, POLITZ and STEWART, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Plaintiff-Appellant Wayne Manieri appeals from the district
court’s dismissal of his complaint against Defendants-Appellees.
For the reasons stated below we AFFIRM in part and REVERSE in
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that
this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except
under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
part.
Manieri originally filed this action in the United States
District Court for the Middle District of Louisiana (the “Middle
District”) alleging that Appellees violated his state and federal
civil rights when they injured him during an arrest. The Middle
District had personal jurisdiction over the parties but was an
improper venue. The Middle District subsequently transferred
this case to the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Louisiana (the “Eastern District”) because it found
that the Eastern District was “the most correct forum and
Tangipahoa Parish is located in the Eastern District.” While the
transfer order did not specify the authority relied upon in
transferring the case, it seems clear that the transfer was
effected under 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a), which provides for the
transfer of cases that “lay[] venue in the wrong...district.”
The Eastern District subsequently dismissed Manieri’s claims
as time-barred. We review the court’s dismissal de novo.
Anderson v. Pasadena Indp. School Dist., 184 F.3d 439, 443 (5th
Cir. 1999).
Manieri asserts federal civil rights claims under 42 U.S.C.
§§ 1983, 1985, and 1986. Because there is no federal statute of
limitations governing these sections, federal courts borrow the
most appropriate statute of limitations from the forum state in
which the action is brought. See Moore v. McDonald, 30 F.3d 616,
620 (5th Cir. 1994). The analogous statute of limitations under
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Louisiana law provides for a one year prescriptive period. See
La. Civ. Code. Ann. art. 3492 (West 1994). Louisiana law also
dictates that the prescriptive period is tolled upon filing. See
La. Civ. Code. Ann. art 3462 (West 1994). If the case is filed
in the incorrect venue, however, the prescriptive period is not
tolled until the defendant is served with process. Id.The Eastern District reasoned that because Manieri
originally filed in an improper venue, and subsequently failed to
serve Appellees within the prescriptive period, his action was
time-barred. See La. Civ. Code Ann. art. 3462 (West 1994). It
is undisputed that Manieri failed to serve Appellees within the
one-year prescriptive period. Nor is it disputed that Manieri
served Appellees within the 120-day time period provided by Fed.
R. Civ. P. 4(m).
In their briefs, the parties’ arguments center around what
transfer statute was used to transfer the case. This argument
misses the mark. The decisive issue in this case is whether
Article 3462 applies to Manieri’s federal claims. If Article
3462 applies, Manieri’s claims were prescribed in the Middle
District and would have been equally prescribed in the Eastern
District, regardless of the statute used to transfer the case.
In cases based on federal law, Article 3462 will not bar a
claim if the claim is filed within the prescriptive period and
served on the defendants within the time period provided by the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The Supreme Court has
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expressly rejected the notion that “when a federal court borrows
a statute of limitations to apply to a federal cause of action,
the statute of limitation’s provisions for service must
necessarily also be followed.” West v. Conrail, 481 U.S. 35, 39
(1987). More recently, the Supreme Court recognized that if a
case is in federal court on a state-created right “a plaintiff
must serve process before the statue of limitations has run, if
state law so requires for a similar state-court suit.” Henderson
v. United States, 517 U.S. 653, 657 n.2 (1996). The Court
continued, however, that “[i]n a suit on a right created by
federal law, filing a complaint suffices to satisfy the statute
of limitations.” Id.This court has held the same. In McGuire v. Turnbo, 137
F.3d 321, 324 (5th Cir. 1998), we held that Texas’s requirement
that a plaintiff exercise “continuous due diligence” in serving a
defendant to toll the statue of limitations does not apply to
claims based on federal law and pursued in federal court. More
specifically, we have held that Texas’s “due diligence”
requirement “does not apply to section 1983 actions in Texas
federal court.” Gonzales v. Wyatt, 157 F.3d 1016, 1021 n.1 (5th
Cir. 1998) (citing Jackson v. Duke, 259 F.2d 3, n.6 (5th Cir.
1958)). The reasoning in these cases is equally applicable to
Article 3462.
We hold that Article 3462 does not extinguish a federal
claim, filed within the prescriptive period in a federal court of
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competent jurisdiction and served in compliance with the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure. Because Manieri filed his federal
claims in a federal court of competent jurisdiction within the
prescriptive period and served Appellees within the time period
provided by Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m), the district court erred in
dismissing these claims as time-barred. This holding serves only
to rescue Manieri’s federal claims. Manieri’s state claims are
still barred by operation of Article 3462.
For the foregoing reasons we AFFIRM the district court’s
judgment dismissing Plaintiff-Appellant’s state law claims and
REVERSE the judgment to the extent that it dismisses claims based
on federal law. Appellees shall bear the costs of this appeal.
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